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This PhD thesis investigates the foundation for a generic philosophy of partnering
in dance, providing a framework for evaluating the act of dancing together. Drawing
primarily from the analytic philosophies of Catherine Elgin, Margaret Gilbert, H. Paul
Grice, and Annette Baier, the thesis lays out the sufficient conditions for dancing together
in the strong sense, which I argue is what constitutes ‘partnering’. From improvisation to 
complex and intricate choreography, dancing together seems to be predicated on certain 
conditions. Moreover, dancing together can be evaluated from a multiplicity of
perspectives and makes the joint act of partnering (whether it is a dyad, trio, or more)
subject to questions about values. But evaluating value is problematic. The thesis argues
that when we understand the conditions that underpin an interaction, a much more complete
picture of what it is people are doing in dancing together is achieved. The aim of this study 
from an epistemological perspective is thus threefold: to critically investigate 1) the
conditions of dancing together in the strong sense, 2) the normative problems that arise
given the underpinning conditions, and 3) the ethical dimensions of trust and moral agency 
in dancing together.
Rather than focusing on how individuals dance together, this thesis interrogates
what the necessary conditions are in order to dance together. The thesis unfolds the terrain 
of associated concepts in dancing together and sets the terms in which partnering can be
framed. Through hypothetical scenarios, thought experiments, and a close reading of how
partnering operates in a filmed recording of Jiri Kylian’s Petite Mort, the thesis lays out
the sufficient conditions of establishing and maintaining a joint commitment to dance
together. Abstracting the principles from specific dance environments is an intentional
move to understand the relationship between aesthetic values and ethical concerns within
partnered movement on a broader scale. In so doing, this thesis provides a unique,
systematic examination of partnering, which contributes to scholarship that is applicable in
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Chapter One: Introduction
For the majority of my teenage years, I spent weekends and weekdays alike
practicing partnering as a competitive Latin/Ballroom dancer. I trained first at a local
studio, which was a central hub of youth ‘DanceSport’ (also known as competitive
Latin/Ballroom dancing) athletes and, as I grew older, began participating in national and 
international competitions. One of my main coaches was world champion Vibeke Toft,
who introduced me to a number of ideas about dancing together. These ideas centered on
the way partners negotiate their relationship in dancing together, how to listen and interpret
music together, and how to emphasize or create different narratives by playing with
different qualities of movement.
To pay for my classes, I began teaching the many pre-teens and junior competitors
at my local studio, as well as wedding couples. I would begin each lesson by asking “do 
you want to learn steps or do you want to practice moving together?” in my own subversive
teenage attempt at behavioral psychology. Most of the time, the response was “we just want
to learn the steps”. Given the pressures of preparing for a wedding or a competition, it made
sense that a couple would want to control at least some part of the experience. Simple
choreography of sharing and shifting weight could become more fun or more dramatic with
dips, spins, and other tricks to make wedding and competitive couples happy. But when
presented with the opportunity to practice the subtlety of moving together outside
choreography, I was always curious why anyone would choose otherwise.
Shortly after winning the United States National Collegiate DanceSport
Championships, I found myself starved for a different kind of dance experience. Returning
to classical ballet and modern dance, I found myself trying to relay ideas of partnering and
musicality beyond the world of DanceSport, inquiring into the subtle relationships
individuals negotiate when dancing together. Joining a pre-professional youth company, I
learned lifts and partnered movement in ballet, as well as jazz techniques and American
Modern, including the work of Lester Horton, Martha Graham, and Jose Limon. Not long
into my new training, I sustained a stress fracture in my lumbar spine from a partnering
accident. My world came crashing down as I realized professional dancing might not be in 
my future.
Enrolling in university, I hopped from discipline to discipline, beginning with
literature and art history and ending with rhetorical theory and cognitive neuroscience. As






          
           
         
            
            
        
      
          
              
           
  
     
          
        
       
      
         
          
           
        
            
       
           
        
       
       
         
            
           
         
              
     
            
              
13
motives influence their ability to dance together? What are the underlying factors of
dancing together well? Is partnering a form of non-verbal dialogue fueled by physical
interaction? Finishing my bachelor’s degree, I moved on to graduate school where I met
Jill Johnson, director of the Harvard Dance Center and a principal dancer of Ballet
Frankfurt and the Forsythe Company. Jill brought established artists to work with us,
including William Forsythe, Ohad Naharin, Karole Armitage, Aszure Barton, among
others. Introduced to their processes, I continued to deepen my practice of teaching and 
performing. My curiosity about the subtleties of dancing together with others complexified,
infusing itself with my own history of competition and social dancing. I recount this early
part of my journey because this thesis is informed by my experiences as both a practitioner
and educator.
My inquiry in this thesis thus began by critically reflecting on my own experience
in dance partnering. I was particularly interested in the shift of observing from the outside
to experiencing dancing from the inside, and the assessment that happens in both instances
of engagement. Starting my doctoral journey, I developed experiments examining the
relationship between physiological responses and cognitive schemas. I designed physical
tasks for dancers within studios settings, to examine the relationship between observable
features and self-reported experience. I thought that spending time with expert practitioners
would open up a cross-cultural study of values in physical interaction across dance forms,
including classical and contemporary ballet, Latin/Ballroom, and contact improvisation. I
spent time observing professional dancers at major concert dance companies, including the
Royal Swedish Ballet, Batsheva Dance Company, Chicago Hubbard Street, Erick Hawkins
Dance Company, and the Boston Ballet. I conducted interviews with expert teachers and
dancers including former World DanceSport Champions Vibeke Toft and Charlotte
Jorgensen, contact improvisation co-founder Nancy Stark Smith, and contemporary
choreographers including William Forsythe, Ohad Naharin, Aszure Barton, and Sharon
Eyal. My goal was to acquire ethnographic, qualitative data based on constituent accounts
of partnering. I asked about the experience of dancing together, the feeling of attunement,
and how dancers knew whether they were attuned or not. My initial qualitative fieldwork
led me to further consider distinctions between what dancers thought they were doing and
what was observable from the outside. The fieldwork served to unearth new ideas, which I
was able to develop dialogically into deeper research questions.
From my time with these companies, I began to realize that there was a larger
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each other. Their answers about attunement were vague and subjective. This is not very
surprising, given that dancers are not often asked to reflect on and articulate their
experience about partnering in such specific ways. Returning to my philosophical roots, I
realized that my interest was in understanding generic principles of dancing together. As
my attention turned away from acquiring qualitative data, I began to scrutinize what kinds
of questions I was asking and the ways in which it made sense to pursue answers. Getting 
to the heart of the questions about partnering proved to be a difficult task, since the
physicality of certain forms (e.g. Latin/Ballroom, classical pas de deux) is habituated within 
my own body. Reflecting on my years of experience has been extremely fruitful, leading
to even more nuanced questions.
From these trials and experiments, I kept running into an explanatory problem when
attempting to critically evaluate and assess partnering paradigms, both from the inside
experience and the outside observation. Some of the interviews were particularly
interesting, like when Nancy Stark-Smith suggested that contact improvisation is “not
partnering” (personal communication, 2016). Our discussion circled around the question
of whether partnering always involves two people, as well as the role of improvisation and
communication in the physical interaction between bodies moving together. We touched
on how contact improvisation follows a sort of formula of 1+1=3, in which the unity of
dancers moving together form more than the sum of their parts. There has been some
important scholarship on contact improvisation by scholars like Cynthia Novak (1994) and
Cheryl Pallant (2006), who demonstrate the cultural and political influences and
implications of dancing together. As Nancy and I discussed contact improvisation and
dancing together more generally, it dawned on me that gathering qualitative data was not
enough to get to general principles that I was hoping to find.
Moving away from qualitative data, I decided to focus on the explanatory problem
about how dancers attune to one another. My research turned to conceptual analysis about
describing and evaluating the interaction between dance partners. I arrived at the
conclusion that the contribution I wanted to make was a philosophical framework that
might offer a descriptive theory (to describe the interaction) about the normative
dimensions of partnering (to evaluate the interaction). I will describe this in greater detail
in the following section on research questions.
A related strand in my inquiry that relates to the explanatory problem is one that
emerges from ideas about logic and reasoning. In my undergraduate studies, I was exposed 
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because of his affinity for logic and his commitment to creating functional, practical
frameworks not only for creating successful arguments but also for deconstructing those of
others. I was fascinated by Aristotle’s exposition of concepts such as embodied, culturally-
bound dispositions (hexis in Greek, later translated to habitus in Latin), felt-time as
distinguished from measured time (kairos versus chronos), as well as the five canons of
rhetoric including discovery (heuresis), arrangement (taxis), style (lexis), memory
(mneme), and delivery (hypocrisis) (Spranzi 2011). Given my background in this branch of
study, I had initially thought to complete a rhetorical analysis of the claims made within 
partnering practice by particular practitioners.
I moved on from classical notions to contemporary rhetorical theory, in order to 
distinguish the persuasive role of the body within communication. Two particular models
stood out to me: Lloyd Bitzer’s concept of “Rhetorical Situation” (Bitzer 1968), and Jason 
Buehl’s Syncretic Model of Multimodal Rhetoric (Buehl 2016). The former model presents
the conditions by which a situation or event can be construed as rhetorical, which I explored
in the context of dance partnering (Vidrin 2018). Buehl’s model understands the
conception, assembly, and circulation of rhetorical artifacts in relation to three overlapping
domains of human experience—the cognitive, the material, and the social (Buehl 2016). I
found it particularly interesting to note that, according to Buehl, a rhetorical artifact is,
merely a specific performance in which cognitive, material, and social
resources are coordinated in the light of actual or imagined cognitive,
material, and social constraints for the purpose of rhetorical action […] best
characterized as an emerging form that temporally fixes a diverse range of
relations among concepts, institutions, symbol systems, and media. (Buehl
2016, 28)
Given this framing, I was excited to consider how a rhetorical artifact could, for
example, be a duet produced extemporaneously by two individuals in a rehearsal space.
Buehl and Bitzer’s capacious understandings of rhetoric led me down a rabbit hole of
considering the role of rhetoric in the broadest sense. I discovered leading rhetoric scholar
George Kennedy, who holds that, “rhetoric, in essence, is a form of mental energy and 
emotional energy. This is most clearly seen when an individual, animal or human, is faced 
with some serious threat or opportunity that may be affect by utterance” (Kennedy 1998,
3-4). Given the complexity of human interactions, one can feel threatened, perceive an
opportunity to gain some advantage, and seek to accomplish goals in uncountable ways, on 
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between. As I considered rhetorical methods of analysis, I thought deeply about the
persuasive elements of attunement in dance partnering, particularly how partners are
convinced by each other’s physical actions. I found support within rhetoric “as a historical
product of practices, rather than as a natural faculty inherent in a cultured human mind,
body, or language” (Stormer 2006, 258). I even found work related to bodily rhetoric, such 
as Shannon Walters’ work on Rhetorical Touch (2014), where she suggests, “touch 
functions in the spaces between the tensions of discourse, embodiment, social construction,
and materiality and in locations of partial and potential identification that bridge individual
experience with social and political connection” (Walters 2014, 8).
The important realization was that rhetoric as a field does not have a monopoly on
considerations of felt-time and culturally-bound dispositions. These lines of philosophy are
apparent across civilizations throughout history, and importantly rhetoric does not spend 
much time reflecting on dance. As I turned away from the Ancient Greek conventions I
found myself drawn to broader questions about how partnering is evaluated, across and 
within different forms of dance. The study of rhetoric offered a point of reference, but I
ultimately felt that it could not be central in this study. While rhetorical concepts such as
felt-time and dispositions do find their way into this writing, they do so in a nuanced way,
without taking up their Greek roots.
As I continued to investigate, I became swept up in complex questions that seemed
only to complexify upon engagement. I was drawn to a broad array of disciplines and forms,
so much so that I became conflicted with the desire to write for too many populations. I
found myself drawn to disparate fields of practice and scholarship because partnered
movement is a complex area of study. Not only does it involve multiple individuals moving 
together, but there are also a plethora of concerns within practice, from biomechanics and
physics to social and ethical dimensions. Given the desire to put these different populations
into direct dialogue with one another, my considered how to contribute a significant
innovation into the dance field. I honed in on the idea of creating a text that would draw on
philosophy such that philosophers would be convinced, yet written in an accessible way to 
support practice by dancers themselves. This contribution focuses on the evaluation about
attunement between dance partners.
My linkage of “partnering” and “attunement” emerges from my experience as an 
International DanceSport competitor (including the slow and Viennese waltz, tango,
foxtrot, quickstep, cha-cha-cha, samba, rumba, Paso Doble, and jive). DanceSport itself
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particular to the style of movement. Moreover, the competitive drive has a significant
influence on the practice of partnering. DanceSport offers a reference point to synthesize
my own experience of overlapping interests in both the aesthetics of attunement as much 
as the physical principles of partnering. Given that the base of this movement form is
lead/follow or action/reaction, it begs the question of what constitutes an “appropriate”
reaction. It is interesting to note that dancers and educators represent different schools of
thought within DanceSport, all of which vary in how they prioritize musicality, partnering,
beauty (aesthetics), as well as physical factors like power and speed (Vermey 1994, Stern
1999, Harman 2019). This thesis is informed by work with my own teachers, former world
champions Vibeke Toft and Allan Tornsberg, who told me repeatedly that they prioritize
partnering in their teaching and coaching practices (personal communication, February
2016).
Hoping to broaden my scope of partnering, I turned to consider other forms that are
not restricted to lead/follow. As I did so, the explanatory problem related to evaluation
began to crystallize and gain importance in my study. I found that other forms of dance that
involve two or more individuals dancing together (e.g. contact improvisation, ballet, tango)
also offer principles from which to attune to other(s) with their own particular ways of
dealing with “appropriateness”. Principles of weight-sharing and weight-shifting (e.g.
rolling point of contact, oppositional force) find their way into many forms often with their
own distinct vocabulary and seem often to be taken in tandem with considerations such as
competence, temporality, and awareness. Across dance forms that involve two or more
individuals moving together—including classical and neo-classical ballet, contact
improvisation, “contemporary” and “modern” dance, as well as social and competitive
practices such as tango, International Latin/Standard DanceSport, swing, lindy hop, and
blues—physical interaction can look and feel quite different. Distinct forms, being what
they are, are subject to particular aesthetic ideals that emerge from spaces saturated with
cultural meaning. One may know what a certain dance looks like because of the way it has
been depicted in photographs, films, and other media, but also because the form itself has
conventions that prescribe boundaries and values for how partners move together. For
example, the boundaries and values that underlie conventions within classical Pas de Deux
often presuppose an erect posture, which is different than how contact improvisation values
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I examined existing texts that explore the practice of moving with others in
culturally-specific settings, including Argentinian Tango (Baim 2007), folk dancing (Grau
and Jordan 2002), Latin-American dancing (Vermey 1994, Harman 2019), contact
improvisation (Novak 1990, Pallant 2006), classical Pas de Deux (Serebrennikov 2000,
Lee 2002, Dolin 2005), and social dancing (Knowles 2009). I found that the culturally
specific representations focus inquiry on concerns of dancing together on their own terms.
There are also numerous scholars of dance that take an analytical approach, especially in
the relationship between intention, thought, and action (including Carr 1987, Sparshott
1995, Sheets-Johnston 1999, McFee 2003, Manning 2007, Sheets-Johnstone 2015, Katan-
Schmid 2016, Bannon 2018, McFee 2018, Pakes 2019, among others). These analytical
approaches draw on and synthesize different methods of inquiry: Anna Pakes draws out the
phenomenological-ontological dimensions of dance works. Maxine Sheets-Johnstone
illuminates the phenomenological-biological dimension of dancing as intentional bodily
movement. Einav Katan-Schmid’s monograph is a singular project on the works of Ohad
Naharin, where Gaga is analyzed as a particular movement language. Graham McFee
analyzes dance through the lens of aesthetics, and advocates for the ways in which dance
can be appreciated. Abstracting the principles from the social, competitive, and concert
dance environments, I make an intentional move to understand the relationship between
aesthetic values and ethical concerns within partnered movement on a broader scale. The
explanatory problem of dancing together, paired with the abstraction from cultural
specificities, come together to inform the main, overarching aim of my thesis: to establish
a generic, philosophical logic to examine conditions, principles, and norms of dancing
together.
Assumptions and Questions
This thesis will be an investigation about the nature and quality of physical
interaction in dance, with particular attention to ethical dimensions of claims made by 
dancers, especially those related to trust, care, empathy, and mutual understanding. This
thesis investigates two core, overarching and interrelated questions:
1. What does it mean to dance together?
2. What does it mean to dance together well?
These two driving questions center on the evaluation of physical interaction. A
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grained or gross movement, is a tendency to frame experience within a subjective lens.
While the subjective experience of physical interaction is incredibly important for dancers
themselves, I focus instead on analyzing the relevant ideas and concepts. Consider for
example a subjective account of a physical interaction. The individual will account for
whatever is salient, which is driven largely by one’s background and history, and perhaps
dominant cultural mores as well. One’s perception of an interaction will affect not only
how one experiences the interaction in the moment, but also how s/he will later describe it.
My goal here is not to critique subjective methods so much as to suggest that there may be
assumptions (both physical and metaphysical) made on the part of the subject in recounting
the interaction. Even in accounting for experience, it seems necessary to understand what
aspects of the interaction are relevant to the possibility of the interaction itself. The tension 
between subjective values and methodological approaches is precisely what makes a
descriptive theory complicated, while a prescriptive one likely impossible. Questions that
have shaped my thinking along the way were to what extent does understanding the motives
depend on familiarity with the setting and conventions of the paradigms people are working 
within (e.g. international DanceSport, Contact Improvisation, milonga, etc.)? To what
extent does partnering depend on the subjective values of the form or the preference of the
dance-maker? That is, can we really say what movement is “supposed” to look like, let
alone feel like? Thus, I find it worthwhile to develop a philosophical framework that can 
account for describing conditions and evaluating norms of physical interaction in dance.
Complexity in this study comes from the wide range of possibilities for physical
interaction in dance, as well as the manifold motivation for dancers to seek physical
interaction in the first place. People may come together to satisfy social needs, intimate
desires, as well as their own artistic visions (choreographically, performatively, musically,
and so on). Given the plethora of motivating reasons for people to move with others, I have
found it useful to distinguish between coming together through dance and coming together
to dance. The distinction holds that coming together through dance creates a sort of
hierarchy, wherein quality and aesthetic form are lower on the metaphoric rung because
movement is happenstance to the encounter, while coming together to dance on the other
hand, suggests that movement itself is the primary focus. Consider for example a case in
which a dancer comes to a social event to relax after a long and arduous work week. In
order to distract herself, she may be looking for a partner that provides an escape by twirling
her around to fast-paced music. In other words, she will be looking to socialize. Given the
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may significantly influence the way she interacts with others. Rather than say something
about the form of practice itself, I am interested in evaluating dancing together in a generic
sense. I will consider what makes partnering distinct from merely dancing together
regardless of the motives to come together. Rigorously considering the necessary
conditions of partnering, I will question what kinds of features are relevant to evaluate. To
be able to establish conditions, however, first requires unpacking the underlying conditions
of dancing together.
This thesis takes an assumption that dance, as a broad field of study, is a practice
concerned with (physical) matter in motion. Whether or not practitioners explicitly use
terms such as gravity and physics, it is important to consider that a fundamental aspect of
dance is people moving their bodies in tandem with the laws of nature. While the laws of
nature may not be salient to a practitioner, it is my assumption that (at least for dancing on
this planet), one is subject to the laws of nature whether or not one is aware of them. To
consider human bodies dancing, however, is already beyond purely physical descriptions,
especially when we consider complex ideas such as how partners make decisions based on
particular ideas about interaction and attunement. Brute physics is thus not enough to 
understand what informs the particular qualities of movement that partners are able to
achieve together, especially given that this study is about interaction. We thus need to
understand more than simply how or why embodied human beings act; we need to know
how they act in relation to (e.g. on account of) other(s).
Even if attunement, as an idealism, is not epiphenomenal to physical interaction in 
dance, this thesis examines the types of tensions that arise given the complicated 
relationship between movement and a particular kind of interpretation of physical
movement. I will be examining the norms that are relevant to the evaluation of partnering
in a practical sense within a pluralist framework, without attempting to reduce movement
or feelings. The space wherein the practitioners are situated (stage, studio, salon), as well
as the cultural and formal backgrounds of the practitioners and audience will undoubtedly
play a crucial role in how the tensions between looking and feeling attuned are handled.
While it may be impossible to directly address these tensions practically in a prescriptive
sense, parsing the normative questions lends support for understanding at least some of the
ways by which claims about attunement can be reasonably and justifiably evaluated.
In a complete and exhaustive theory of partnering, I would talk about all of the
complexity that partnering entails, but here in my thesis I draw on analytical philosophy to
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evaluated. Since individuals can seek out opportunities to dance with others for any number
of reasons, ranging from social and aesthetic ones, to ritual and tradition, my focus is on
the interaction itself. I will examine the relationship between physicality and ethical claims
about trust, responsibility, and mutual understanding between partners, and what makes
such claims about physicality potentially tenable. Defining attunement, however, is
complicated. The simple fact remains that people feel attuned, and so the first part of this
study is essentially one of an explanatory problem. How do we account for the conditions
of attunement, interpreted from the inside of a dyad, as well as the interpretation of an
outside observer? What counts as evidence for attunement when partners dance together,
and what conditions need to be established in order for interaction to be successfully
attuned? As bodies are fundamentally social, experience is unequivocally tied to culture
and history. Moreover, situations are not necessarily repeatable, and so we run into tension 
between empiricism and ontology. A philosophical framework points out these tensions,
names them, and provides a basis from which to critically evaluate the subtleties of
partnering.
By bringing attention to partnering in this way, I will explore the conditions that
govern physical interaction, as well as the potential epiphenomenally emergent sensation 
(and perception) of attunement. Analytic philosophy provides a method to draw on my own 
experience as a dancer, educator, and coach to build an argument about the conditions
necessary for partnering and the norms that allow for evaluation and dialogue between 
dancers, invested observers (coaches, choreographers), and audience members. I seek a
generic philosophy of partnering that is not only philosophically sound, but will also be
applicable and useful in the practice of partnering. I recognize that taking a philosophical
lens to identify and parse the finer points of this distinction in a theoretical way will not
lead to a truly generalizable argument that is applicable in all cases, nor will it necessarily 
arrive at a prescriptive framework. There will likely be some points of disagreement with
my characterization, but I believe this is ultimately useful to inform dialogue (verbal and
physical) between practitioners (to articulate what is working and what is not), as well as
the tools by which an audience can evaluate what they observe1 with respect to the quality
of interaction. I will examine the utility and implications of such a framework in the
conclusion of this thesis.
1 It is important to note here that an instructor, coach, or choreographer is conceived here
as “audience” given that s/he is not practicing in the moment, but rather observing 
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Summary of Chapters
This thesis is a study on the norms and conditions of partnering. The initial
reference point is a conception of how dancing together leads constituents to evaluate the
quality of physical interaction between partners. As it stands now, partnering as a term is
often quite broad (e.g. two people moving together) or quite narrow (e.g. culturally-bound
practice such as ballroom, often with a heterosexual couple moving in very specific, pre-
determined ways). Of course, this is not true for all scholarship. Erin Manning’s Politics of
Touch (2007) is an example of a text that examines the broader cultural and political
implications of partnering, notably drawing from the context of Argentinean Tango.
Cynthia Novak’s Sharing the Dance: Contact Improvisation and American Culture (1994)
is a similar example of a text that investigates contact improvisation as a form of dancing 
together with cultural and political ties. Susan Ravn’s work is also a good example of
investigating principles of dancing together in Tango and Sports dance (Ravn 2016, He and
Ravn 2018). Maxine Sheets-Johnstone also has a recent chapter on dancing together, where
she provides insights based on her previous work on the phenomenology of dance (Sheets-
Johnstone 2017). Despite these sources, there are no texts that examine the issues of
partnering in a general sense.
The challenge of this study has been in identifying the norms that apply to
partnering generally, which can inform how people interact physically in dance, both 
broadly and in specific cultural settings. The difficulty is how to be generic without getting
into specific practices, yet still be relevant for practitioners. Throughout the thesis, I will
draw on specific examples of partnering to substantiate and deepen my argument. By 
drawing upon literature in the fields of epistemology (Elgin 1996, 2017), philosophy of
social behavior and joint action (Gilbert 1989, 1990), communication theory (Grice 1991),
and ethics (Baier 1986) this thesis seeks to develop discourse surrounding dance partnering. 
In particular, my hope is to inform the research, practice, and scholarship of dance. I will
argue for principles that are generic, such that insights can be applied not only to dance but
other fields concerning human interaction, such as philosophy, psychology, anthropology,
and sociology. Ultimately, this work is meant to be a contribution to the field of dance
studies.
Throughout the thesis I fluctuate in the use of personal pronouns in reference to an
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chosen to investigate both the inanimate and animate, because I believe such inquiry reveals
the very real possibilities of how agency and choice play a role in partnering. As I
investigate the implications of partnering, I will not focus on revealing hegemonic
ideologies within dance forms, such as heteronormative approaches that establish fixed 
roles (e.g. leader/follower). Instead, I will focus on the conditions of dancing together.
For a long time, I have harbored an intuition that dancing together is somehow
distinct from partnering. Thus, I have been interested in distinguishing when dancers are
merely going through the motions of dancing together and when they are attuning
(physically, as well as perhaps in some deeper sense energetically). There are myriad ways
to approach this problem, and I choose to do so through the lens of philosophy. I will
interrogate the idea and practice of attunement – between partners dancing together,
between philosophy and dance, and between ethics and aesthetics more broadly. Since the
term partnering has different meanings for practitioners, within the same form and across
forms, I have been interested in understanding my own intuition about partnering as a
distinct practice of dancing together, as well as broader questions about partnering as a
discourse with its own general principles and norms that guide interaction and what those
general principles might be. This thesis thus launches a rigorous investigation about quality
of interaction in partnering that is missing from the literature related to movement practices
in culturally specific settings, which I find necessary to unravel the explanatory problem of
attunement. This reference point is immensely complex, with at least two large problems;
the ontological one, which questions the nature of partnering, and the normative one, which
questions the character and quality of interaction in dance.
One of the central challenges of this thesis is determining the appropriate methods
for distinguishing and evaluating the act of partnering. Chapters two and three thus provide
a breakdown of the analytic methodology employed in this study. Chapter two presents a
Literature Review that draws from a tight selection of prominent scholars of social action,
communication theory, and epistemology. This literature is intentionally narrow, in order
to provide the basis to analyze partnering through the way particular analytic philosophers
have thought about reasoning, communication, and ethics when people interact with each 
other. Chapter three then focuses on how analytic philosophy provides a rigorous
Methodology by which to evaluate the epistemic, metaphysical, communicative, ethical,
and normative problems in dance partnering, within which physical principles serve to
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outside of dancing together to offer a framework for interpreting and synthesizing the
regimes of partnering that may be upheld by distinct movement forms.
Chapter four, Joint Commitments in Dancing Together, examines the conditions of
dancing together to distinguish it from partnering. I will examine how partnering is a
special kind of dancing together, with stricter constraints than just dancing together. I
examine the conditions that make dancing together feasible. I consider the conditions of
partnering in dance on the basis of an encounter that forms a special kind of joint
commitment between partners. I examine conditions including willingness, ability, and
understanding, and I highlight the normative force of physical commitments in partnering
following the work of philosophers Margaret Gilbert and Catherine Elgin, with special
attention to elements such as agreement, (shared) intention, obligation, and rebuke.
Unpacking these elements may reveal valuable insight into how partnering can be 
successfully evaluated, leading to a more nuanced understanding of physical interaction.
Chapter five, Norms of Exchange, presents partnering as a symbolic act on the basis
of signals through proximity (direction), relative position (orientation), and point(s) of
contact (touch, eye contact, breath, sound, etc.). I investigate the notion of signaling and
interpretation. Following the work of H. Paul Grice, I extend the significance of implicature
into the physical domain to investigate when partners seemingly flout cooperation (e.g.
obscuring effort or creating seemingly ambiguous positions in order to better support each 
other).
Chapter six, Norms of Attunement, turns to a deeper examination of concepts within 
attunement in partnering. Instead of examining the language individuals use to describe
what it is that they are doing (or think they are doing) or the language they use to evaluate
others, I examine how the temporal and relational dimensions of partnering can intersect
and diverge. I use the term graviception to highlight the significance of perceiving mass in
relation (to the floor, the surrounding air, a partner). Drawing from a filmed recording of
Petite Mort (1996/2006), an existing duet by Jiri Kylian, I investigate how physical
movements of partnering function for partners to attune to each other. I take up these points
theoretically, by providing a critical vocabulary to distinguish two distinct ways of relating:
coordinating and calibrating. Coordinating is referential to an external structure 
(independence), while calibrating is recursively relational, or in service to the relation (co-
dependence, interdependence). I delineate the qualitative differences in each mode,






         
  
        
             
          
           
          
          
             
            
              
        
        
         
           
          
        
              
          
           
          
             
         
   
            
            
          
         
             
        
            




observable (e.g. visually), others of which are kinesthetically experienced and thus difficult
to capture and track.
Chapter seven, Moral Norms, investigates the ways partnering involves certain 
responsibilities for each partner. Drawing from the work Elgin, I build an argument for how
good partnering, if not by luck, requires moral epistemic agency. I position Elgin’s work 
in line with moral philosopher Annette Baier, who writes about trust, vulnerability, and
discretionary power. I examine trust as a three-part predicate, and question whether partners
ought to entrust each other to satisfy choreographic ideas as well as uphold a safe and 
sustainable relation. I examine what it means to understand harm in a partnered situation,
and I present the kinds of harm that partnering may inflict. In particular, I examine the
significance of resilience in light of errors, as well as the abilities which allow dancers to
calibrate to each other to adapt and better prepare for any situation.
In chapter eight, Reasoning in Relation, I turn to investigate how the evaluation of
partnering entails a certain kind of reasoning, which requires a certain kind of
understanding. I examine the nature of heteronomy and autonomy in relation to dancing
together, which will serve to open a discussion about agency. I recognize that calibrating
and coordinating are not the only two ways to relate, and that each engenders aesthetic
preferences that may be suitable insofar as they do not cause intentional harm. I focus on
the factors that modify the interaction, including agency, predictability, false belief, and
reflective endorsement. I discuss the difference between intentional action (what it is
partners are trying to do) and deliberate action (whether partners are competent to achieve
their goals, and what their goals require). I investigate a tenable foundation for what is
necessary for to exercise deliberate practice when they choose to relate in certain ways and
not in others.
The aim of this study from an epistemological perspective is thus threefold 1) to
tackle the explanatory problem that the concept of partnering poses for the practice of
dancing together, 2) to investigate the normative problems that arise given the conditions
by which partnering is possible, and 3) to examine the ethical dimensions of dancing
together. It is beyond the scope of this work to engage with the specificities of any particular
partnering practice or to compare and contrast practices cross-culturally. Rather, I
investigate the conditions that would satisfy partnering in a broad sense, in order to open a
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Chapter Two: Literature Review
While my focus in this thesis is constructing a generic philosophy of dancing 
together, this literature review will begin by pointing to some of the broad philosophical
problems in epistemology, communication theory, and ethics as they relate to this study. I
draw from the tradition of Western, analytic philosophy, stemming from the work of
classical philosophers Plato and Aristotle and enlightenment philosophers Rene Descartes
and Immanuel Kant. Before getting to the systematic evaluation of partnering, it is
necessary to stabilize and ground the particular terms, concepts, and background literature
that inform the way I refer to partnering in this thesis. The epistemological foundation of
this dissertation is supported through the lens of Harvard epistemologist Catherine Elgin,
as well as concepts of philosopher of language H. Paul Grice, social action philosopher
Margaret Gilbert, American psychologist J.J. Gibson, 20th century dance theorist and
practitioner Rudolf von Laban, and moral philosopher Annette Baier. I will begin by tracing
a few broad strokes of traditional epistemology leading into Elgin’s work, followed by
communication theory leading into Grice’s work on the Cooperative Principle in
conversation, Gilbert’s work on joint commitment, and end with Baier’s work on trust and
discretionary power.
Background to Epistemology 
Here I will present a brief background of analytic philosophy as it pertains to this
thesis. Traditional epistemology emerges from the term’s etymology “study of
knowledge”, with a history of particular questions revolving around what might constitute
as necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge. One such question interrogates the
distinction between appearance and reality. In his allegory of the cave, Plato relates this
distinction to an epistemic problem of whether it is possible to actually know anything at
all, given that perspectives are necessarily limited by perception. Plato addresses this
problem by considering knowledge as only that in which one has sufficient justification to
believe (Spranzi 2011).
The commitment to systematically interrogating knowledge as justified, true belief
became a staple problem within analytic epistemology, as did the concern that we can be
confused and misled by sensory stimuli. This problem was taken up in the 17th century by
Rene Descartes, who questioned the nature of, and distinction between, mind and body. In
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epistemic assets: “the senses have been given to me by nature in order to signify to the
mind what is beneficial or harmful to the composite of which it is a part” (Descartes, M6,
AT VII 83/CSM II 57). Recognizing that mind and body are part of the same system,
Descartes nevertheless signals to an exigent problem of whether mental interpretation of
sensory experience is trustworthy.
Descartes complexified the appearance/reality problem raised by Plato, further
highlighting dimensions of self-awareness and responsibility. The synthetic move to 
separate mind from body, or reason from experience, became known as Cartesian dualism.
This dualism informed the work of Immanuel Kant, who questioned what can be, or indeed
should be known independently of experience on the basis of reason alone (Kagan 2018, 
70). Kant considered this issue, known as a priori reasoning, in relation to ethics,
suggesting that we ought to know in advance of inflicting harm that it is wrong. Kant’s
work is often criticized as too absolute, which led to scholarship that responded to and 
highlighted subjective experience (Nussbaum 2003). The development of phenomenology
in particular challenged Kant’s work by accounting for the significance of what can be
known through experience, or a posteriori knowledge. Contemporary accounts of
epistemology contest purely a priori reasoning by demonstrating how individuals are
always historically, socially, and culturally situated, and so too are knowledge systems
(Elgin 1996, Elgin 2017, Nussbaum 2001, Nussbaum 2003).
This thesis finds a balance between the relativism of phenomenology and the
absolutism of Kant by grounding into the pluralist account of epistemology in the work of
Elgin. Importantly, Elgin draws on the analytic work of Kant, arguing that epistemology 
refers to a system of “cognitive achievement” concerned primarily with understanding
rather than the standard onus of non-fortuitous (i.e. not accidental or by chance) justified,
true belief (Elgin 1996, 2004, 2008, 2017). I choose to ground into Elgin’s work because
she argues that dance provides a form of exemplification that is cognitively valuable,
despite it being neither truth-conducive nor reliable (Elgin 2017, 205-220). 
Catherine Elgin’s Epistemology
In this section, I will focus on two of Elgin’s main texts, Considered Judgment
(1996) and True Enough (2017), which together challenge the long-standing epistemic
fixations on reliability and truth. Considered Judgment introduces her stance on
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as we recognize that “there is nothing for knowledge to be except what we take it to be”
(Elgin 1996, 60). While Elgin herself acknowledges that this stance may seem to weaken 
the authority of epistemology, she demonstrates how shifting the lens from knowledge to
understanding opens a more urgent problem about our responsibility to what it is we know
(or think we know). In True Enough, Elgin questions epistemology’s commitment to truth,
advocating for a holistic approach that “acknowledges that tenable theories must be
tethered to the phenomena they concern, but denies that truth is the sole acceptable tether”
(Elgin 2017, 1). In this section, I will present Elgin’s philosophy in terms of her stance on
normativity, imperfect procedural epistemology, as well as her terms of art including 
reflective equilibrium, epistemic yield, and epistemic responsibilism.
In Considered Judgment, Elgin holds that epistemology is fundamentally
normative, stating “it concerns what people ought to think and why” (Elgin 1996, 5). By
highlighting the normative dimension of epistemology, Elgin’s work provides the support
for the kind of questions asked in this thesis, such as what characterizes appropriate
responses in partnering, and when dancers claim they know something (such as where their
weight is in relation to their partners’), what do they take as evidence to justify their claims?
I will unpack the normative dimension of how partners systematically negotiate, evaluate,
and dialogue about what it is that they know (or think they know) in and through movement
in Chapter Seven on Moral Norms. 
Elgin maintains that the standards, methods, and goals of classical epistemology,
namely the pursuit of objective truth in ‘perfect procedural epistemology’ and
‘foundationalism’, are too strict and therefore doomed to be too difficult (if at all possible)
to fulfill. Elgin demonstrates the particular shortcomings of perfect procedural
epistemology, which hinge on the requirement of determining “precisely what and how
much evidence would immunize against error” (Elgin 1996, 28). She claims, “by making
the avoidance of error our sole or primary epistemic objective, [foundationalism]
overlooked the importance we attach to sensitivity, relevance, informativeness, and 
cognitive efficacy” (Elgin 1996, 59). Given that perfect procedural epistemology seeks
permanent credibility, Elgin argues that this foundationalist aim excludes certain valuable
resources and systems because they fail to satisfy foundationalism’s rigorous standards.
This includes anything that would lead to error, such as “a painter’s sense of color, a
farmer’s feel for the land, and a poet’s sensitivity to nuance” (Elgin 1996, 9). Since such 
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often considered epistemically inert (Elgin 1996, 9). It has been Elgin’s project to
demonstrate that this is not the case.
While some of the subjective content may not be worrisome to epistemologists on 
the surface, Elgin suggests this stance logically excludes that which may be significantly 
valuable, such as metaphors and ethics, “because their meanings cannot be fully
articulated” (Elgin 1996, 28). The matter of excluding ethics from epistemology is
troubling when trying to account for the ways in which individuals reason about and justify 
their actions in relation to each other. Elgin points to how this strict view of epistemology
creates a “hierarchy [that] has no room for evaluative knowledge” (Elgin 1996, 28). She
finds fault with this claim, and advocates instead for imperfect procedural epistemology,
which “is pluralistic, holding that the same constellation of cognitive objectives can be
realized in several ways, and that several constellations of cognitive objectives may be
worthy of realization [..] there is no straight and narrow path to truth” (Elgin 1996, 14).
This kind of pluralism departs from the universalist assertion that there is only one
justifiable approach, while simultaneously advocating that the multiplicity of practices be
held to standards by which they can be evaluated on the basis of certain conditions and
norms. Elgin demonstrates how this approach supports reflective endorsement, insofar as
considered judgments “are not held true come what may but accorded a degree of initial
credibility because previous inquiry sanctioned them” (Elgin 1996, 15). According to
Elgin, imperfect procedural epistemology “prefers error to ignorance” and “risks error to
achieve understanding” (Elgin 1996, 14). This approach is significant because it considers
“nothing as incontrovertible”, and advocates for “reviewing, revoking, altering, and
amending previous conclusions, methods, and standards in light of later results” (Elgin 
1996, 14). Referring back to epistemology as fundamentally normative, she holds that a
failure “should it occur, amounts not to a decisive defeat but to a challenge to do better next
time” (Elgin 1996, 15). Thus, by loosening our standards away from truth and toward
understanding, Elgin builds a case for how something like dance serves as epistemically 
valuable.
One of Elgin’s major contributions to epistemology is thus the move from non-
fortuitous, justified true belief to the negotiation of a system of considered judgments in
“reflective equilibrium” (Elgin 2017, 63-69). Elgin notes that “advancement of
understanding is not an incremental growth of knowledge” but rather “a process of delicate
adjustments” which “must be reasonable in light of one another, and the system as a whole
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(Elgin 1996, 13). To reason about and identify what we know, Elgin suggests that, “actions
speak louder than words. If the conclusions a community acts on differ from the ones it
avows, we take the actions to reveal its commitments and ignore the avowals. We look at
what the members of a community do, not at what they say” (Elgin 1996, 19-20). Elgin’s
philosophical stance on imperfect procedural epistemology points to inquiry as a social
practice, with norms that are established by a community whose network of cognitive
commitments manifests in wide reflective equilibrium.
With this framing, Elgin’s work is particularly valuable to this thesis because in 
valuing the cognitive, she opens space for bodily action and sensory input. Elgin advocates
that understanding requires interpretation, which is contingent on a refined sensitivity. This
sensitivity extends to certain seemingly unreliable things, such as emotions. She maintains
that, “emotion, metaphor, exemplification, and fiction affect the constitution and adoption 
of orientations, the construction and application of category schemes, the generation and
extinction of saliencies, the fixing and blurring of focus” (Elgin 1996, 204). In her view,
emotions are vital to developing and deepening understanding by providing a frame of
reference and acting as “sources of salience” (Elgin 1996, 149). She does not suggest that
emotions are wholly reliable sources of justified true belief, but rather that emotions “yield
epistemic access to factors we might otherwise miss” (Elgin 1996, 150). She recognizes
that overwhelming emotions significantly inhibit our ability to reason and recommends that
“rather than exclude their deliverances entirely, epistemology should delineate the
circumstances when [emotions] are untrustworthy” (Elgin 1996, 157). Just as blinding light
overwhelms our sense of sight and deafening noise influences our ability to hear, Elgin
builds a case for how sensory information is epistemically valuable. Elgin asserts that
salience is an important factor in understanding, as it supports identifying considered 
judgments in reflective equilibrium. Recognizing that we can be misled and overwhelmed
by our emotions, she proposes that “refining the sensibilities increases emotion’s epistemic
yield” (Elgin 1996, 158). This statement in particular informs this thesis, as I consider the
epistemic dimensions of such a refinement within the context of dancing together and 
works to influence the communication, mutual understanding and ethical status of partners
as they negotiate, evaluate, and dialogue in partnering.
Another one of Elgin’s major contributions is an account of epistemic norms that
centers on an individual’s responsibility. Rather than the standard epistemological
approach of rejecting that which is unreliable, Elgin builds a case that it is an individual’s
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to claim not enough evidence altogether). Her case hinges on an argument against the
acceptance of certain claims based on the typical binary of true or false. Her notion of
epistemic acceptability “turns not on whether it is true, but on whether it is true enough— 
that is, on whether it is close enough to the truth. ‘True enough’ obviously has a threshold”
(Elgin 2017, 16). Thus, Elgin provides an epistemological foundation for accepting that
which is true enough in order to make a cognitive commitment. The maneuver that is
particularly valuable to this thesis is that this notion of epistemic acceptance “turns on
epistemic responsibility rather than on reliability” (Elgin 2017, 2) and “is not restricted to,
and does not always, involve belief” (Elgin 2017, 19). Turning away from that which is
reliable (and thus error-free), she critically examines sensory input in relation to making
choices. Elgin states, “we can’t help but see, hear, and feel what we do. But the issue is not
whether we are passive in the reception of inputs; it is what we do with those inputs (Elgin
2017, 92).
Elgin notes that this kind of epistemic “acceptance involves agency” (Elgin 2017,
22), and shows how this responsibility, which she refers to as epistemic responsibilism,
provides a framework for what we accept to be true enough in order to be moral epistemic
agents. According to Elgin, moral epistemic agents reflectively endorse what it is they 
accept. Although Elgin considers this a “cognitive end”, she notes how this is not
necessarily a purely rational, cognitive process. She maintains,
To be sure, an epistemic agent does not entertain deliverances one by one
and ask herself, ‘Am I buying this?’ Rather, she develops and deploys a
variety of methods, mechanisms, heuristics, and habits that enable her to 
credit or discredit wide swaths of inputs efficiently […] even if her
acceptances are largely automatic, she could, if she chose, withhold
acceptance of the content of a deliverance, or of a source of deliverances.
What makes the epistemic agent responsible for her opinions is that she
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In part, this thesis considers the methods, mechanisms, heuristics, and habits that allow
partners to reflectively endorse their physical actions in relation to each other. As a driving
question, I will consider the conditions that enable partners to exercise epistemic agency to
responsibly and reflectively endorse action. Elgin suggests that an agent’s ability to be
responsible relates to the fact that “voluntary actions are subject to constraints” some of
which are “enterprise-specific” (Elgin 2017, 96). She further maintains that “agents can
and often do cut corners, jump to conclusions, reason carelessly, and think sloppily. They
are subject to criticism for their errors and omissions, for they could do better if they tried”
(Elgin 2017, 96). I propose that partnering can be viewed as a specific enterprise, where
dancing together constrains and limits certain actions at certain times. As such, the criticism
and error of partnering are determined both by the agent and members of the “epistemic
community” (e.g. other dancers) who set “standards of evidence and thresholds for
acceptance. They determine how much evidence is required for a contention of a given sort
to be worthy of reflective endorsement” (Elgin 2017, 97). Elgin’s framing of ethics, agency,
and value is crucial to this study because her ideas of moral epistemic agency shift the focus
from reliabilism to responsibilism. While there are certainly dance scholars who have
worked with ethics, agency and value (Bannon 2018, Noland 2009, Pakes 2019), I have
chosen to engage deeply with Elgin’s work because it provides the foundation for
evaluating the role of ethics in partnering from an epistemic perspective. This is especially
important given that my aim is to provide a generic understanding of partnering, based on
the satisfaction of certain conditions. Elgin’s work provides the framing for moral agency
and value in the context of ethics, which I bring to bear in dance partnering specifically.
In this thesis I will draw on and extend Elgin’s philosophy to dance, in order to
investigate the issue of epistemic agency with respect to partnering. I will build an
argument for how good partnering, except by luck, requires moral epistemic agency.
Dancing together can happen to go really well. Some dancers are so good that they count
on everything going well. The question is what can partners do to accommodate each other
when things do not go well? How does the ability to accommodate a range of infelicities
relate to the general norms of partnering as a discourse? Further, should partners know how
to do certain things when agreeing to dance together and, if so, what might those things be?
Elgin’s work sets the frame for addressing these questions. In chapters seven and eight, I
will examine the epistemic dimensions of responsibility in dancing together, particularly in
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Communication Theory and Value
The normative dimension of knowledge relates to another broad problem within
philosophy, namely what it means to communicate well and what it means to understand 
other(s) given our partial and limited perspectives. These points are normative in that they
relate to success and evaluation. For partnering in particular, I will ask what makes an
exchange successful and what are relevant norms by which we evaluate success? This
normativity can tie in both ethics and aesthetics, such as how expectations set forth by
aesthetic ideals influence the ability for partners to communicate ethically.
The challenge with considering dance as a general form, and indeed partnering for
that matter, is largely an issue of how aesthetic, moral, and conventional norms influence
and saturate the systems of understanding within the practice of negotiation, evaluation,
and dialogue in and of partnering. To get at this normative problem requires first opening
up the ways in which partners communicate and understand one another, as well as the
standards and norms (e.g. beauty, understanding, trust) that are employed to evaluate
partnering systematically. Prominent analytic philosopher Paul W. Taylor (1961) frames
normative discourse as a theory of value. He suggests that value lives in “the logical
relations between normative assertions and empirical assertions” (Taylor 1961, xi), which 
I find relevant to the study of dance partnering since some aspects (though presumably not
all) of movement are observable and thus the empirical evaluations we make are subject to
normative assertions that inform both evaluation and prescription. To evaluate the system
of value means looking at partnering discursively. Taylor notes,
The language in which we express evaluations, prescribe acts, and
give reasons for or against evaluation and prescriptions, I call
“normative language”. When we judge an object to be good or an
act to be right, when we tell someone what he ought or ought not to
do, and when we try to justify such judgments and prescriptions, we
are carrying on normative discourse (preface, vii).
I find Taylor’s conception of normativity compelling because it offers broad strokes
for questioning values at large, especially in the overlap between aesthetic preferences and
ethical values.
Following the line of analytic philosophy, scholars argue that Plato’s choice to write
in the form of dramatic dialogues reflects a commitment to conversation as a crucial
element of knowledge (Puchner 2010, Spranzi 2011). In these dramatic dialogues, Socrates,
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understanding. More often, Socrates demonstrated that his interlocutors lacked knowledge,
earning him the nickname “gadfly” (Spranzi 2011). Throughout these exchanges, Socrates
demonstrated that he cared about arriving at the Truth more than he cared about his
interlocutors, and often at their expense. While his method is often called Socratic
Dialogue, Socrates’ method of exchange is more closely aligned with the ideals of dialectic,
an exchange which focuses explicitly on discovering truth (Spranzi 2011).
If dialectic exchanges are truth-seeking, what then is dialogue? Questioning this
distinction has been taken up by philosophers across cultures throughout history. In the
Western analytic tradition, Søren Kierkegaard, for example, distinguishes two forms of
exchanges: communication of knowledge (videns meddelelse) and the communication of
capability (kunnis meddelelse), respectively (Kierkegaard 1967, via Hermann 2008). Each 
form of exchange has its own value and, according to Kierkegaard, as reported by Hermann
(2008), it behooves the communicator to understand when and why to approach an 
interlocutor appropriately. Martin Buber relates dialogue to the act of turning toward others
(Buber 2003). In this way, Buber’s work suggests that dialogue upholds an ethical dynamic
between interlocutors such that the nature of the exchange is about coming together and
turning toward each other rather than necessarily seeking truth. Buber highlights the
difference between dialogue and dialectic by maintaining, “the life of dialogue is no
privilege of intellectual activity like dialectic. It does not begin in the upper story of
humanity. It begins no higher than where humanity begins. There are no gifted and ungifted
here, only those who give themselves and those who withhold themselves” (Buber 2003, 
40). Buber points to dialogue as an exchange that is natural, one that is widely accessible,
yet still requires some kind of commitment to relate.
The resources of analytic philosophy, such as conceptual analysis and thought
experiments, provide the very tools for differentiating between kinds of exchanges such as
dialectic and dialogue. While dialectic exchanges have been pursued as a method of
arriving at truth, they have not always been endorsed. Kant, for example, suggests that
[dialectic] is a logic of illusion – a sophistical art for giving to its ignorance,
in deed even to its intentional tricks, the air of truth, by imitating the method
of thoroughness, which logic prescribes in general, and using its topics for
the embellishment of every empty pretension.” (Kant 1998, 198).
That dialectic can give an outward appearance of truth serves to establish an 
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to justify the nature of exchange. This point is important for this thesis as I will argue for
the distinction between dancing together and partnering, including the problem of how 
certain actions may look attuned without actually being attuned. The debate between
dialogue and dialectic also raises important questions about the nature and purpose of
communicative exchanges between individuals. In this thesis, I take up this debate to
investigate how partnering is a deliberate practice based on physical communication in and
through movement. I will argue that partners relating through movement are always
communicating to each other, regardless of the purpose, intention, or form of practice. I am
inclined to endorse the work of Buber, to understand dialogue as an exchange in which 
partners value the relation at least as much, if not more, than the truth. The significance of
positioning dialogue in this way enables a focused investigation about the ethical realities
involved in physical exchanges between individuals.
Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Kant, Kierkegaard, and Buber all represent a particular
lineage of thought with respect to the philosophy of communication. Their work finds a
particular culminating point in the work of American philologist Herbert Paul Grice, who
took up the inquiry of dialogue by using the tradition of analytical philosophy to interrogate
the conditions of conversation. Grice has had a significant impact on the way theorists
approach the normative questions of communication in the philosophy of language. Using
his work as a jumping off point, I probe the conditions that are deserving of attention within
the practice of partnering as physical dialogue. I pick up this line of inquiry when 
investigating the conditions and norms of exchange in chapter five, including the question
of how dance partnering facilitates (or inhibits) the transfer of information between the very
bodies that move together, framing the traditional concept of audience within a more
intimate setting of those engaged in practice.
Cooperative Principle and Gricean Maxims
In 1967, Grice delivered a series of lectures at Harvard University, from which a
(1991) book was then published with the title Ways with Words. In chapter two of this
work, Logic and Conversation, Grice points to a linguistic debate that certain aspects of
natural and formal languages diverge in meaning. He focuses broadly on the dispute
between formalists and informalists, the former who believe that some concepts in natural
language “cannot be precisely or clearly defined, and that at least some statements
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the latter understand that “language serves many more important purposes besides those of
scientific inquiry; we can know perfectly well what an expression means (and so a fortiori
that it is intelligible) without knowing its analysis” (Grice 1991, 23). He attributes this
mistaken assumption to “inadequate attention to the nature and importance of the
conditions governing conversation” (Grice 1991, 24). For Grice, meaning seems to be
valuable insofar as individuals understand each other (or are able to understand each other)
in a conversation. He argues that conversation is a “purposive, indeed rational, behavior”
(Grice 1991, 28), and suggests “talk exchanges do not normally consist of a succession of
disconnected remarks, and would not be rational if they did. They are characteristically, to
some degree at least, cooperative efforts; and each participant recognizes in them, to some
extent, a common purpose or set of purposes, or at least a mutually accepted direction”
(Grice 1991, 26). This framing is broad enough to consider how non-verbal exchanges
function as cooperative efforts, in which a common purpose may be the pursuit of
connection. Grice proposes a general “cooperative principle”, which states “make your
conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the
accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged” (Grice 1991, 
26). This thesis will explore how partnering follows a general principle of cooperation, in
particular how such a purpose may have a significant impact on semantic construal between 
partners within the practice.
Though Grice frames his thinking for the conditions of conversation by proposing 
the purpose is “a maximally effective exchange of information” (Grice 1991, 28), he also 
concedes that the “specification is, of course, too narrow, and the scheme needs to be
generalized to allow for such general purposes as influencing or directing the actions of
others” (Grice 1991, 28). Within a conversation, Grice notes that the “purpose or direction 
may be fixed from the start [...] or it may evolve during the exchange; it may be fairly
definite, or it may be so indefinite as to leave very considerable latitude to the participants.
But at each stage, SOME possible conversational moves would be excluded as
conversationally unsuitable” (Grice 1991, 26). This is especially relevant when considering 
how partners interact when entering a physical practice, such as changing and influencing 
their spatial relationship through touch, eye contact, breath. In chapter five, Norms of
Exchange, I will consider the conditions of communication in dancing together. I will use
terminology from the study of non-verbal interaction, including from the work of American
linguistics George L. Trager (Trager 1958) and Edward T. Hall (Hall 1966). For partnered
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is particularly fascinating, especially when considering the governing body that would have
the power to deem something “unsuitable”. Bringing Elgin and Grice into conversation 
provides the framework to consider the significance of communication in partnered
movement. This brings us back to the case in which partnering can appear (kinesthetically 
and/or visually) more or less attuned. In some, cases this may be up to an outside party,
such as an instructor, choreographer, or coach, while in others it is up to the practitioners
themselves to decide to voice concerns. How partners resolve the sensation or perception 
of disconnection is as relevant as the physical moves that got them there in the first place.
Grice’s Cooperative Principle stresses more than just devoting attention to one’s partner.
There is an implication of receptivity—that is, receiving and interpreting in a way that is
appropriate to the context. Within the context of dance partnering, this position implicates
an ethical claim, given that failure to respond appropriately may lead to misunderstanding 
that causes harm and injury. I return to this in chapters six, seven, and eight when examining 
the norms of attunement.
Grice’s major contribution in this work is a concept he calls “implicature”, in which
certain claims can be made in conversation without actually being explicitly spoken. My
thesis extends Grice’s work by investigating not only how partnering involves physical
implicatures, but also the consequences these physical implicatures can solicit (e.g.
misinterpretation, misleading, misunderstanding) in the context of dance together. Within
partnering, implicature is especially tricky since words are not the medium by which
physical dialogue occurs. Grice helps by giving us a conceptual framework that can be used 
in the investigation of dancing together. This is relevant to the qualities with which a
movement is articulated, and how it is subsequently interpreted. I will unpack this idea in
chapter five.
To question the extent to which the Cooperative Principle can be generally 
applicable, Grice proposes four broad categories: Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Manner,
which together delineate specific maxims that “yield results in accordance with the
Cooperative Principle” (Grice 1991, 26). The maxims call for individuals to make
conversational contributions that are “as informative as required” (but not more
informative), to refrain from saying what one believes is false and for which one “lacks
adequate evidence”, “to avoid obscurity of expression”, “to avoid ambiguity”, to be “brief”
and “orderly” (Grice 1991, 26-27). Implicatures, Grice notes, arise when a maxim is
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conveyed beyond what has been spoken. In this way, Grice stresses that each agent in the
conversation must be sensitive—not only the one speaking, but also the one(s) listening.
It is important to note that Grice’s work is also fundamentally normative. In
generalizing about the Cooperative Principle, Grice maintains, “I expect a partner’s
contribution to be appropriate to immediate needs at each stage of the transaction” and “I
expect a partner to make it clear what contribution he is making and to execute his
performance with reasonable dispatch” (Grice 1991, 28). These expectations set up norms
about what partners ought to do when engaging in conversation. Adapting Grice’s
argument to view dance can be unhinged by a simple case of individuals moving together
without, what might appear to be, a clear purpose. The simple response is that transgression 
or lack of a cooperative principle renders the physical exchange something different than 
conversation, such as two coordinated monologues. It is possible to extend the argument
by saying those individuals moving together without purpose are not, strictly speaking,
engaging in the practice of “partnering”. On the surface, this seems rather unfair. Certain
movement practices that utilize the term partnering cannot be criticized simply because
constituents are exploring the infinite possibilities of physical interaction. Thus, in chapter
six I will explore the different modes of relating that are possible in communicative
exchanges. I am particularly interested in the tension that is present when considering how
one approaches the communication necessary to share and/or shift weight in relation to
other(s). Assuming attunement can only emerge from responses that are contextually
suitable (i.e. appropriate), there are important claims to consider about one’s responsibility 
to listen and respond to change. The notion of conversational suitability will appear often 
throughout this work. I will examine the competence required to be able to partner in a
way that adheres to the Cooperative Principle, particularly in how reasoning systematically
about the conditions of interaction provide the space to build on tacit, experiential
knowledge.
In chapter six, I will expand on Grice’s work by positioning his philosophy in
dialogue with 20th century dance theorist and practitioner, Rudolf von Laban’s concept of
effort and American psychologist J.J. Gibson’s concept of affordance to further investigate
the epistemic dimensions of communication in dancing together. There are some cases of
Gibson being used in relation to dance partnering, particularly in the work of dance scholar
and practitioner Michael Kimmel (Kimmel 2009, Kimmel and Rogler 2018, Kimmel et al
2018). I find the notion of effort and affordance particularly relevant to expand on Grice’s
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partners. In this thesis, I will examine the exchange of information in relation to how
partners move (e.g. the degree of effort, the awareness of affordances within the
partnership) in ways that may seem to flout or disregard cooperation, such as the ambiguity
in maintaining a restrictive embrace and obscuring effort from an audience.
Following the philosophy of Grice, I will examine partnering with the
presupposition of a Cooperative Principle. Since partners are negotiating through
movement, I believe systematic study can reveal important aspects of physical interaction 
that can support an epistemological foundation of partnering. Connecting Elgin and Grice,
I will examine in particular how the communicative act of partnering requires a particular
exercise of agency. While formulaic study can be supremely disruptive to the emergence 
of connection, Grice’s work paves a way to approach the normative dimensions of
partnering, first by understanding communicative potential of movement itself by reflecting 
on the conditions that need to be satisfied in order for certain norms to adhere (e.g.
communicating well or developing mutual understanding).
Contracts, Rules, and Joint Commitments
Grice also notes how he was “attracted by the idea that observance of the
Cooperative Principle and the maxims, in a talk exchange, could be thought of as a quasi-
contractual matter” (Grice 1991, 29). In other words, Grice is interested in how partners
uphold their side of the agreement in a conversation. He suggests a contingency that there
are “certain features that jointly distinguish cooperative transactions” such as “participants
have some common immediate aim” and that a “transaction should continue in appropriate
style unless both parties are agreeable that it should terminate” (Grice 1991, 29). The goals
he suggests of reciprocally giving and receiving information, as well as influencing and 
being influenced, seem in direct line with the purported goals and values of partnering in a
broad sense, and so his work lays the groundwork for examining how maxims such as being
informative, avoiding obscurity and ambiguity, and being orderly fit in accordance with 
exchange of information through dancing together.
Ultimately, however, Grice comes to realize that “while some such quasi-
contractual basis as this may apply to some cases, there are too many types of exchange,
like quarreling and letter writing, that it fails to fit comfortably” (Grice 1991, 29). Grice is
always aware of the ways in which the purpose of a conversation can shift the attention of
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questions about the responsibility of each agent. He suggests, “anyone who cares about the
goals that are central to conversation/communication [..] must be expected to have an
interest [..] in participation in talk exchanges that will be profitable only on the assumption 
that they are conducted in general accordance with the [Cooperative Principle] and the
maxims” (Grice 1991, 30). Though he has doubt about whether such a conclusion can be
reached, by introducing the notion of “care”, particularly in relation the central goals of
communication, Grice points to the teleological concern for conversations. This
responsibility he places on the interlocutors themselves, though he leaves certain questions
unanswered, such as to what extent should one take responsibility for what one may be
implicating? To what extent should a partner be assuming anything other than what is
articulated?
To get at these questions, it is necessary to have to set the foundation for the
significance of responsibility between individuals. There is a rich history of social
responsibility, which finds some culmination in the work of political philosopher John
Rawls. In his seminal (1955) paper titled “Two Concepts of Rules”, Rawls uses conceptual
analysis to differentiate “the justification of a practice and the justification of a particular
action falling under it” (Rawls 1955, 18). Rawls highlights the distinct rules and 
responsibilities of promise-making as a type of contract between two or more people. In
considering the practice of promise-making, Rawls looks at the kind of contingencies
partners can claim in order to break a promise. He is particularly concerned with the
problem of how a utilitarian view, that one will do what is best for the greater good, is at
odds with the rules of promises, especially in cases where promises are broken because
they seem not to uphold the greater good anymore. He considers examples in which one
promises a partner a sum of money, and upon winning that sum of money decides it will
be for the greater good if he keeps it. The rules of promises prevent one from breaking an
agreement simply because it is no longer serving the greater good.
Rawls goes deeper into theorizing rules by outlining two distinct concepts:
summary rules and practice rules. Summary rules, according to Rawls, are rules of “thumb”
or convenience. They represent a “summary” of previous decisions arrived at by direct
application of more basic reasoning (such as employing the utilitarian principle). They are
useful because similar cases tend to reoccur, and as such are “regarded as reports that cases
of a certain sort have been found on other grounds to be properly decided in a certain way”
(Rawls 1955, 19). Rawls maintains that decisions made on particular cases are logically 
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require the stage-setting of a practice of which this rule is a part” (Rawls 1955, 22). In
principle, one is “always entitled to reconsider the correctness of a rule and to question
whether or not it is proper to follow it in a particular case” (Rawls 1955, 23). According to 
Rawls, using a summary rule is justified if it will lead to an independently correct decision.
A basic example is looking both ways before crossing the street. It is not a law, but it is
likely the right thing to do. A more complex example is something like “one should tell the
truth”. Rawls considers this example when proposing a situation in which a terminally ill
person asks a friend to find out for him whether his illness is terminal. It may cause further
psychological distress, so whether it is right for the friend to disclose this information (i.e.
tell the truth) is independent of the rule of thumb. The problem is considering whether a
summary rule can serve as useful in every case.
To juxtapose summary rules, Rawls proposes practice rules, which are “logically
prior to particular cases” (Rawls 1955, 25). As opposed to a rule of thumb, a practice rule
applies to particular practices. Rawls gives baseball as an example, in which it is only
possible to “strike out” given the rules of the game and the parameters of having bases,
batters, and pitchers. Actions are thus governed by the practice, such that asking, “can I
have another strike” after having three would not make sense since the rules of baseball
clearly stipulate three strikes. Rawls notes that the “practice view leads to an entirely 
different conception of the authority which each person has to decide on the propriety of
following a rule in particular cases” (Rawls 1955, 26). When questioning whether to follow
a practice rule, Rawls suggests that we are effectively questioning the design of the practice
itself. Actions governed by practice rules are correct or incorrect depending on the design
of the practice. We can consider, for example, a couple dancing the tango in which one
asks whether they have to maintain the “dance frame” the whole time. Breaking the frame
is certainly allowed in partnering as a whole, but in the case of the particular action it may
mean breaking the rules such that one is simply not dancing the tango. Defenses of
particular actions falling under practices must take the form of appeals to the rules of the
practice, and then defenses of the practice as a whole. Rawls concludes the article by 
suggesting that “there is no inference whatsoever to be drawn with respect to whether or
not one should accept the practices of one’s society” (Rawls 1955, 32). In other words, 
Rawls opens the space for considering ethical action on a smaller scale than gross
misconduct by considering how and when to apply each type of rule. He maintains that
“one can be as radical as one likes but in the case of actions specified by practices the
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(Rawls 1955, 32). Thus, given the provided tools to inquire systematically, Rawls urges us
to consider the responsibilities of reasoning about and within social practice.
While it may seem like a stretch to apply Rawls’ work to dance, I find that his
analytic approach provides a useful template for considering the underlying rules and
principles of dancing together. Thus, I extend Rawls’ conceptual analysis to consider the
justification of partnering alongside what it might look like to reason about responsibilities
for each partner executing a specific action like moving together to music. From this view,
it is possible to understand movement practices (e.g. tango, contact improvisation, ballet)
as particular conventions of partnering. From there, I can consider the ways in which 
partnering norms are manifest and employed for particular aims. Rawls provides the
foundation to consider the significance of responsibility. 
Political philosopher Margaret Gilbert dives deeper into responsibilities,
obligations, and rules by considering the social phenomena when people do things together.
In her seminal (1990) paper entitled “Walking Together: A Paradigmatic Social
Phenomenon”, Gilbert considers the necessary philosophical conditions for two people to 
go for a walk together. She argues that walking together requires the two parties to 
constitute what she calls a “plural subject”. In her view, “plural subjecthood extends not
only to goals but also, at least, to beliefs and principles of action” (Gilbert 1990, 10). That
is, the two parties must share collective beliefs and joint principles.
In her later work, Gilbert unpacks the idea of collective belief and joint principles
systematically. Starting with individual decision-making, Gilbert argues that, “a personal
decision commits its maker insofar as it has the relevant normative force for the person in
question” (Gilbert 2017, 756). Thus, if one makes the decision to encounter a partner, one
does so with a commitment such that one’s actions will serve to pursue and uphold the
encounter. Gilbert is careful to note that the defining feature of personal commitments is
such that an individual “is in a position unilaterally both to make and to rescind them”
(Gilbert 2017, 131). In other words, the fact that an individual makes a commitment means
there is something they now ought to do, and they also have the power to change or end the
commitment. Gilbert suggests that, all things being equal, this commitment is such that
“one ought to change one’s mind first rather than act contrary to one’s decision” (Gilbert
2017, 756).
Gilbert’s notion of personal commitment sets the stage for two important concepts.
One is the fact that the normative constraint creates the possibility of error with what Gilbert
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succeed, even if the failure is insignificant. If, for example, I decide that I will take ballet
in the evening, then get carried away with writing such that I lose track of time, my
commitment means that, in not taking class, I have acted in error. As such, Gilbert argues
that I am in a position to “rebuke” myself for not conforming to my decision. In other
words, I obligated myself to ballet. Then, in missing the class, I have failed to satisfy my
obligation. This obligation, Gilbert points out, need not be a moral one. It is simply the
result of a normative process, wherein the product does not conform.
This feature of commitment in decision-making is crucial for the setting of
Gilbert’s second concept, which she calls “joint commitment”. Gilbert argues that:
A basic joint commitment comes about as follows: each of two or more
people openly expresses his readiness jointly to commit them all in a certain 
way, and their having made these expressions is common knowledge
between the parties. By this I mean, roughly, that the expressions are
entirely out in the open between them, and each knows this (Gilbert 2006,
131).
Gilbert maintains that joint commitment must reflect a) some kind of expression of
readiness (which need not be verbal, as in the leaning forward of a kiss or meeting 
someone’s quarrelsome tone), and b) the condition of common knowledge. To return to the
problem of walking together, Gilbert argues that the two people can only be said to be
walking together if they a) satisfy a plural subject (the two individuals) must establish their
readiness and this must be common knowledge to them both. She notes that “even going 
for a walk together has a political dimension” in that there are “many problems to solve”
such that “one may always question whether collective decisions and joint principles have
been arrived at in a fair way and whether their content is acceptable” (Gilbert 1990, 10-11).
I will investigate joint commitment throughout this work as a necessary condition for
partnering.
In another paper on joint action, Gilbert offers an interesting example in the realm
of partnered dance. The example is as follows:
Suppose that Joe and Liz are now on the dance floor, having established
their joint commitment. The heel of Liz’s shoe is suddenly trapped in the
wooden floor and she appears to be about to fall. Joe jumps to attention and 
rescues his partner. Has he acted in a caring manner? Has he acted with
concern for his partner’s well-being? Has he shown that he considers his
partner’s needs as important as his own, or that he values her as an end in
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Gilbert argues that, given what we know of the circumstance, the answer to all of
the questions is “not necessarily”. For Gilbert, the normative force of the joint commitment
is not necessarily a moral one. So, according to what we know of Joe based on the
description above (which is notably not much), it is not obvious or in fact necessary that
his rescuing of Liz is a moral act. Gilbert suggests that “it is enough for him to understand 
that the joint commitment to which he is subject is such that he ought – in a non-moral
sense – to conform to it, and that conforming to it requires that he does his best to keep his
dance with Liz on track. In that case he ought – in a non-moral sense – to rescue her from
falling” (Gilbert 2018, 764). The question we are left with is how Joe goes about rescuing 
Liz. Does he gracefully scoop her up and place her down on balance? Does he yank her
arm to keep her from falling, and in so doing cause a minor case of whiplash? Does he
further disrupt the integrity of the dance by moving suddenly to free her foot? The important
aspect that Gilbert does not allude to is the aesthetic dimension of the joint commitment in
dancing together. This is unsurprising, as she clarifies that in her work she is not asking,
“under what conditions from a physical point of view are people doing things together”,
but rather “what thoughts or conceptions must be involved in order for people to count as
(intentionally) dancing together” (Gilbert 1989, 165). Elaborating on Gilbert’s work, I will
interrogate the necessary conditions to dance together. I will construct an account that
examines the relationship between physical conditions and thoughts or conceptions in order
to say that individuals are partnering. Moreover, I will examine partnering as a special kind 
of joint commitment, with a particular content and set of exclusionary properties that are
aesthetically driven. In chapter four, I will consider joint commitment in depth, and in
chapters seven and eight, I will consider how the physical demands of partnering relate to
moral norms of making responsible decisions. 
Annette Baier and the Philosophy of Trust
I look to moral philosopher Annette Baier, who, in her seminal paper, Trust and 
Antitrust, bemoans a gap in philosophy that has failed to provide a general account of
morality in trust relationships. She raises a concern that trust is not always necessarily a
good for which one ought to strive. She states, “we do in fact, wisely or stupidly, virtuously
or viciously, show trust in a great variety of forms, and manifest a great variety of versions






            
        
 
         
         
        
          
     
            
        
       
 
           
        
              
          
       
      
           
             
             
           
         
       
             
          
           
            
           
                
                  
             
             
               
           
            
             
45
Baier shows that there are varieties of trust, and sketches out the relationship
between trust, relative power, and voluntary abilities. She maintains,
Trust is often mixed with other species of reliance on persons. Trust
which is reliance on another’s good will, perhaps minimal good will,
contrasts with the forms of reliance on others’ reactions and attitudes
which are shown by the comedian, the advertiser, the blackmailer, the
kidnapper-extortioner, and the terrorist, who all depend on particular
attitudes and reactions of others for the success of their actions. We all
depend on one anothers’ psychology in countless ways, but this is not
yet to trust them (Baier 1986, 234-235).
Baier is adamant about differentiating different forms of trust, framing her
exposition around the implicit assumption that “trust is a good and that disappointing
known trust is always prima facie wrong, meeting it always prima facie right” (Baier 1986,
235). She maintains that “when the trust relationship itself is corrupt and perpetuates
brutality, tyranny, or injustice, trusting may be silly self-exposure, and disappointing and
betraying trust, including encouraged trust, may be not merely morally permissible but
morally praiseworthy” (Baier 1986, 253). Baier breaks apart the rhetoric of trust,
demonstrating how we should be more critical in order to act morally. Close, intimate ties
may allow the space to thrive, but there is still a responsibility for what is being created in
relationship. This critical lens informs the way in which I will consider the moral
dimensions of partnering, particularly how partners rely on and support each other to fulfill
choreographic aims while maintaining moral standing.
Baier points out that there are different forms of trust, including at least
“unconscious trust, unwanted trust, forced receipt of trust, and trust which the trusted is
unaware of” (Baier 1986, 235). Taking a step toward a formal definition, Baier suggests
that trust is “accepted vulnerability to another’s possible but not expected ill will (or lack 
of good will) toward one” (Baier 1986, 235). To differentiate between these forms of trust,
Baier suggests a test by which we can judge “trust from a moral point of view” (Baier 1986,
232). This test is built on an exposition of the “varieties of sorts of good and things one
values or cares about, which can be left or put within the striking powers of others, and the
variety of ways we can let or leave others “close” enough to what we value to be able to 
harm it” (Baier 1986 235). It is important to note that Baier does not, however, consider
trust explicitly within the physical domain. She examines trust as a mental phenomenon
and argues that “intentional trusting does require awareness of one’s confidence that the






          
       
       
            
        
            
           




            
            
          
         
              


















examine Baier’s notion of trust and discretionary power in relation to the moral dimensions
engendered by the physical demands of partnering. I am particularly interested in 
unpacking the ways in which partners may exercise discretionary power successfully by
being aware of the kinds of harm they can inflict. To support my reading of Baier, I will
look at contemporary philosophers of ethics including Paul Faulkner and Thomas
Simpson’s (2017) edited volume Philosophy of Trust, as well as philosophers Richard
Holton, Fay Niker and Laura Specker Sullivan, all of whom offer insight into the
complexities of trust relationships. I pick up this line of inquiry in chapter seven on Moral
Norms.
Conclusion
This study will draw primarily from the epistemologies of Elgin, Grice, Gilbert, and
Baier, in order to unpack the necessary conditions that make partnering a discursive
practice, subject to normative discourse that informs the negotiation, dialogue, and
evaluation of interaction between practitioners. In the next chapter, I will present the
methods used to engage in this inquiry, as well as the underlying methodology of analytic
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Chapter Three: Methodology
Analytic philosophy has a rich tradition of analyzing concepts, and includes
branches such as ontology, metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and ethics
(Williamson 2018). As the name suggests, analytic philosophy is concerned with the
analysis of ideas Williamson (2018). Approaching dance from a philosophical point of
view means uncovering concepts and ideas embedded in the actions of dancing together. I 
find analytic philosophy valuable in order to uncover the nuances of dancing together that
are generic and applicable across forms of practice. In this short chapter, I will outline the
analytic methods I employ throughout the thesis.
The methods of analytic philosophy include distinct approaches such as conceptual
analysis, thought experiments, counterfactuals, and hypothetical scenarios (Williamson
2018). In this thesis, I will focus primarily on thought experiments and hypothetical
scenarios as methods of analysis. These methods are pertinent to this thesis as I will be
examining multiple dimensions of partnering, including the term itself (language), the
nature of the act (ontology), the generalizability of the act (metaphysics), how to understand 
and evaluate the act (epistemology), and how people can (and should) treat each other in 
the act (ethics). While this may seem widespread, analytic philosophy provides precisely
the kind of tools to conceptually unpack and interrogate complex ideas and actions, from
the broadest point of physical interaction to the subtleties of attunement. Analytic
philosophy has had a very rich tradition of examining the nature and conditions of
knowledge, as well as metaphysical assumptions about the relationship between 
appearance and reality. There has also been a history of rejecting metaphysics, given the
idea that looking at things in an analytical vacuum is a worthless pursuit if the aim is
accessible knowledge. I recognize that philosophy is useful insofar as the tacit assumptions
of analysis are being named and considered along the way. My main aim in using analytical
philosophy is to interrogate the nuanced ideas and concepts embedded in the act of dancing
together. Rather than focus on the psychological underpinnings of what people think they 
are doing, I focus on the epistemic problems in the relationship between thought (e.g.
intention) and action (e.g. behavioral expression). This is especially important in dancing
together, where the intentions and behaviors of individuals may misalign in complex ways.
In chapter four, I will interrogate the main concepts of intentionalism in joint action drawn 
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the context of dance, which gives rise to the investigation of normative dimensions
explored in subsequent chapters.
Throughout this work I will investigate what a descriptive theory of partnering
might look like, to provide a critical lens through which to analyze physical interactions in
dance. I will also speculate about the significance of joint action in dance. To do this, I will
first analyze the conditions necessary to establish that individuals are dancing together, and 
then analyze the norms that contribute to the evaluation of dancing together well.
Conditions in this thesis relate both to the thoughts and actions from which it is possible to 
say that people are in fact dancing together. Norms in this thesis relate to the evaluation of
the established conditions, such that it is possible to claim that people are dancing together
well. The challenging part is defining the conditions for partnering, and the related norms
of partnering well. I will examine partnering as a kind of practice that comes to be in certain
circumstances. To reason about partnering well, I seek to argue for a gradient in partnering,
wherein some cases of people moving together will not be partnering, while in other cases
dancers will exemplify poor partnering. A gradient is an analytic tool that demonstrates
distinctions in degree or scale. By demonstrating that concepts such as attunement and
dependence function in degrees, I aim to unpack the normative dimensions of dancing 
together.
Analytic Tools
Analytic philosophy provides the tools to create an epistemological foundation for
evaluating norms within communication, attunement, reasoning, and trust in partnering. I
chose to focus on creating an epistemological foundation because my central research
questions examine the criteria and standards of evidence about whether an interaction is
constitutive of dancing together, and the factors that contribute to making such claims.
Creating an epistemological foundation entails systematically demonstrating particular
justifications and distinctions. I will examine and propose justifications for why certain 
interactions count as dancing together by examining the conditions that need to be satisfied 
when one engages with others. Creating an epistemological foundation also provides the
support for determining the kinds of understanding that is required within the act of dancing
together. Using Elgin’s epistemology as a lens, I shift the focus from what is it that dancers
need to know to what it is they need to understand. While broad understanding is contingent
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it is important to analyze the specific role of understanding within the act of dancing
together. As an epistemic matter, this analysis will reveal further insight into the normative
dimensions of dancing together. Rather than derive generalizations about any particular
dance form, I use thought experiments and hypothetical scenarios to conduct a conceptual
analysis that interrogates partnering as an exact term with particular conditions and norms.
To understand the normative significance of physical encounters and exchanges, I seek to
understand what aspects of partnered actions can be evaluated. Taking an epistemological
approach allows me to parse the norms with which to evaluate the quality of interaction
between individuals, such as attunement, mutual understanding, and trust. I will rely on the
conceptual analysis to construct thought-experiments and hypothetical scenarios, which
will in turn serve to demonstrate some of the key normative dimensions of dancing
together.
Assuming that dancing together involves a number of factors such as competence
and understanding, it follows that there are multiple, discrete articulations by which one
can respond to any given action. This assumption serves as the basis for conceptual
analysis. Conceptual analysis is rooted in language and consists of breaking down concepts
by examining relevant terms in order to gain a clearer picture of a concept (Williamson 
2018). Conceptual analysis also functions as a tool to make reasoning visible. For example,
I analyze how the concept of dancing together has particular terms associated and
embedded within it. These terms have their own concepts associated with them, so the
investigation of partnering requires a complex conceptual analysis of terms and their related
ideas. I will use conceptual analysis throughout the thesis whenever breaking a concept
down by the associated terms.
Philosopher of social action, Margaret Gilbert, points out, “a standard and important
route to the analysis and explication of concepts is a consideration of how we use certain
key words or phrases” (Gilbert 1989, 11). Starting with the inexactness of partnering as a
concept, there is an easy claim to make that partnering is simply the term used to describe
the act whenever two people say they are dancing together. This is problematic when we
look at the range of qualities that the term partnering would describe. Thus, investigating 
the conditions necessary for dancing together means clarifying partnering as an exact term
that refers to a particular kind of practice of dancing together. Prominent analytic
philosopher, Rudolf Carnap, maintains that while the explication seeks an exact solution to
an inexact problem, we “cannot decide in an exact way if the solution is right or wrong […]
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4). As tools, explication and clarification enable the transformation of inexact concepts by 
recognizing tacit assumptions about the term. To arrive at an explication is to demonstrate
the term as “exact”, “fruitful”, and “simple” (Carnap 1962, 7). I will adopt Carnap’s tool
of explication the analyze the conceptual aspects of dancing together.
Carnap’s tool of explication highlights an important distinction between language
and ideas. If partnering can be used as a term simply to refer to people dancing together, 
then dancing together and partnering can be used interchangeably. I find this problematic,
at least because there are different ways of dancing together. This thesis probes the
conceptual differences between dancing together and partnering, assuming that partnering
is more than just dancing together. As a tool, explication works to interrogate linguistic and
conceptual ambiguities. Concepts require defining relevant terms. Throughout this study, I
will clarify terms, and examine the tacit assumptions of the terms as they relate to dancing 
together.
Defining the necessary conditions of partnering, including joint commitment and 
mutual attunement, provides the basis for establish criteria for evaluating dancing together
given particular aesthetic, epistemic, and ethical values. The aesthetic refers to the quality
and method of movement (felt, observed), the epistemic questions the features which can
be taken as evidence of attunement, and the ethical relates to the quality of interaction
between partners (e.g. trust, care). By analyzing the embedded concepts of idea and action
within the act of dancing together, I will be able to critically investigate the instantiations
of embodied ethics in physical interaction. By examining the conditions and norms of
partnering, I will be able to construct a critical vocabulary for questioning assumptions and
reasoning about our systems (trained, habituated, enculturated, or otherwise) of
understanding ourselves in relation to (or as extensions of) other(s).
Catherine Elgin maintains “a thought experiment is an imaginative exercise
designed to investigate what would happen if certain conditions were satisfied” (Elgin
2017, 245). I use the work of Gilbert, Baier, and Grice to construct and evaluate thought-
experiments about the nature of partnered movement paradigms with respect to conditions
that modulate quality of interaction. Elgin further argues that “a thought experiment has a
narrative structure, with a beginning, middle and end. It is subject to interpretation, and to
reinterpretation if the background assumptions change” (Elgin 2017, 235). Taking Elgin’s
ideas on board, my methods have included modifying the narrative structure of thought
experiments based on hypothetical scenarios that may occur in typical situations (e.g. one
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a broomstick). Examples from outside dance, such as leaning on a wall or playing the
clarinet, reveal insight about aspects of concepts embedded in physical actions. These
hypothetical scenarios allow for analysis and interpretation of complex scenarios that may
occur when dancing together. They offer opportunities to take on different perspectives. As
Elgin suggests, “by adopting a different perspective, we come to see familiar items in new
ways. We thereby appreciate relationships between them that we previously had
overlooked or underemphasized” (Elgin 2017, 206). To adopt a new perspective about
partnering assumes that there is not one right way to partner. By working through a number
of scenarios my aim is to present an account for the way partners can reason about their
interaction, and advocate for an approach that values communication, mutual attunement,
and deliberate decision-making. Conceptual analysis through thought experiments and 
hypothetical scenarios provides the core method to reveal how partnering might act as a
mode of symbolization that communicates intersubjectivity, realized in and through
interactive movement.
Whenever possible, I use analytic philosophy to move away from describing the
intrapersonal, in favor of critically evaluating the interpersonal. Many of the thought
experiments and hypothetical scenarios are elaborations of Gilbert’s examples of Jack and
Sue dancing together from her 1990 paper “Walking Together”. Gilbert offers hypothetical
scenarios that I expand upon in order to consider intention in dancing together. Rather than
focus on the phenomenal experience of dancing together, I investigate the conditions that
would qualify or disqualify claims about dancing together. Conceptual analysis of
hypothetical scenarios enables deeper insight into the epistemic dimensions of what it is
that people are doing when dancing together, rather than examining what they think or feel
they are doing.
To move beyond the hypothetical territory, I turn to an example of an actual duet.
In chapter six, I analyze two recordings of Petite Mort, an existing duet choreographed by
Jiri Kylian (1996/2006). Analyzing two different performances of Petite Mort offers the
opportunity to examine actual behavior in dancing together. Rather than conduct a
historiography of the piece or an ethnography with the dancers themselves, I will rely on
conceptual analysis to demonstrate critical aspects of observable behavior in dancing
together. The recorded duets offer material from which to construct thought experiments
to further analyze the complexity of dancing together.
In addition to conceptual analysis through philosophy, I have observed professional
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dance parties for dances such as the swing, salsa, bachata, as well as DanceSport
competitions, and rehearsals and performances of professional companies including the
Royal Swedish Ballet, Boston Ballet, Batsheva Dance Company, Berlin Staatsballett, and
the Forsythe Company, among others. This observation is paired with my own studio
practice dancing ballet, contact improvisation, tango, ballroom, and other social dance
forms. My studio practice has served in furthering conceptual analysis to unpack generic
problems in dancing together, such as negotiating the shifting and sharing of weight. While
I recognize that distinct forms of practice have their own ideologies, I have used 
observation and practice to return to the problem of what qualifies as dancing together, and 
what kinds of norms adhere to the evaluation of partnering.
Conceptual analysis brings attention to the philosophical problem of how the 
concepts associated with partnering relate to elements critical to the generic act of dancing
together. Though I use the particular example of Kylian’s Petite Mort, it is beyond the
scope of this thesis to comment on the specificities of any particular partnering practice or
to compare and contrast practices cross-culturally. Methodologically, conceptual analysis
allows for the creation of an epistemological foundation from which to demonstrate that
the act of partnering is distinct from dancing together. Demonstrating this distinction is
crucial to support critical and nuanced normative discourse of dancing together. In the next
chapter, I will lay out the conditions of dancing together, in order to differentiate the
concept of partnering.
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In this chapter, I will consider the conditions necessary to dance together. I will
draw on the work of philosopher of social behavior and joint action, Margaret Gilbert.
Throughout her work, Gilbert interrogates what it means for people to do things together
(Gilbert 1989, 1990, 2006, 2017). For example, in her 1990 seminal paper, Gilbert asks,
“what is it for two people to go for a walk together?” (Gilbert 1990, 2). Throughout the
paper, Gilbert argues for conditions that establish what she calls a plural subject. These
conditions include the foundation for a joint commitment based on each member
“expressing willingness” to form a plural subject with a particular goal “in conditions of
common knowledge” (Gilbert 1990, 7). For Gilbert, common knowledge means that each
member knows of the other’s goal to walk together (as opposed to each just thinking to
themselves that they’d like to engage in walking together without establishing it to the
other). Gilbert also maintains that both common knowledge and willingness may be
expressed in a number of different ways, such as the way two people understand they are
willing to walk together by continuing to walk alongside each other after a relatively short
amount of time. Gilbert is careful to note that plural subjecthood “extends not only to goals,
but also, at least, to beliefs and principles of action” (Gilbert 1990, 10).
Gilbert’s account of taking a walk together fits into the broader scope of her work
as a paradigm case of doing something with others, which she refers to as “joint action”.
Based on Gilbert’s account of how doing something together is contingent on establishing 
a plural subject, I will analyze the necessary conditions within the context of dance.
Following Gilbert, I will interrogate how dancing together is contingent on expressing 
willingness for a shared goal, belief or principle of action (presumably dancing together),
in which willingness is common knowledge between partners. I will put the theories of
Gilbert in dialogue with epistemologist Catherine Elgin to consider epistemic problems
between thought and action in dancing together. Aligning Gilbert with Elgin, I will then
consider what makes partnering distinct by suggesting that partnering is a special kind of
dancing together.
While Gilbert does not write in detail about dance, her work opens important
dimensions about what it means for individuals to interact with each other such that they
form a plural subject. In this way, Gilbert’s work provides the foundation for a deeper
analysis into the underlying epistemology of concepts in dancing together. Drawing from
her work, I will examine the conditions of what it means to do something together in the
context of dance. What conditions need to be satisfied in order to dance together? To
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establish individuals as doing something together physically. In this chapter, I will (1)
operationalize key concepts, including expression, willingness, ability, understanding, and
commitment in the context of dancing together, (2) provide a conceptual framing of these
relevant concepts to demonstrate how dancing together is a special kind of joint action, and 
(3) demonstrate the normative problems that arise when evaluating the act of dancing
together on the basis of commitment. This chapter will form the basis for a normative
discussion about systematically evaluating dancing together that will unfold in later
chapters. I will begin by unpacking Gilbert’s notion of expressing willingness in the context
of dance. I will explore each concept separately in order to begin to explore the nuances of
dancing together.
Willingness
Gilbert notes that there needs to be some kind of exchange or interaction to “express
willingness”. She presents an example in which one person, Sue, is going for a walk and
suddenly realizes that a figure is walking alongside her. Gilbert argues “physical proximity
is clearly not enough to make it the case that they are going for a walk together. It may 
disturb Sue precisely because they are not going for a walk together” (Gilbert 1990, 2,
emphasis in the original). The scenario quickly shifts when Sue recognizes the figure
walking alongside her is Jack Smith, someone she wishes to know better. Recognizing Jack 
as a potential friend, she is no longer disturbed. But there is more to be said about the
physical nuances of expressing willingness.
Gilbert’s example establishes that if two people walk next to each other, they are
not necessarily expressing willingness to go for a walk together. By walking alongside each
other, it is possible that two people are merely going in the same direction in close
proximity. From the outside, it may even look like they are walking together. To illustrate
this point more clearly, consider a crowded sidewalk on a street in New York City. Many 
people walk in close proximity, but one would hardly say they are all walking together.
Gilbert argues that “in some contexts it may be enough for both parties to continue walking 
alongside each other for several minutes without any sign of discomfort” (Gilbert 1990, 3).
While this may be true in some contexts, this is clearly not the case in the context of New
York City where individuals can walk alongside each other for more than several minutes
without signs of discomfort, merely because they are walking in the same direction.
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New York City example may seem tangential, it is important to consider the physical
nuances of individuals when moving in close proximity with others.
The proximity example in New York City can be illustrated in the context of a
crowded dance floor. The music plays and everyone is dancing in close proximity, but one
would hardly say that everyone is dancing together, based on Gilbert’s idea of expressed
willingness. The streets of New York and a crowded dance club are both a particular kind
of environment where people can move in close proximity without any significance. But
what happens if the dance floor is completely empty except for two individuals? Physical
proximity may still not be expressing willingness to dance together. Consider a scenario in 
which Sue is dancing on her own and suddenly realizes that someone is dancing next to 
her. Suppose the individual is the same hypothetical Jack Smith. Jack may have gotten lost
in his own rhythm and ended up in close proximity to Sue. The proximity may also be
merely a passing moment, if Jack closes the distance in order to pass by Sue, pauses to
watch Sue dancing on her own for a few moments, and keeps going to the other side of the
dance floor where his date is waiting for him. This may also be a malicious proximity, if
Jack wishes to coercively impose on Sue. Then his proximity is still an expression of
willingness, though notably not of dancing together. When Jack dances close to Sue, his
close physical proximity on its own is not enough to be understood as an expression of
willingness to dance together with Sue.
There are two terms that have been presented here that need further clarification:
expression and willingness. I understand an expression to be any kind of discernable
manifestation. Walking together involves the discernable manifestation of walking
alongside each other. Thus in walking alongside each other, two individuals may be
expressing willingness to walk together. The problem is that discernable manifestations do 
not necessarily mean the same thing in different contexts, nor do they always mean what
we think they mean. Walking alongside each other does not necessarily mean that two
people are in fact walking together. Gilbert notes “what is at issue here is not simply
behavioral expressions but something that is expressed: actual readiness on the part of each 
jointly to commit them all in a certain way” (Gilbert 2017, 131). Physical proximity may
simply be a happenstance behavioral expression, rather than behavior that expresses
willingness (as in the case of the crowded New York street or the packed dance floor).
What then is willingness? Gilbert draws a link between willingness and actual
readiness. She argues that readiness is “a state or disposition of the will” (Gilbert 1989,






               
         
             
          
          
           
              
              
           
           
            
        
           
            
             
            
             
        
            
           
        
             
           
          
            
           
             
  
               
          
          
         
         
     
 
56
disposition of the will – it must be a bodily, physical disposition as well. Why is this the
case? Because dancing together implies joint physical action for which each party needs to 
be ready – two individuals cannot dance together if one is not actually ready.
It is important to note that Gilbert’s work revolves around shared intentionality
within joint action. Willingness is a particular kind of intention to act in a certain way.
When people are walking alongside each other in the crowded streets of a city, or dancing
next to each other in a crowded club, the distinguishing factor for Gilbert’s concept of joint
action is that people are willing to do something together. She notes that readiness is “a
kind of engagement to act when the appropriate conditions obtain, rather than (or rather
than only) a kind of thought or attitude regarding one’s so acting” (Gilbert 1989, 185).
Thus, Gilbert lays the foundation for understanding that some special kind of engagement
is necessary to do something together, without spelling it out in detail.
For dancing together, I argue that the special kind of engagement is based on
physical interaction, and for physical interaction to be possible, certain conditions need to
be met. If we take the term at face value, interaction seems to presuppose action between
some entities. We can thus assume that for interaction to be possible, there needs to be
some kind of encounter—in other words, a meeting of individuals. Thus, there are (at least)
two conditions underlying physical readiness to dance together: encounter and interaction.
Interaction is contingent on the encounter, such that without the encounter there is no
interaction and there can be no dancing together. Thus, we have our first condition for
dancing together: an expression of willingness that is based on a discernable manifestation
of physical readiness. Gilbert does not go into detail about the physical nuances of
expressing willingness because her work attempts to account for joint action in a broad
sense. She does, however, point out the complicated link between expressions and
intentions. She states “action concepts are in general complex: they refer to a species of
overt behavior on the one hand, and to intentions and other subjective phenomena on the
other” (Gilbert 1989, 165). As an example of overt behavior in dance, Gilbert offers a
particularly relevant example:
Imagine that you see two people, a man and a woman, say, on a dance
floor. He has his arm around her waist; they expertly perform the steps
of a waltz. Surely the fact that they are dancing together can be obvious,
even to one without access to the thoughts of parties concerned? So how
can the fact of their dancing together be in any way dependent on their
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One striking issue is that Gilbert does not breakdown what it means to expertly
dance together. On the one hand, Gilbert clarifies that her work is not “under what physical
conditions can people be said to be dancing together? But rather ‘what thoughts or
conceptions must be involved in order for people to count as (intentionally) dancing
together” (Gilbert 1989, 165). I am extending her argument precisely by asking the question
she does not: under what physical conditions can people be said to be dancing together? 
Given that an expression is a discernable manifestation, how does expressing willingness
function to establish joint physical action? Since I am focusing on dancing together, it is
important to consider the factors of the physical interaction in particular. Given my
additional requirement of physical readiness, what sorts of dispositions or abilities enhance
or inhibit the joint physical action?
Ability
One-sided expressions of willingness are not enough to establish joint action,
though one-sided expressions can establish coordinated individual action, which the
following hypothetical scenario will help to illustrate. Imagine in a dance hall, Jack sees
Sue dancing alone and decides to join her. His expression of willingness to dance together
with Sue needs to be reciprocated by Sue in order for them to be dancing together. Why
does this distinction matter? Jack’s decision to dance together with Sue is not based only
on his own willingness. In other words, while they may be dancing next to each other in
close proximity, and Jack has expressed willingness to dance with Sue, Jack’s expression 
of willingness is not enough to establish that they are doing something together (i.e. joint
action). Sue must also express willingness to dance with Jack in order for them to be
dancing together. Otherwise, they are merely moving in close physical proximity. More
specifically, Jack is dancing in close proximity with Sue, which may make Sue
uncomfortable if she does not wish to be dancing with Jack. For the time being, let us
assume that it does not make Sue uncomfortable that Jack is dancing in close proximity to
her. In fact, it is also possible that they are moving in the same direction, with similar
actions or gestures. Consider for example dances like the hand jive, electric slide, or cupid
shuffle. Close proximity and similar movements do not necessarily mean that individuals
are dancing together. It merely means they are all dancing to the same music and executing 
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order to say that they are dancing together. Both must accept the other’s willingness in 
order to establish their joint physical action.
The relationship between expressing willingness and acceptance is an epistemic
problem because something needs to be understood in order for acceptance to be possible. 
There must be an encounter for an interaction to unfold, but the interaction between 
individuals depends on more than just the encounter. Dancing together has an epistemic
dimension in that individuals must understand certain behavior as an expression of
willingness. In part, this means that certain behavior is intentional (e.g. goal-driven) rather
than happenstance. Consider for example leaving the bus at the same time as someone else.
You both exit the vehicle and turn right. While this other individual’s behavior is certainly
a discernable manifestation, it would be odd to assume that this person has a goal to do
something together with you simply because you have both left the bus at the same time
and turned in the same direction. Thus, it is more likely simply a coincidence. If you find
that the person makes all the same decisions as you, including entering into your office
building and then into your very office, then you might conclude that the person is
following you. You may even go so far as to believe that that in fact the person has a
particular goal and that goal has something to do with you. The behavior may prompt you
to ask something like “what are you doing?”.
For Elgin, epistemic acceptance is a “disposition to act” (Elgin 2017, 19). What is
the significance of disposition in the context of dancing together? Coming back to my
earlier claim, having a disposition of the will is not enough to establish joint physical action.
A disposition of the will certainly reflects something about one’s character, but the
disposition to act in the context of dancing together should be some kind of physical
disposition. For example, Jack is only able to see that Sue is dancing alone and move toward
her to dance with her given his bodily dispositions (e.g. sight to see, skin to feel and touch,
sense of relative position to the floor through proprioception, balance, kinesthesia, and so 
on). Physical dispositions have a significant influence on how individuals approach one
another, as well as the quality of exchange that unfolds. If an individual is missing a limb
or is differently-abled in sight or hearing, their disposition will affect the interaction.
Whether one has the disposition to move with another is also not necessarily enough to
establish readiness.
Physical dispositions to dance together entail more than just willingness. There
must be a physical readiness as well as an expression of willingness. The physical
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proprioception), strength, visuo-spatial sensitivity (e.g. exteroception, distinguishing left
from right), and so on. If one lacks strength, dexterity, balance, flexibility, and/or other
bodily dispositions, then one may not be actually ready to dance together with someone.
Moreover, one’s disposition of will (e.g. willingness) alone may not reflect one’s physical
state of readiness. Consider a hypothetical scenario in which a dancer is hospitalized after
a major injury – the dancer may have a disposition of the will such as a wish or desire to
dance, but the injury may create physical limitations that prevent the dancer from being
actually ready in that their body is, literally, indisposed. Jack and Sue are able to dance
with each other because they have the dispositions to interact with one another and they 
express willingness to do so. The intention (e.g. willingness) must be paired with a physical
readiness (bodily disposition), for the interaction to be possible. The ability to move
together will determine whether it is feasible.
“Feasible” and “possible” are not synonymous – an interaction may be possible but
not feasible given certain factors. Something is possible if it can be done, while something
is feasible if it is likely to happen. Some encounters may influence interactions such that
they are not feasible. Consider a hypothetical scenario of inviting someone to dance. It is
possible to extend an invitation if there are dancers in the room willing to dance. It is
impossible if there are no dancers around to invite to dance. It may be unfeasible, however,
if the dancers all speak different languages, if the event is too crowded to join, or if there
is an odd number of participants such that no one is available at the moment. Environmental
factors may also make certain situations unfeasible, such as the floor being too slippery or
the deejay not having the right music to dance a particular form (e.g. tango, salsa, swing).
Such environmental circumstances, while ostensibly extraneous to the partnership itself,
significantly affect the quality of interaction by presenting factors that can make dancing
together theoretically possible but practically unfeasible.
Feasibility is thus circumstantial. Sometimes individuals claim that certain
interactions are not possible, but it may be that they mean interaction is not feasible.
Consider a scenario in which one dancer is trying to lift another. The lifting dancer may be
too weak to execute a particular kind of lift, which may mean the dancer is not actually
ready despite having expressed willingness. Thus, lifting in general may seem like a matter
of possibility. Indeed, the action of lifting may be subject to particular aesthetic ideals or
conventions such that the first dancer’s weakness, paired with the aesthetic convention of
something such as an overhead deadlift, makes a particular lift impossible. However, there
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create dynamic choreography that allows for momentum and inertia to complement,
enhance, and/or compensate for the dancer’s lack of physical strength, such that another
kind of lift becomes feasible. The dancer may also spend some time working out to develop 
strength (assuming the disposition is possible). The ability of the dancers, based on their
physical dispositions, will influence what is feasible. By openly expressing willingness to 
dance together and accepting each other’s willingness, individuals are set up to establish 
joint action.
That joint acceptance is contingent on both willingness and ability establishes an 
important link between physical action (e.g. dancing together) and intention (e.g.
willingness qua readiness). Elgin further argues that epistemic acceptance “bridges the
divide between the intellectual and the practical. It is practical in that it consists in a
readiness to use a commitment in inference or action –that is, a readiness to do something.
It is intellectual in that its range is restricted to contexts where the agent’s ends are cognitive
(Elgin 2017, 123). The ends of dancing together are cognitive insofar as it is understood
that there is a goal, belief, or principle of action that guides and informs the movement.
Importantly, Gilbert’s condition of willingness in the context of dance is quite
vague. Clearly walking together is a form of joint movement, but is walking together the
same as dancing together? If not, what makes it different? A simple answer might be that
one is dancing while the other is not. But this does not give much information. Is it merely
that the movement itself is different when partners dance together? This seems intuitively
wrong – there is more to dancing together than the movement itself. For example, two
individuals may be actually ready to interact through movement but not necessarily to 
dance together. They may be willing to shake hands or make eye contact to establish an
interaction but not to touch or establish close physical proximity (despite being physically 
disposed to do so). By openly expressing willingness, individuals establish the conditions
for joint action. Each must accept the encounter for it to become an interaction, but the
willingness to interact is not yet to say that individuals have a shared goal, nor that they are
necessarily dancing together. Moving forward, I will consider the ends of a joint
commitment to dance together.
Joint Commitment in Dancing Together
Gilbert argues that to commit is to be normatively constrained in a certain way.
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131). Applying Gilbert’s notion of commitment to the context of dance, suppose Sue
decided that she will go to a dance event to clear her head and dance on her own. By making
a decision to go to the dance event on own, Sue commits herself to solo dancing. Gilbert
calls this kind of action a personal commitment of the will (Gilbert 2017). She states that
“the defining feature of such personal commitments is that the person in question is in a
position unilaterally both to make and to rescind them” (Gilbert 2017, 131). I find this
pertinent to considering commitment in the context of partnering because dancing itself
involves all sorts of personal commitments that influence expression of willingness and the
nature of joint commitment with others.
Gilbert’s notion of personal commitment establishes two important concepts. One
is that the normative constraint creates the possibility of error with what Gilbert calls
‘exclusionary properties’ (Gilbert 1990). By making a commitment to something, one may
fail to succeed, even if the failure is insignificant. When Jack decides to dance close to her,
Sue’s plan to dance alone may be in trouble. Sue need not necessarily consider Jack’s
proximity to her a failure, because she can simply go on dancing on her own in close
proximity to Jack. By dancing with Jack, she acts in error if she does not rescind her
commitment to herself. As such, Gilbert would argue that Sue is entitled to rebuke herself
for not upholding her own commitment to dance alone. A rebuke may be manifest itself
into something like Sue slapping her forehead in realizing that she did not uphold her
commitment to dance alone. The other important concept is obligation. Sue obligated
herself to dance alone. Then, dancing with Jack, she failed to satisfy her obligation. This
obligation, Gilbert points out, need not be a moral one. It is simply the result of a normative
process, wherein the person fails to uphold a personal commitment. The normative
constraints of one’s own decisions create a certain normative force, such that a continuum
of success (or failure, depending on how one looks at it) comes into play. In the context of
dancing together, however, obligations may become moral if they carry the potential for
bodily harm. I will return to this point in chapter seven.
The normative constraints of joint action pave the way for evaluation. Willingness,
for example, can be evaluated in degrees. Jack may calmly sashay over to Sue. He may
also thrash about next to Sue. Sue may have a preference for the thrashing about, such that
she expresses willingness by joining Jack in thrashing about. She may also find the
thrashing about too violent and conclude that it is unsafe to dance with Jack or in fact that
Jack’s thrashing is not in fact an expression of willingness, but rather a desperate attempt
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other discernable manifestation? For Gilbert, the difference is the intention behind the
expression. Though we may not have access to her intention, it is still important to analyze
from a philosophical standpoint in order to better understand the epistemic problems
between thought and action. If Jack has ended up close to Sue by accident, then his
proximity is merely happenstance rather than an expression of willingness. If he has an
intention to do something with (or to) Sue, then his proximity can be understood as an
expression of some kind of intent. I will return to consider intentionality in more depth in
chapter seven and eight.
Individuals can have their own goals within joint physical action of dancing 
together. They may be following a ritual, a set choreography, enacting a codified or
conventional practice that includes some rules of thumb, generalizations, and firmly
established principles, or any other number of individual commitments. Individual goals
will result in a collection of “I” statements, rather than “we” statements. The purpose of the
interaction raises particular questions about why individuals interact with each other, as
well as how they do so. In other words, the quality of each dancer’s movement within the
interaction itself. If individuals have their own commitments, they may somehow interfere
with the joint action.
Individual goals may create conflict. Consider a simple example of two individuals,
Jack and Sue, dancing next to each other in close proximity. Both individuals express
willingness to interact, but each individual may have their own goal. Jack may simply be
jamming to the music after a long day of work, willing to dance in close proximity to 
experience the rhythm. Sue may be enjoying the experience of close proximity with another
person. The individual goals may not conflict with one another, such that dancing together
is smooth and unproblematic. Gilbert maintains that, “once the exchange has taken place,
both parties will be entitled to assume that the attitudes and actions appropriate to their
going for a walk together are in place” (Gilbert 1990, 7, my emphasis). The entitlement to 
assume may create certain problems if the individuals are not on the same page.
Gilbert argues that multiple shared individual goals are not enough to establish a
plural subject. By establishing a plural subject, Gilbert argues that those going for a walk 
together can say something like “shall we stop here?” (Gilbert 1990, 8). But joint physical
commitments do not need to be realized solely in terms of “we” statements. If I ask you,
“do you want to stop here?”, making it clear that our stopping is conditional on your
agreement, that may have less force than “shall we stop here”. Extrapolating her argument
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we move this way?”. Establishing a “we”, however, means more than a collection of
individual goals. The individuals need to share a goal, belief, or principle of action such 
that they constitute a plural subject. This may be specific to a form, such as conventions
for inviting others to dance in social dance forms. This may be choreographed into a duet.
Whether the expression of willingness is a product of social convention or designed
choreography, some kind of understanding needs to be had between partners.
Understanding the normative constraints of a commitment may drive or deter
expressions of willingness. An expression of willingness may, for example, be merely an
intention to interact. If two people dancing next to each other make eye contact, the mutual
gaze may be an expression of willingness for just that – willingness to make eye contact. It
may be a willingness to interact through eye contact. It may also be happenstance to 
wandering eyes. Importantly, making eye contact may be a willingness to interact up to a
certain point – in other words, a dancer may be willing to make eye contact, but not to touch
or move in closer proximity. This may (easily) be misinterpreted on the part of a potential
partner depending on the previous experience and expectations of the individual. Very little
can be said about the intention of behavioral expressions such as physical proximity and
mutual gaze without knowing additional information. Moreover, the physical conventions
of any given dance form may fuel (and be fueled by) goals, beliefs, or principles, or drive
(or be driven by) some kind of ideology such that some dances require a certain level of
dexterity, flexibility, strength, balance, and/or other bodily dispositions. The ability to
accept another’s willingness is different than understanding what it is they are accepting.
One may express willingness to dance together with another by maintaining eye
contact with a potential partner. The individual may be expressing willingness without
understanding what dancing together entails. Dancing together may involve elements of
close proximity, touch, mutual gaze, and adherence to particular steps. This may be as
simple as swaying together to music, or as complicated as a set of choreography that
involves lifting, pulling, pushing, going down to the ground and coming back up.
Interaction must be feasible, meaning that an encounter is possible and individuals have the
disposition to interact with one another. The physical disposition may be further linked to
dexterity (e.g. being able to isolate and coordinate various parts of the body), as well as
perceptual sensitivity. Part of the sensitivity is an awareness to recognize the expression of
willingness and accept it as such. If moving in close proximity can be understood as both
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recognizing and distinguishing behavioral expressions that are meant to express
willingness to dance together?
Gilbert argues that there is a way to consider joint action in a strong sense, meaning
more than just two people appear to be doing something together. She states,
In order for X and Y to be doing A together, some condition of behavioral
appropriateness must presumably hold, but both X and Y must also have a
special kind of conception of what is going on (Gilbert 1989, 166).
The statement makes two claims 1) that there is some kind of condition of
behavioral appropriateness, and 2) each person must have a special kind of conception of
what is going on. Behavior in the form of physical expressions are inevitably a part of
dancing together, but not all behavior will be appropriate for a given interaction nor will
all behavior necessarily be expressive of something relevant to the dance (e.g. dancing in
close proximity is not necessarily an expression of willingness, though the proximity can 
be interpreted as such). What is it that partners agree to when dancing together?
There are several practical problems that are associated with willingness that are
worth considering here. What is Jack’s motive for dancing with Sue? How long does he
intend to dance with Sue? How will he react if Sue does not want to dance with him? This
returns to the distinction between coming together through dance and coming together to
dance, which I proposed in the introduction chapter. Any agreement has underlying motives
and intention, but these may be implicit for dancing together. Some intentions may be more
accessible than others. Consider a hypothetical scenario in which one approaches a dancer,
establishing close proximity, and reaches out a hand while maintaining eye contact. It
would not be strange to understand the action as an intentional invitation to dance together.
If, on the other hand, someone reached out a hand from a distance, without establishing or
maintaining eye contact, it would be difficult to ascertain the intentions or even the motives
of the movement.
In some cases, the motives are merely to dance with someone for the length of the
song, and if something goes wrong then they will part when the song ends. There may also 
be divergent motives, such that Sue wants to dance with Jack for the length of the song, but
Jack wants to take Sue home and so has more in mind than merely dancing together. Here,
I am investigating the motives and intentions of dancing together, beyond the motives and
intentions of doing something together for the sake of togetherness. When Jack has an
intention to dance with Sue, he moves closer to her. By establishing physical proximity,
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may be the extent of his willingness. Jack wants to dance with Sue, but he is unwilling to 
make eye contact, to touch, or to establish other means of interaction beyond the proximity.
Thus, an expression of willingness is subject to interpretation.
Gilbert argues that “each person expresses a special form of conditional
commitment such that (as is understood) only when everyone has done similarly is anyone
committed (Gilbert 1990, 7, emphasis in the original). To dance together, the commitment
is conditional in that if one stops moving with the other, the movement may no longer be
considered a joint act in the strong sense. Suppose that Jack gets “lost” in the music. He
stops paying attention to Sue and moves on his own. Jack’s movement becomes
independent of Sue’s, such that despite the fact that they are both willing to dance together,
because of the condition of joint commitment they are now dancing on their own in close
proximity. Given the normative force of commitments, Sue is entitled to rebuke Jack for
not upholding the joint endeavor of dancing together. The entitlement to rebuke and the
actual action depends on how partners are encountering and interacting with each other.
The quality of their movement and the interaction is contingent on their individual
dispositions.
What does Sue have to object to in her interaction with Jack? She wants to dance
with him, has openly expressed willingness to do so, and he is just dancing with her in close
proximity. To dance together with Jack, the quality of her dancing is somehow keyed to
their interaction. It is not necessarily a matter of what anybody knows. In other words, there
is a property of dancing that is absent whether anyone can tell, indeed whether anyone
knows, or not. Why does it matter if no one can tell? Just because individuals express
willingness and have the disposition to dance together does not mean they necessarily will
do so. This is because dispositions have a counterfactual dimension. As Elgin points out,
To ascribe a disposition is to indicate something not only about what does
happen, but also about what would happen had circumstances been
different. The glass that never is struck and never breaks nonetheless has the
disposition of brittleness if it would break if it were struck (Elgin 2017, 52)
A counterfactual will serve to illustrate the epistemic problem with Jack getting lost
in the music without Sue being able to tell. Perhaps Sue has the experience that everything
is fine. Suppose Jack is just grooving with the music and has a dim awareness that Sue is
somewhere nearby. As it turns out, she trips. Does he notice? If Jack doesn’t notice, then
there is nothing joint going on. If she doesn't trip, would he have noticed had she tripped?
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counterfactual illustrates what Elgin calls a dispositional view. This dispositional view
offers insight into what could go wrong based on what one is capable of or willing to do.
Gilbert notes that “if Jack’s goal is to walk alongside Sue, prudence obviously 
requires him to monitor the situation carefully and to take what action he can to keep the
two of them together” (Gilbert 1990, 4, emphasis in the original). For the context of dancing
together, the ability to accept an expression of willingness requires sensitivity both in terms
of perception (e.g. monitoring the situation) and in terms of dexterity (e.g. taking action to
establish the action as a joint one). Something about physically expressing willingness must
factor into what dancers are doing together for it to have influence on their interaction. If
one expresses willingness to the other without reciprocation, meaning the other is either
unable or unwilling, then the result is merely moving alongside each other in close
proximity.
To establish joint action, partners must be willing and able to monitor each other to
some extent. The problem is how partners harness their ability, once the willingness has
been expressed. Harnessing ability may be a problem of knowing how to do so. Elgin
argues that know-how is an “achievement”. She claims,
[Knowing-how] involves a capacity to do something well, or rightly, or
correctly. An adequate explication should do justice to this normative
character. Some habits are bad; some are neutral; some are good. Some
dispositions are benign; some are beneficial; some lead us astray (Elgin 
2017, 48).
Elgin’s notion of know-how is pertinent to consider in dance, given that individuals
may have various habits that preclude them from monitoring or attuning to each other.
Consider how Jack getting lost in the music may constitute a habit of his. To dance together
with Sue, he will need to work on not getting lost in the music. One could ostensibly be a
great dancer but fail to attune, just as someone could be great at attuning but lack the
competence to dance well. The degree of attunement will depend on the kind of obligation
partners enter into when dancing together. Whether one will be able to access the
attunement depends on one’s ability and/or competence.
Competence opens the normative dimension of ability, in that one is able to do
something well. Part of doing something well means understanding how to do it. Elgin
argues that know-how may be linked to simply following the rules of the practice, but “not
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forms of dance may have their own norms, I am interrogating the general conditions for
dancing together, which includes how partners access their know-how when dancing
together. How partners express willingness and understand the relevant expressions is a
crucial aspect of dancing together. More subtly, the way in which an encounter is
approached will determine whether the feasible interaction will be successful. As a
normative term, success will be assessed according to some standards.
To consider the added dimension of attunement in dancing together, I will consider
an example of dancing with a broomstick (this was considered an effective exercise of
learning to partner in my ballroom training). By holding one’s arms out with palms facing 
downward and laying a broom longwise supported by the backs of the hands, one could
become more sensitive to the requisite dimension of maintaining a dance frame position
such as the one in the waltz, foxtrot, quickstep, and tango. Dancing with a broom is not like
dancing alone, because one has to attune to the micromovements of the broom or else it
will fall. Dancing with a broom sets up what Elgin calls a “logical space”. Elgin maintains
that,
A logical space is a multidimensional array of possibilities open to the items
that occupy the space. To locate an item in a logical space is to determine
which of the possibilities defined by that space it realizes (Elgin 2017, 155)
Attuning to the broom includes the possibilities that are available given the physical
characteristics of the broom. Dancing with a broom offers a particular modulation of the
logical space via the availability of the broom as a prop to partner. If one is trying to keep
the broom steady while dancing with it, then any movement of the broom will offer
feedback about one’s attunement to it. The dancer has to be sensitive to the broom’s
movement, but the broom cannot be sensitive to the dancer.
If one is attuned to what the other is doing, then one is in effect more sensitive than 
if one is not attuned. Suppose Jack and Sue both express willingness to dance together, and 
so start to dance together. It is perfectly possible that they will feel that they are dancing 
together. But the experience of moving together might be misleading. If one were to trip,
the other would likely not notice if they are not attuned to some degree. The problem is that
individuals can make various joint commitments such as walking together without
necessarily needing to have a high degree of attunement to each other. Their commitment
consists merely in coarse-grained attunement. In other words, there is a bare minimum
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when dancing. Only when something unexpected happens (e.g. some kind of
counterfactual) will this become visible.
Gilbert misses important nuances of the physical dimensions of joint action. This is
unsurprising, since her work is focused more on the doing things together in a broad sense.
Nevertheless, her work lays the foundation for considering the significance of physical
nuances in expressions of willingness. Consider for example that Jack is much taller than
Sue. He takes steps that are twice as big as Sue’s, such that she needs to scurry along 
quickly to keep up with him. If Sue and Jack are not attuned to each other to some basic
degree, and walk as they normally would on their own, then they likely won’t be walking
together for very long. On the other hand, two dancers could mutually attune their
movements to one another across a fairly large distance as long as they can interpret the
relevant features of the interaction.
So far, I have argued that an encounter and an interaction in the form of some
physical exchange on the basis of mutual attunement are the conditions of dancing together
in the strong sense. Moving forward, I will refer to dancing together in the strong sense as
“partnering”. I have demonstrated how interactions are contingent on individual
dispositions and capacities to express willingness. But one could ostensibly have a capacity 
to dance with someone without having any disposition to do so. An individual may be, by
character, never inclined to enter the dance floor. Thus, there is more to the joint act than
mere willingness and disposition. Though two dancers must be able to dance with each 
other for the joint act to be feasible, I believe there is more at play in partnering than
willingness to move together.
Partnering
In the case of mutual attunement between dancers, each dancer has to be sensitive
to the other. But the sensitivity may be limited to merely coordinating actions
independently. Consider for example two individuals dancing together. Their action may 
be coordinated such that they are doing the right movement at the right time, without
necessarily attuning to one another. Just because their action is coordinated does not mean 
that they are partnering, even if they are dancing together. Willingness and shared goal may
be enough to establish the joint act of dancing together, but it will not be enough to establish
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qualitatively, from dancing together even if there is an expression of willingness to 
establish a joint commitment to dance together.
Partnering involves establishing movement on account of the other. If Jack senses
Sue leaning, he may lean with her or against her. Though Sue’s actions need not have any
influence on Jack, he can choose to respond to her movement and thus move on account of
her action. This would mean that he is attuning to her. If Sue’s subsequent action is
negotiated on account of Jack’s response to her, then they are not merely moving together.
Their action is mutually attuned, responsive, and negotiated on account of each other.
Partners can attune to the quality of each other’s movements such that they are
negotiating timing, rhythm, and quality of movement on account of each other. Quality of
movement is what I propose distinguishes one form from another, one kind of dance from
another kind of dance. Returning to the example of Sue leaning into Jack, if she is leaning
into Jack because she is tired, the quality of her movement will be different than if she is
leaning into the other because she is investigating the act of leaning. If the willingness to 
engage is there, but part of the agreement is implicit or not common knowledge between 
partners such that there are hidden motives on the part of either dancer, they may run into
problems.
It is important to distinguish movement that is joint on account of each other
through mutual attunement and movement that is merely simultaneous or otherwise
executed without attunement – or the bare minimum of attunement which satisfies the
conditions of joint action, but not of dancing. There is some counterfactual element that
informs the individual dispositions. If individuals are partnering, they are doing more than
the right steps at the right time, because they will have to accommodate uncertainty.
Suppose Jack sees Sue stumble. In attuning to her movement, he can come to her rescue
(assuming she needs to be rescued). The logical space gives a range of possible ways the
interaction might unfold, in that it contains all of the necessary conditional components for
partnering to be achieved or not.
When individuals are partnering, they are not just thinking about the range of
possibilities, each is also thinking about what the other thinks is going on as well. This is
because dancing together can involve different kinds of obligations. The obligation will
depend on the norms of a practice. Some forms of partnering present some sort of a
choreographic obligation. This is the case for dances that have codified steps and rules or
conventions of a practice (e.g. tango). Other forms of partnering may be informed by social
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Given that interactions have normative force, partnering can be evaluated based on the kind
of obligation partners are committing to.
Partnering is further formed and informed by individual and collective perspectives. 
This may be related to expectations, such as codes of conduct or attire. Certain forms of
dance may insist on special shoes or attire, just as certain practices may uphold particular
ways of encountering and engaging with the floor, music, or others in the space. Certain 
spaces may feel different than others, which may become evident simply from the first
encounter. Consider for example how a stage feels different than a studio space, or how a
studio may feel different than a ballroom function hall, public community space, or night
club. Some spaces feel open and inviting, while others can feel oppressive and austere.
Moreover, individuals are likely also to bring their own associations to the encounter. This
is because encounters do not occur in a void. Places of practice have their own historical
and cultural cadences, just as individuals have their own personal histories.
Some cultural cadences may be implicit, requiring some kind of inside knowledge,
while others make rules and conventions explicit. Consider for example how different
cultures have different ideas about mixed genders walking together. In some cultures, it is
unacceptable for men and women to walk together, while in others it is so conventional
that observers may not even notice. Cadences may be the result of historic practices.
Consider for example how individuals may encounter each other at a social dancing event.
The history of social dancing in the West has been dominated by heteronormative ideals,
in which men invite women to dance2. There is no absolute requirement, however, that says
men must invite women to dance, nor that men cannot dance with other men, women with
other women, let alone those who identify as non-binary. The conventions of a practice
contribute to how individuals encounter one another.
Individuals have their own previous histories, expectations, assumptions, and
motivations inherently infuse the practice. If one had a traumatic experience in a dance
studio, then it is certainly possible that other studios may trigger memories or sensations of
the event by association with environment. The aesthetic dimensions are always already 
situated within the act of moving together. By having a shared goal (e.g. seeking something 
like a particular idea of beauty in the joint act), individuals are manifesting their own
aesthetic values. Whether this is creating particular shapes or avoiding effort, the aesthetic
2 Viki Harman’s (2019) exposition on the sexual politics of ballroom dancing points to the heteronormative conventions
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values of partnering are manifold. Partners ostensibly need to agree on their goals in order
for the goals to be shared. This is a matter of acceptance.
Acceptance may lead to its own slew of problems. Without accepting an interaction,
individuals may impose themselves on others. With enough strength and coercion,
individuals can be overpowered, and interactions can unfold that are non-consensual. This
is especially true in interactions where the power dynamic is unequal. In those cases, the
lack of acceptance is a key factor to the evaluation of what went wrong. Practitioners may
thus interrogate the thresholds for acceptance and the standards of evaluation for the joint
commitment in partnering within the act itself. I will return to this point in chapter eight
when examining reasoning.
It may seem banal to say that the emotional energy put into the practice of partnering
has a significant impact on how two or more individuals will interact, yet it seems an 
obvious point of departure for considering what may be regarded as successful within a
normative lens, especially when we consider ethical concepts such as commitment and
obligation. This stems from the fact that both willingness and ability to interact with others
breaks down under certain circumstances. This is the space where it is truly vital to evaluate
how people move together, visually from the outside or experientially (kinesthetically,
physically, tactilely, and so on) from the inside.
One of the key components that distinguishes merely moving together from
partnering is whether partners joint movement is on account of the other. Partners’
willingness to commit will be subject to attunement to the characteristics of the physical
interaction and the changes therein. This includes physical elements such as proximity,
pace, direction, and so on, as well as the character and quality of movement. Partners attend 
to how the movement looks or feels, which is not true when merely moving together. Even
the act of walking together may be considered partnering if partners are attending to the
aesthetic dimensions of the physical interaction. From walking together to partnering, there
must be some kind of a shift in how partners encounter and interact with each other.
The normative force of joint commitment in partnering means there is some margin
of success to dance with others in the strong sense. To accept the expression of willingness
to dance together, individuals must be both willing and able. Since joint actions are
normative, what is the nature of the commitment individuals make to each other when 
dancing together? What is the significance of attunement to the physical aspects of the
interaction, including proximity, pace, and direction of the other? If both Jack and Sue
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enough to say that Jack and Sue are dancing together. But it is not enough to say that they 
are dancing together well. Does this satisfy the conditions of partnering? What are the
methods in relation to achieving the goal of dancing together?
Conclusion
Dancing together is a special case of doing something together because the physical
expressions matter for the joint act itself. Consider for example that Sue and Jack are sitting
across the room from each other and both say, “yes, I’d like to dance together”. Though
both have expressed willingness to dance together, the expression is not enough since there
is no physical interaction happening yet. This is different than if they had expressed interest
in something other than dancing together, like singing or playing a video game. In other
joint acts, physical proximity may not be a necessary condition. Consider for example how
a minute of silence on a national holiday could be construed as a joint action across the
country, where everyone jointly observes a silence without any sort of physical proximity.
In dancing together, however, physical proximity seems to be a necessary condition. The
sort of physical proximity dancing demands has something to do with moving together. But
the proximity alone is not enough3. Partners can adjust and modify their physical actions
through behavioral expressions such as physical proximity to express willingness (or
unwillingness) to move together. Behavioral expressions such as physical proximity may
also be mere happenstance. Returning to the case of the dancers who are simply dancing
alongside each other, they need not be mutually attuning to one another. If they are mutually
attuning to one another, they may be simply attuning so as to not bump into each other.
This may be the case in dances such as the twist, hand jive, electric slide, macarena, cha-
cha slide, cupid shuffle, and so on. To change their physical action on account of each 
other, individuals need to be sensitive and responsive to relevant features of the interaction.
The conditions presented in this chapter, namely the expression of willingness
contingent on an encounter and exchange, as well as the establishment of a shared goal in 
conditions of common knowledge, do not reveal what makes partnering good or bad,
successful or unsuccessful, appropriate or inappropriate. While partnering cannot occur
without interaction, certain exchanges are considered and evaluated by those practicing as
well as those observing. This aligns with the driving questions in this thesis circle around 
what it means to partner and what it means to partner well. To address these questions, it is
3 It is important to note that there are various ways in which ‘dancing together’ could be experienced when not in physical
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necessary what it means to dance together in the strong sense, how that strong sense is
evaluated, what kinds of claims about dancing together are tenable, and the difficulty of
prescribing rules or designing formulas that predict the success of an interaction.
Partners’ willingness to commit will be subject to the characteristics of the physical
interaction and the changes therein. This includes physical elements such as proximity,
pace, direction, and so on, as well as the character and quality of movement. Partners that
attune to each other will be doing more than merely dancing in close proximity. Both
behavior and intention are situated within the normative domain: not just behavior, but
appropriate behavior. Not just a conception, but a special kind of conception. What are the
behavioral conditions for dancing together?
Why does the distinction between merely moving together and partnering matter?
By establishing that partners constitute a plural subject with a mutual attunement condition
wherein movement is negotiated on account of each other, it is possible to argue that
partnering establishes 1) a specific kind of joint commitment, 2) an obligation to uphold
the commitment, and 3) entitlements to rebuke a lack of attunement or a penchant for
merely coordinated action. This reveals some insight into the normative dimension of
partnering.
Gilbert lays the foundation for analyzing how the expression of willingness in doing 
something together is ongoing. Importantly, establishing the joint action of dancing 
together is contingent on more than a one-off, singular expression of willingness. One may
not have been paying attention to the other, off in some daydream, and so fails to monitor
the expression of willingness pace and proximity accordingly. The other may also have
stopped paying attention, such that both lose sight of each other and, despite being willing
to dance together, both are no longer expressing willingness since they are no longer in
close proximity or keeping pace with each other.
Individuals must have some base level of mutual attunement in order to do
something together. But is this enough to partner? Moving together may satisfy the
experiential (phenomenological) condition of joint physical action, but the experience of
togetherness is not the end I am after in this thesis. I propose that partnering, or dancing 
together in the strong sense, requires an understanding of mutual attunement such that
partners can form a joint commitment based on an expression of willingness and ability to
mutually attune to one another. Together these constitute the conditions for partnering
which I am approaching from the perspective of epistemology. I focus on what (rather than
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and some sort of interaction based on mutual attunement, it is not the case that any physical
interaction can be referred to as partnering. Interaction is a necessary, but not sufficient
condition for partnering, which needs to include at least willingness and ability to accept
the joint commitment. The concepts that are embedded in the physical act of partnering 
have to do with the nature of the obligation, including harnessing ability (competence) and 
the degree of attunement. I propose that partnering means coming together to dance, rather
than just coming together through dance. Establishing the commitment, however, is not
enough within the act of partnering. Partners must maintain the joint commitment, which
requires understanding actions on a fine-grained scale. In the next chapter, I will argue that
understanding these actions is contingent on communication between partners.
Chapter Five: Norms of Exchange
In the previous chapter, I established the conditions for partnering as dancing
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movement on account of each other through mutual attunement. I argued for necessary
conditions of expressing and accepting willingness, contingent on physical readiness,
ability, and understanding the agreement of the commitment. I also pointed to encounter
and exchange as two factors within the physical interaction of dancing together. The
discussion closed with the epistemic problem of maintaining the joint physical
commitment. How is it that partners maintain and negotiate their willingness within their
physical interaction? While exchange may be a necessary condition of partnering, it is
important to note that there are different kinds of exchanges. For example, there are
communicative exchanges, such as the ones between people walking together. There are
also the non-communicative exchanges, such as the ones presented in the previous chapter
when considering interaction between the environment (ground or air) or props such as a
broom.
Some interactions are experienced as more meaningful and deeper than other
interactions. Why is this the case? At least in part because individuals find different things
meaningful when interacting with others. Before entertaining the meaning of a particular
expression, however, it is necessary first to be aware that each movement, no matter how
small, can be significant in the process of exchanging and interacting with others. Bodily
movements can be informed by aesthetic discourses and conventions, whether they are
social, competitive, folk, concert, or otherwise. But one can interact with others without
being aware of the meaning of gestures, since gestures may be different across cultures and
represent subcultural meanings within the same cultural milieu. This is an epistemic matter.
Drawing on the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein (1953), Gilbert distinguishes between
thin and seriously intended communication (Gilbert 1989). In both instances of
communication, “some person, P1, uses (means) term ‘T’ and understands ‘S’; another
person observes P1’s utterance of ‘T’ and understands ‘T’ in sense ‘S’” (Gilbert 87, 1989).
The distinction Gilbert claims is that thin communication “does not require that either
person has any reason to believe that they interpret [terms] in the same way” (Gilbert 1989,
87), while seriously intended communication “essentially involves intentional
achievement” (Gilbert 1989, 88, emphasis in the original). For the context of this thesis,
the important aspect that needs to be unpacked is how expressing willingness in dancing
together is a communicative act. Based on Gilbert’s notion of thin communication, it is
possible that individuals may willingly commit themselves to a joint act in which they use
similar gestures, movements, and the like, but interpret the same gestures differently. In
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from the interaction specifically because the exchange is thin. Dancing together based on
thin communication may not constitute partnering (i.e. dancing together in the strong sense)
because the lack of mutual understanding puts partners at risk of being unable to maintain
their joint commitment. Thus, I propose that partnering requires ongoing communication
in the form of a physical conversation.
In this chapter, I will argue that partners maintain their joint physical commitment
by expressing and negotiating willingness through communicative exchange in an ongoing,
continuous way. I will present the epistemological foundation to understand
communication in dancing together as a physical exchange of information. To do so, I will
interrogate the maxims of cooperative communication proposed by American philologist
H. Paul Grice. I will lay out the conditions of communicating willingness in partnering, to
which the relevant norms of evaluation can adhere. I will argue that these conditions are
based on being both receptive and responsive to proximity, orientation, and point(s) of
contact. These conditions can be linked to a broader understanding of communication that
is paralinguistic, or beyond that which is spoken. Some of the terminology, such as the
spatial (proxemic) and temporal (chronemic) relationship partners establish in their
communication will emerge from the work of American linguists George L. Trager and
Edward T. Hall.
Grice points out that conversations “do not normally consist of a succession of
disconnected remarks” and are “characteristically, to some degree at least, cooperative
efforts” (Grice 1991, 26). His notion of conversation is thus quite specific, in that it
excludes exchanges which are random or uncooperative. Furthermore, Gricean 
conversation has a clearly established purpose, which “may be fixed from the start, or it
may evolve during the exchange; it may be fairly definite or it may be so indefinite as to
leave very considerable latitude to the participants” (Grice 1991, 26). His narrow, focused 
conception of conversation fits neatly into Gilbert’s notion of joint commitment, in that
those within the exchange obligate each other to make particular kinds of conversational
contributions.
Grice’s cooperative principle, which I already introduced in the literature review, is
as follows: “make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which 
it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are
engaged” (Grice 1991, 26). The principle has a certain normative force, given that accepted 
purposes and conversational contributions obligate interlocutors to communicate in a






          
            
    
            
           
         
       
          
           
           
         
             
           
            
            
         
        
          
           
           
         
    
 
 
          
          
              
         
           
          
        
           
           
77
the potential for failure, which suggests there are right and wrong ways to engage and 
evaluate an exchange. It is not hard to imagine how failure to make appropriate
contributions may lead to confusion and misunderstanding between partners. Grice also 
maintains that cooperative conversations have “a common set purpose or set of purposes,
or at least a mutually accepted direction” (Grice 1991, 26). This also aligns well with 
Gilbert’s notion of joint commitment, in that participants in a conversation will be
committed to some purpose (or set of purposes).
To question the extent to which the cooperative principle can be generally
applicable, Grice proposes four categories: Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Manner, which
together delineate specific maxims that uphold the cooperative principle. Together, these
four categories constrain the transfer of information, including a) quantity of information
b) the quality of information), c) relation of information to the purpose or to other bits of
information in the conversation, and d) the manner in which information is presented (Grice
1991, 28). Applying Grice’s categories of information transfer to dance partnering, I will
first focus on the manner and relation with respect to maintaining joint commitment. I will
then position Grice’s concept of cooperation in line with Elgin’s concept of
exemplification, in order to parse the epistemic problems partners may face in maintaining 
their joint commitment when dancing together. I will consider thought experiments and
hypothetical scenarios of communicating willingness, and then turn to Grice’s concept of
implicature. I will end with a discussion of the normative dimensions of communication
in partnering. Rather than provide a how-to guide for communication, I will develop a 
critical framework for evaluating communication in partnering.
Receptivity
In the previous chapter I argued that a physical encounter is necessary for
interaction to be possible. The encounter provides the conditions for an exchange on the
basis of some physical transfer of information. I propose that the manner of transfer in 
partnering is based on (at least) three conditions: proximity, orientation, and point(s) of
contact. Different forms of movement practice will have different conventions about each 
of these conditions. For example, an Argentinian Tango has different points of contact,
proximity, and orientation than the International DanceSport Tango, in which partners use
different manners to convey information to each other. For the purposes of this chapter,
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Proximity refers to the distance at which partners encounter and interact with each
other. Partners can direct their movement in multiple dimensions, including forward,
backward, side, up, and down. Orientation refers to the relative physical position of each 
partner to the other(s). Partners can orient to each other by facing, pitching, and twisting 
toward and away from each other. This includes multiple planes such as forward and 
backward (sagittal), spinal rotation (transvers), and side-to-side (frontal). Point(s) of
contact refers to the method of interaction such as touch, breath, eye contact, and rhythm,
as well as external elements such as sound (e.g. music).
Proximity, orientation, and point(s) of contact function as the manner by which 
partners establish and maintain ways of dancing together. These three conditions can be
established and maintained in a multitude of different ways. For example, there can be close
proximity with no contact (e.g. facing away without touch or eye contact) and contact
without close proximity (e.g. establishing and maintaining eye contact from afar, or perhaps
even teleconferencing). Proximity can be considered a function of space, in which direction 
is negotiated through shifts of weight toward and away from a shared center. Orientation 
can be considered a function of shape, in which relative position is negotiated through 
extension, flexion, rotation, and translation in the spine and pelvis. One may use multiple
points of contact to establish shared focus, including complex rhythm through touch,
breath, and gaze.
Communication is only possible given some kind of an encounter, just as it will be
constrained (e.g. stronger or weaker) given certain factors. To understand the conditions of
communication, I will examine two factors systematically: signaling and interpretation. I 
propose that a signal is something that conveys information. To illustrate nuances in
signaling, I will begin with encounters with inanimate matter and then with exchanges
between human agents. I will first examine linear exchanges, in which information is
transferred in one direction.
I can encounter and act upon inanimate things, such as a wall or an instrument. For
example, I may commit to encounter a wall with the goal to practice leaning, shifting, and
displacing my weight to build strength, coordination, or even courage to be off-balance.
My exchange with the wall will be rather limited, since the wall cannot signal (i.e. convey
information) to me on its own. A limited exchange in this scenario is favorable, however,
since I have a particular goal in mind when encountering the wall. While it is possible to 
act upon a wall, it is odd to say that the wall is communicating with me. But I am signaling 
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weight, it does so simply by the design of its reinforcement. Moreover, while my actions
do have some effects on the wall (since I apply pressure, the wall matches my force with 
an equal and opposite force as per Newton’s third law of motion), the effects are likely too
small to be observable or significant. Acting upon a wall allows me to practice signaling
through proximity, orientation, and point(s) of contact.
Committing to act upon a wall, however useful as a means to practice holding and 
releasing weight, is significantly different from acting upon an instrument designed for
interaction (such as a musical instrument or digital device). A musical instrument is more
complex than a wall as it is in many ways designed for interaction. I can commit to play a
clarinet and maintain my commitment through pressure and breath because the clarinet has
distinct mechanisms that react to these certain parameters, many of which require specific
knowledge (e.g. through training, extensive practice, or some other means of spending time
understanding the design and mechanics). To control the sound, I must simultaneously 
produce breath into the mouthpiece while stabilizing the reed with my embouchure. The
clarinet has recognizable effects based on how I interact with it, all of which are predictable
contingent on my familiarity and expertise with the clarinet. A clarinet, given that it is
designed for interaction, can hone different communication skills than that of a wall. I
cannot lean against a clarinet, nor can it support my weight. One can produce signals (i.e.
convey information) within the interaction in ways that may not be possible with a wall
(such as the production of sound). The question is which communicative skills are relevant
to dancing together. Being able to practice producing and listening to nuances in music
may be valuable for establishing and maintaining rhythm. Being able to lean against a wall
may be valuable to practice being in off-balance positions.
There is an exchange happening between myself and a wall or musical instrument,
though it is limited given that the basis of signaling is entirely contingent on me being the
only one involved to establish and maintain proximity, orientation, and point(s) of contact.
As such, I can maintain my commitment through the conditions of proximity, orientation,
and point(s) of contact in the mouth and fingers. Importantly however, neither a wall nor a
clarinet can establish or maintain a joint commitment. Nevertheless, there is something
important to be learned about signaling when considering the ways in individuals can be
receptive to action. While the clarinet cannot play without me, it reacts differently given
the way I interact with it. For example, a clarinet will react differently in the cold than it
will in hotter weather, because the wood expands and contracts under different
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my garage. A two by four will also expand and contract given different temperatures, but
a clarinet is more flexibly dependent on ambient circumstances given the fact that is has
distinct mechanisms that will react differently given the manner in which I signal. A
clarinet is more reactive (to both the weather and me) than a two by four. Moreover, my
clarinet will play differently than my partner’s clarinet, and so if I attempt to treat another
person’s clarinet the same way as I would my own, I may run into some trouble. My success
is contingent on how well I attune to the clarinet. Though the clarinet cannot attune to me,
I must be receptive to it in understanding the effects of my signals on it.
Though it is not yet considered a conversation, Gricean maxims may serve to
understand how information functions in my unidirectional exchange with a wall or
clarinet. Physical information includes how much I lean into or away from the wall
(quantity), how close or far and with what orientation (relation), and characteristics of
movement (quality). I can further practice the manner of signaling by changing how I move.
Though neither the wall nor the clarinet can signal back, I can be receptive to the effects of
my signals. In this way, receptivity is more than just registering what is going on (within
myself, my partner, my surroundings). I propose that receptivity means that due attention 
and weight are committed to the phenomenon of attuning to the subject of the interaction.
Signals can be discrete. Proximity, orientation, and point(s) of contact can all be
established such that I can come close to the wall and walk away. I could also be
encountering either of these unintentionally, and not even notice that I did so. I may in fact
be surrounded by walls, but I am not committed to any interaction with them. The walls
might not be salient to me, given a particular frame of reference. I can face the wall
(orientating to it) and face away without necessarily seeing it. I can also direct my gaze
(eyes as point of contact) to the wall, see the wall and look away, just as I can establish a
point of contact with my hand and immediately remove my hand. By encountering the wall
and clarinet I can establish a willingness to commit to interaction, but it does not mean that
I necessarily will commit.
Signals can also be continuous. In playing the clarinet, I am constantly adjusting
my mouth and fingers. I produce continuous sounds and maintain contact with certain keys
when performing a composition. I also maintain contact with the clarinet so as not to drop
it. I attune by listening to the pitches. By establishing and maintaining a particular
orientation, proximity, pressure, and breath, I am expressing willingness and it is my ability
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Between inanimate matter like a wall and clarinet, there are non-human animate
subjects, such as a cat. I call to my cat and she reacts differently. Sometimes her ears perk 
up, sometimes she looks at me, sometimes she even comes over. But her reactions differ,
and it is difficult to be certain about how or when she will react. She seems to choose when 
to sit with me and when to go about her own business. There are ways in which my cat can
express willingness to sit with me, which may be something like a proto-joint commitment,
though it is likely difficult to make a joint commitment with a cat because of barriers in 
mutual understanding.
Physical interaction with a wall, a clarinet, and cat are limited compared to a person,
given the way individuals can be receptive to each other. The limited exchange with a cat
can be further illustrated with a limited exchange that happens with a baby. For example,
my one-year-old nephew has learned certain physical signals as well as certain words,
though he cannot yet form full sentences. When he wants my attention, he can wave, pull
on my hand, yell out. He establishes willingness to interact when he pulls me into his room
to show me his toys. Occasionally, we dance together. Even without any formal dance
training, my nephew can maintain close proximity, facing me while holding my hand. He
can exhibit disappointment or frustration if I unilaterally decide to stop dancing with him.
As such, my nephew and I can make a joint commitment, albeit somewhat limited.
Following Elgin’s logic, the question is what is salient to him and what actions of mine
produce the kind of communication necessary to maintain a joint commitment.
Signaling depends on the types of constraints that are present for each partner. If I
come to a social event of a movement form I have no experience with, interacting with a
partner may not be feasible because I will find their movement potentially random or too
complex. Similarly, an advanced dancer in a different form may have trouble interacting
with me upon realizing that their actions have no recognizable effects on me. While the
interaction is ostensibly possible, it may be unfeasible given my lack of experience with 
the present form. This will depend on my ability to receive (i.e. be receptive to) the given
signals (which may be further contingent on quantity and/or quality of training or practice). 
Sometimes the manner of communication is influenced by the aesthetic and formal
conventions of the genre being practiced, at other times communication is something
dancers can explicitly negotiate. For partners to physically maintain their joint commitment
to move on account of each other, they need to be able to differentiate their own individual
actions, as well as their joint action, with respect to proximity, orientation, and point(s) of
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effects they have on each other’s movements. This is a matter of how partners respond to 
each other.
Responsiveness
While a clarinet or a wall cannot make signals on their own, individuals can produce
a variety of signals in how they encounter and respond to the subject of their interaction.
Human interaction is complicated at least because of the fact that individuals, unlike
inanimate matter, can be willing and able to signal on their own with symbols that are
culturally and/or conventionally significant (Hall 1966). This forms the basis for
communicative exchange. There are linear exchanges, in which an exchange of information
is unidirectional (e.g. oral presentation in front of others), and transactional exchanges, in 
which an exchange of information is bidirectional (e.g. depositing or withdrawing money
from a bank teller, buying groceries from a grocer, chatting with friends).
Grice’s maxims require individuals to make conversational contributions that are
“as informative as required” (but not more informative), to refrain from saying what one
believes is false and for which one “lacks adequate evidence”, “to avoid obscurity of
expression”, “to avoid ambiguity”, and to be “brief” and “orderly” (Grice 1991). Grice
stresses that each person in the conversation must be sensitive—not only the one
communicating, but also the one(s) listening. This is because Grice considers the transfer
of information as the paradigm case. There are plenty of places where ambiguity and 
vagueness may be appropriate if the goal of conversation is no longer the successful transfer
of information. Moving away from the goal of cooperation means these requirements will
be relaxed.
When considering the kinds of exchanges that occur within the context of
partnering, it is important to understand the ways in which exchanges are evaluated.
Assuming that partnering involves communication, it is necessary to inquire into the nature
of this exchange systematically. I am extending Grice’s notion of conversation to include
full body movement. If partners are engaging in a physical conversation, what is being
communicated? Further, how do expectations set forth by aesthetic ideals (i.e. values such 
as particular shapes, movements, feelings, images, and so on that are associated with the
movement either by the practitioner or by the cultures of the form of practice) impact the
ability for partners to successfully communicate with each other? To unpack this question,
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Elgin argues that “dance consist of symbols” (Elgin 2017, 206). While her argument
is centered on the relationship between spectators and performers, it is not difficult to see
how the symbols may be between dancers themselves. Drawing on Gilbert’s example of
Jack and Sue walking together, there are two instances that can be construed as instances
of symbols in moving together. The first one is proximity. If two people are walking on
opposite ends of the street going the same direction, one might be hard-pressed to say they
are walking together. On the other hand, a common way of pursuing a suspect is to have
three people spread out and look independently, regulating their movements so as to keep
the suspect in the center of a triangle. Though they are not close to each other, they may be
moving together in order to follow a suspect. Moving in close proximity may be understood 
as an expression of willingness to establish a joint commitment. I propose that the
behavioral expression of proximity can be understood as a symbol of joint action. The
second condition Gilbert mentions is when individuals keep the same pace. By walking
next to each other, individuals keep time (in a rough sort of way) such that they walk
together. Thus, keeping up with each other functions as a symbol that individuals are doing
something together. Proximity and timing are at least two ways of interpreting symbols in
joint action.
Elgin maintains that an instance can be converted into an exemplar by excluding
that which is (or can be) distracting. To understand this conversion, Elgin argues that there
is a need to breakdown the instance into “components—those we seek to exemplify and
those we do well to set aside” (Elgin 2017, 192). From the discussion in chapter four, we
know that not every discernable manifestation (e.g. expression) in dancing together will be
meaningful. If in dancing together I start swinging my arms, the movement may be purely 
aesthetic. If I wave to my partner to come closer, the wave functions communicatively. In 
this case, the wave serves as a signal to come closer, and the wave also functions as a
symbol of joint action. Connecting to Grice’s categories, the added layer of symbolic action 
is important in that the symbol conveys some quantity of information, using movement of
the arm as the manner of transferring information. The quality of the movement will bear
influence on the quality and quantity of information conveyed between partners.
Elgin further argues that dance is replete with symbols that function as exemplars
(Elgin 2017, 208). In other words, she claims that movements can instantiate certain
properties, patterns, or relations. For example, a leap can exemplify joy, just as a leap into
someone’s arms can exemplify love or intimacy. A different kind of leap or jump may
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just as a leap into someone’s arms can exemplify fear (as when someone thinks there is a
mouse and jumps into another’s arms for fear of getting bitten). While these examples are
somewhat reductive, I point to them in order to establish that the action itself has some
properties that relate to expressions such as joy, frustration, love, intimacy, and so on. It is
the quality and manner of the movement that needs to be unpacked further.
Close proximity and matching pace can thus exemplify walking together. But they
can also exemplify other things, such as crowdedness. As I argued earlier, proximity and
pace are not enough to establish whether people are actually walking together (as in the
case of people walking in close proximity in the same direction at the same speed). Elgin
maintains that exemplification is contingent on instantiation, in that action or movement
“functions as a symbol that makes reference to some of the properties, patterns, or relations
it instantiates” (Elgin 2017, 184). Elgin further argues that movement can seem to
instantiate certain properties by exemplifying them. For example, bodies cannot instantiate
weightlessness (since we are bound to the laws of gravity), but bodies can appear to be
weightless by exemplifying particular qualities of movement4 that give the appearance of
weightlessness. Extending Elgin to the context of partnering, I propose that understanding
symbols means being receptive to context, which influences whether individuals will
accept or reject the interaction, as well as how and when to end the interaction once they
have accepted it.
In partnering, signals function in both an epistemic and aesthetic dimension in that
partners sense and interpret symbolic action. As Elgin suggests, “we are prey to massive
information overload. Inputs flood our sense organs. Infinitely many obvious consequences
follow from every belief. To know, understand, perceive, or discern anything requires
overlooking a lot. The question is: what should be overlooked?” (Elgin 2008, 43). Signals
may include all sorts of actions, including direction of movement, relative position, as well
as posture and facial features such as a smile, raised eyebrow, nod, averted glance, and so 
on. As exemplars, symbols such as proximity, orientation, and point(s) of contact can 
exemplify willingness (or lack of willingness) to establish a joint commitment. As
communicative exemplars, they can function further to maintain the joint commitment of
mutual attunement necessary for dancing together in the strong sense (i.e. partnering).
There are all sorts of ways people can interact with others without being receptive
to properties of each other. I remember my father never noticing when my mother got a
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haircut, even when the resulting coif was quite different. The haircut was simply not salient
to my father. I agree with Elgin, who insists that people attend to information they find
relevant based on their frame of reference or attitude. She states that an attitude “supplies
an orientation”, which is related to “expectations, states of perceptual readiness, patterns of
salience, and dispositions to utter, accept, reject, and deliberate (Elgin 1996, 153).
Returning to the notion of physical disposition in chapter four, it is the changes in proximity
and pace that provide a frame of reference for two people dancing alongside each other.
Being willing and able to maintain distance or pace exemplifies a maintenance of the joint
commitment. Having made a commitment to move alone (such as walking down the street
in New York or dancing alone in a club), the actions of those individuals in close proximity
need not necessarily influence the actions of the individual. Having made a commitment to
walk together, if one changes pace or distance, it is the obligation of the other to maintain
by keeping up.
Expressions such as willingness require receptivity. Consider how despite facing 
each other, one partner has a slight rotation away from the other, a slight pitch backwards,
and a slight translation to the side. These slight movements may be choreographed, such
that the individual is upholding the design of the movement. The movements may be
dispositional, relating to how an individual executes movement with others based on what
is feasible within one’s individual body or pursuant of one’s character. They may be
habitual, informed by how an individual typically moves. The movements may be
something else entirely. In any case, the movements can be interpreted as symbols that
exemplify something about the interaction between partners, therefore conveying
information as signals. Elgin argues that “if one has the requisite background, what is being
symbolized may be perfectly clear” (Elgin 2017, 218). To consider whether Elgin’s claim
holds for partnering in dance, it is important to ask what qualifies as the requisite
background in partnering (e.g. dispositions, abilities, competencies)? To address this
question, I will first unpack the epistemic problems, related to thought and action, of
receiving signals in partnering.
A symbol that functions to convey information (i.e. signal) can be interpreted in a
number of different ways. When I increase pressure, I may be signaling a greeting, vying
for my partner’s attention, indicating for my partner to come closer or stay in position. With
the same pressure, I could be signaling that I am falling, having a panic attack, or keeping 
my partner awake. The interpretations for something like pressure, proximity, and 
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Partners may also develop their own symbol system where changes in pressure function to
convey particular kinds of information. Consider a hypothetical scenario in which any time
Sue squeezes Jack’s hand, he understands that Sue is asking him to slow down. Thus, the
squeeze functions as a symbol that conveys information to Jack that he is going too fast for
Sue. If Sue finds herself dancing with someone other than Jack, she will likely quickly
discover that her changes in pressure will not convey the same information with anyone
other than Jack.
Though many dance forms have their own idiomatic vocabularies, conditions such
as proximity, orientation, and point(s) of contact are not neutral enough to be truly
regimented. This is because dance forms that function as conventional, regimented systems
will always be influenced by cultural backgrounds, as well as individual histories, as well
as physical and mental dispositions. Language is similarly influenced and constrained by 
cultural backgrounds, but it does not follow that one always needs to be aware of these
influences in order to communicate linguistically. The epistemic problem is thus a matter
of what can be interpreted.
No matter how regimented dance partnering is, there will always be a matter of
subtle interpretation that challenges partners to be receptive to one another. What can 
partners do in order to interpret signals? Elgin argues that interpretation must
draw on context, background assumptions, and, where available, collateral
information instead […] their interpretive stance is Gricean. They assume
that the cooperative principle is in effect, hence that they have the resources
needed to interpret the exemplar correctly (Elgin 2017, 189).
Elgin reiterates that Grice’s cooperative principle is designed to promote the set of
purposes to which partners commit. It is important to consider the normative significance
of cooperation in physical transfers and exchanges of information. I understand partnering
to have multiple levels of interpretation based on the conditions of proximity, orientation,
and point(s) of contact. Such interpretation includes (at least) visual, kinesthetic, and tactile
signals which can be executed in the moment, without necessarily requiring extended
deliberation. That is, through the ongoing, continuous process of movement itself, partners
make interpretations about the quality and character of the signals within a partnership.
For a simple example, consider a dancer suddenly moves into close proximity of
another dancer. There is a near infinite number of possible responses for the second 
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unwanted. What signals function to communicate discomfort to the other dancer? There
may be a tightening of the partner’s body, a slowing down or hesitation, or perhaps the
individual simply continues moving past and avoids the interaction completely. In such 
cases, as well as ones where there is no choreography, the partners can attune to these
signals. They can sense the tightening or the hesitation and negotiate movement on account
of the signals they interpret. Following Grice, I will position partnering as a physical
conversation in which a main aim of partners is to cooperate. The significance of
positioning partnering in this way enables a focused investigation about the normative and
ethical problems involved in physical exchanges between individuals. I will consider what
it might mean to communicate appropriately and ethically.
Epistemic Problems in Receptivity and Responsiveness
Signals may be easily overlooked or misinterpreted. Consider an example of a
concept from contact improvisation sometimes referred to as “going for a ride”. A simple
exercise that illustrates this concept involves one individual leaning forward almost into a 
forward fold while in contact with another mover. The folded individual “scoops” the other
individual onto their back, giving them a “ride” by lifting them off the ground. Considered 
formulaically, however, joint action can cause problems because of misinterpretation.
Taking the same example, an individual bends forward to explore the physical motion of
pitching and bending. Another individual in close proximity misinterprets this as an
opportunity to “go for a ride” by suddenly giving weight to the pitched individual. In some
circumstances, sharing weight is a suitable response to a lean, and in others it is an 
opportunity to fall, jump, move away, or any other number of actions. A weight-sharing 
movement may also be a performative action emerging from the result of studied imitation.
Given the myriad possibilities of aims a practitioner may have coming into a practice,
creating an exhaustive formula for communication in particular is simply impossible.
However, there are still conditions that need to be satisfied in order to maintain a joint
commitment.
Consider for example an asymmetric relation. An expert dancer offers to dance with
a novice dancer. The expert executes certain actions, only to discover that the novice does
not react. The expert comes to realize that certain actions do not register with the novice,
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Consider the same example from a different angle. The novice dancing with an
expert tries to execute actions as she has seen them executed by experts. The problem with
repeating movement is that there is more at play than the motions themselves – there is
intention that underlies movement, which can contribute significantly to the quality and 
quantity of information being exchanged between individuals. Elgin offers a relevant
example:
The novice who emulates the performance of an expert treats that expert as
an exemplar. She identifies the features of his behavior that she thinks
account for his success. That is, she factors his complex behavior into
elements, selectively disregards those she considers irrelevant to his
effectiveness, and sets herself to reproduce the rest (Elgin 2017, 194).
In the context of dance partnering, none of these actions need necessarily be
deliberative. The novice sees an expert execute a lift and attempts to do the same. She may 
study with the expert or she may just see it once in passing and attempt it from memory.
Her success will be contingent on multiple factors, including whether she has the aim to 
cooperate by moving on account of the expert’s movement, or merely move with the expert
with only a base level of attunement. In Elgin’s example, the novice is emulating the
performance of an expert, but she may not know what the postures or movements are
exemplifying. Thus, she may be missing important information – she needs to know how
the exemplars function. By interpreting movement as a symbol of some kind, partners are
radically cutting down the number of possibilities for what movements exemplify. To
interpret movement successfully requires understanding more than just the way the
movement looks. Partners need to understand what they are doing with the movement,
including the quality and manner in which they convey information to each other. As such,
they need to understand what any given movement is an exemplar of, provided they are
trying to be communicative (and cooperative).
Suppose that the novice is emulating the expert in trying to change the direction of
her partner. A change of direction requires some kind of signal. The novice is walking
toward the expert, holding his hand while he walks backwards. Suppose that to change her
partner’s direction from backward to forward, the novice needs to signal through a pulling
action. A pull can look like the mere movement of an elbow, changing proximity from
close to slightly further away. If the novice emulates the expert by imitating the movement
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because she does not pull. To successfully signal a change of direction, the movement of
the elbow must be accompanied by a particular quality of movement (e.g. physical
resistance to establish a pull).
It is possible to look at the example at a finer grain by interrogating the quality of
response time between each partner. At first glance, this may seem only relevant to forms
where prescribed timing plays a principal role, such as highly choreographed duets set to
predetermined music. The choreography may involve time-based cues that are musically
driven, such that dancers must be attentive to the sound. Upon closer examination, the same
is true even for improvisational practices, since partners communicate with each other
through their pacing to one another. Recall that in the last chapter, Gilbert sets the stage for
how even something as simple walking together involves keeping time (at least in a rough
sort of way). This can be true for dances that have a particular set of rhythms that partners
execute in relation to the music, or for improvisational practices with no music given that
any movements (e.g. lifts, floorwork, foot patterns) can be time-dependent.
How do partners identify their relationship to time? There are the obvious
considerations of measured time, such as music or predetermined choreographic sequences,
as well as less obvious elements such as internal bodily rhythms. For example, in 
lead/follow scenarios a follower is constrained by the timing of the leader. In
extemporaneous leading, such as the kind seen in tango, swing, bachata, and other
partnered dances, a follower is further constrained by not knowing when the leader will
change direction, orientation, or point(s) of contact such as rhythm or touch. A leader is
subsequently constrained by the time it takes for a follower to respond. The internal element
of time functions as a clear constraint in that partners must be attentive to potentiality— 
when is a particular signal going to be most effectively received by a partner? This is true
too in other forms of improvisation that do not necessitate leader/follower roles (e.g.
contact improvisation); though it is perhaps more acceptable to disrupt sequences by
actions such as jumping out of a lift or opting out in what might seem like the middle of a
phrase because the roles are relaxed.
Grice posits that within a conversation, “at each stage, SOME possible
conversational moves would be excluded as conversationally unsuitable” (Grice 1991, 26).
This is especially relevant when considering how partners interact when maintaining their
joint commitment, such as maintaining eye contact, maintaining a (proxemic) spatial
relationship, or maintaining touch. The notion that some moves may be considered 
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exchange between individuals whose aim is to cooperate by negotiating movement on 
account of each other. In some cases this may be up to an outside party, such as an 
instructor, choreographer, or coach, if the movement is externally designed. In other cases,
it is up to the practitioners themselves to decide when something feels unsuitable. How
partners resolve the sensation of disconnection is as relevant as the physical moves that got
them there in the first place. This is where the standards of evaluation are necessary to
understand.
Formulaic study of responses can lead to merely coordinated independent action: a
practitioner gives the impression of responding appropriately by articulating a studied
response which is inappropriate based on some subtle misunderstanding. Grice notes how
in cases of communication within natural languages, exchanges always seem to have the
capacity for multiple interpretations. This harkens back to the problem I presented at the
start of the chapter about Gilbert’s distinction between thin and seriously intended
communication. Within the context of dance partnering, the problem may be one of
misattunement.
There are multiple levels of complexity. For one, there is the case in which a
particular quality of movement is perceived by an outside party (instructor, choreographer
or coach). The perception may be a misinterpretation of what is being communicated
between the performers because (at least) 1) one may not be privy to what is happening
between the moving bodies, or 2) one may not understand the way in which the manner
and quality of movement are conveying particular information. For example, gestural
choreography may seem to indicate particular cultural tropes that are not significant to the
action of the performers themselves, such as when one dancer extends a hand to another
seemingly in invitation but is really only extending the arm as part of the design of the
choreography. On the other hand, partners can sense and perceive signals (kinesthetically,
physically, tactilely) such that they are both audience and performer to each other. It is
interesting to note that a partner may misperceive and/or give ambiguous signals based on
a lack of understanding of the conventions of a particular form. A prime example is the
signals in some social dancing forms. To lead an underarm turn, a leader may be taught a
signal to raise the arm of the partner, under which s/he can then perform the turn. Even
with extensive training in other forms of dance, the signal to turn from the lifting of an arm
is a convention particular to the social form. Thus, without explicit previous experience in
the social form, arriving at understanding of an underarm turn is unlikely (though of course,
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account of a pre-determined symbol, rather than on account of the movement itself. I will 
return to this problem in the next chapter when examining norms of attunement.
The case is interesting to consider both for an individual who newly arrives to the
social form as a leader or as a follower. The novice leader may raise the arm of an
experienced follower for aesthetic effect (i.e. a movement the leader finds beautiful or
pleasing), and so unknowingly leads the follower into a turn. Similarly, an experienced
leader raises the arm of an inexperienced follower to no avail, given the lack of experience
prevents the novice from discerning the lifted arm as a relevant cue. If the movement is
meant to be cooperative, but a partner does not perceive it as such, then there is a problem
of interpretation.
Implicature in Dancing Together
Grice interrogates what he calls “conversational implicature”, in which certain
actions may seem uncooperative, but in fact convey information that is indeed cooperative.
A simple example Grice provides is as follows:
A is standing by an obviously immobilized car and is approached by B; the
following exchange takes place:
A: I am out of petrol
B: There is a garage around the corner (Grice 1991, 32).
It may seem that B is being irrelevant, since he does not directly respond to A’s
problem about being out of petrol. But if A understands B’s comment as cooperative, then 
it becomes clear that B is providing relevant information in the form of an implicature.
Matters get more complicated when implicatures involve some kind of inside
information. Grice’s famous example involves Person A asking Person B how Person C
(not present) is doing and being met with a response, “Oh quite well, I think; he likes his
colleagues, and he hasn’t been to prison yet” (Grice 1991, 24). The implicature that Person 
C has not yet been to prison can be met with a contextually appropriate response only if
Person A understands why Person B implicates Person C being in prison. Otherwise,
Person A will likely ask something along the lines of “what do you mean?” in which case
Person A does not understand what is being implicated in the claim.
There are (at least) two levels of complexity in Grice’s notion of implicature: 1) the
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information, and 2) the consequences that implicatures solicit. Within dance partnering,
implicature is complex because words are not the medium by which physical dialogue
occurs. This is relevant both to the qualities with which a movement is articulated, and how
it is subsequently interpreted. Precisely because of this complexity, it is important to
understand how certain movement can implicate willingness (or lack thereof), intentionally
or not.
As I mentioned earlier, Grice considers information transfer the paradigm case in 
conversation. As such, the maxims (quantity, quality, relation, and manner) delineate
specifics to uphold the cooperative principle. The maxims require individuals to make
conversational contributions that are “as informative as required” (but not more
informative), to refrain from saying what one believes is false and for which one “lacks
adequate evidence”, “to avoid obscurity of expression”, “to avoid ambiguity”, and to be
“brief” and “orderly”. Grice stresses that each person in the conversation must be sensitive
as long as the successful transfer of communication is the goal (Grice 1991).
To avoid ambiguity and to be brief and orderly in movement will depend on the
disciplinary boundaries of a particular form. For example, a choreographed duet that is
performed for an audience might be composed specifically to exemplify ambiguity to an 
audience. There is no failure in communication there, at least not between the audience and
performers. Since the message of the dance is that it can be read in multiple ways, it is
doing what it set out to do. It may be that the dance is trying explicitly to be uncooperative.
Even so, it is probably desirable for partners to avoid ambiguity in communicating with
each other, since they are trying to do something together. Even if the dance seeks to 
exemplify a lack of cooperation, partners may need to cooperate in their effort to exemplify
the underlying message of the dance.
Partnering can be impeded if partners communicate ambiguously. Excessive arm
movements in lead/follow, for example, may be ambiguous because one can unwittingly 
change the direction, timing, and spatial orientation of a partner. This may also be failing
to uphold the maxim of quantity, in that one does not have adequate information to interpret
the movements of one’s partner.
Sometimes actions are ambiguous because they are functioning as implicatures.
Consider an example in which two individuals are swaying together in a stationary position,
holding hands. They move freely, changing orientation by spiraling the shoulders, side-
bending, and pitching forward and backwards. One dancer constrains one’s own movement
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pressure to the hands of her partner such that her partner’s movement is restricted. This
constraint may be seen as
1. An oppressive act flouting the cooperative principle
2. A cooperative act, where resistance is an invitation to explore off-balance
movement or elasticity 
Resistance in this way can be a form of physical implicature, particularly because
resistance may be interpreted as the opposite of willingness. Both interpretations could be
correct, making the action ambiguous. The first interpretation makes the act seem
uncooperative, but the second reveals the way in which resistance in this scenario is indeed
cooperative. Resistance can take the form of ambiguity in that the same action may be
properly interpreted in the two different ways mentioned above. If it is meant to be either
one or the other, then it is an unambiguous symbol that has been misinterpreted. This is an 
important matter to consider.
Partners communicate by successfully interpreting what movement exemplifies.
Physical resistance can be vital to some actions in partnering, despite (or regardless) of the
idea that resistance may be perceived as a lack of willingness. For example, lifts and off-
balance positions require resistance, since rigidity allows dancers to maintain bodily
shapes, positions, or postures while being lifted or in physically precarious positions. When
working in the studio, I call this action “resisting to support”. Both the resister and the
mover have some obligation to each other (the resister may also have an obligation to
themselves). If the resistance is ambiguous, it may be an invitation to explore the
cooperative aspect of the partnership. It may also be misinterpreted by those who lack the
requisite communicative skills (e.g. novices).
Another example of implicature in partnering is obscurity. Recall the example of
interacting with a potential partner who is willing to engage only up to a certain point. The
dancer accepts the pace and the proximity but withholds certain physical information. This
may be because the dancer hopes to obscure effort, either from a partner or from audience.
By obscuring effort, the act may be cooperative. But like all implicatures, it has the danger
of being interpreted as uncooperative.
Implicatures open a problem about the intention of communication. Withholding
physical information or giving ambiguous signals may cause problems. Grice maintains
that successful interpretation of implicatures depends on competence, suggesting that “it is
within the competence of the hearer to work out, or grasp intuitively [that a particular
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may fail to be received as cooperative if one is not sensitive to the competence of the other,
including if the partner assumes competence of the other that is not actually available.
Furthermore, I propose that a partner may be unreceptive to the cooperative nature of a
physical implicature if one is not sensitive to the quality and manner of information that is
physically conveyed. To what extent should a partner be assuming anything other than what
is physically articulated? Grice offers the following thought:
Any one who cares about the goals that are central to
conversation/communication (e.g. giving and receiving information,
influencing and being influenced by others) must be expected to have an
interest, given suitable circumstances, in participation in talk exchanges that
will be profitable only on the assumption that they are conducted in general
accordance with the CP and the maxims (Grice 1991, 30).
The goals Grice suggests of giving and receiving information, as well as influencing 
and being influenced, seem in direct line with the goals of dancing together in the strong
sense (i.e. partnering) in that action is being negotiated on account of each other’s action.
By introducing the notion of “care”, Grice restates the normative concern. I argue that it is
by caring about the goal to negotiate movement on account of each other, rather than (or
in addition to) just establishing it, partners are able to maintain their joint commitment.
Grice initially suggests a contingency that there are “certain features that jointly distinguish 
cooperative transactions” such as “participants have some common immediate aim” and
that a “transaction should continue in appropriate style unless both parties are agreeable
that it should terminate” (Grice 1991, 30). Ultimately, however, Grice comes to realize that
“there are too many types of exchange that it fails to fit comfortably” (ibid).
How partners negotiate their joint commitment depends on their ability to
differentiate their signals. If partners can successfully interpret each other's movements
then they may be able to fairly easily accommodate uncertainty. In some cases, they can 
also talk to each other and use language as another mode of communication to understand
each other. If one is unfamiliar with the form of dancing together, however, interaction may 
prove to be difficult or perhaps unfeasible if the dancer perceives movements as random or
is unable to differentiate signals because they are too complex. By accepting that actions
in partnering are always communicative, all movements are technically open to
interpretation. If partners are being uncooperative, or indeed do not have cooperation as a
main aim, then maintaining a joint commitment may be unfeasible. This is where the door
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Ethical Considerations
Sometimes partners communicate things that they don’t intend. In particular,
through proximity, orientation, and point(s) of contact, partners can unintentionally
communicate a lack of care. There is a difference between communicating a lack of care
because one does not care and communicating a lack of care because one lacks the requisite
communicative skills. This brings us back to the link between willingness and ability.
Individuals may be willing to establish and maintain their joint commitment, but they may
be unable to do so because they lack the refined ability (e.g. physical dexterity) to articulate
particular qualities of movement (thereby reducing the quantity of information), or they
lack the perceptual awareness to interpret minute changes that are signaling relevant bits of
information. The important aspects to consider is 1) whether each partner actually values
communication (or whether one is simply upholding a conventional rhetoric of
togetherness), and 2) whether each partner has the refined awareness to engage in fine-
grained communication—that is, to communicate subtle or nuanced information, and to
interpret signals from one’s partner(s) as indicating subtle or nuanced information. The
second point may be a problem of merely emitting signals. For example, consider someone
blushing. The sudden redness in one’s cheeks constitutes some kind of physical information
because of a change in a visual appearance. But a blush does not necessarily communicate
anything. One merely had a change of state that was visible such that someone could draw
an inference. If the blushing individual says something like “I'm very embarrassed”, then
something has been communicated.
The same example can be considered in a partnering context. Consider that two
people are dancing together, and one begins to slip. There could be a non-communicative
signal, such as an increase in pressure that signals a state-change akin to a blush. Or the
one slipping could give a look that communicates something like "help me out", or further
cry out for help. In the case of increasing pressure, one may merely be emitting a signal
such as fear, which is not necessarily communicating a cry for help. If a partner is
responsive, then some exchange has occurred. But the pressure could easily be taken as
noise rather than as signal.
Given the joint commitment to move together, each partner has an obligation to
uphold the commitment as long as they have the goal of dancing together in the strong
sense. To maintain the joint commitment, partners must be receptive to what is being
communicated. Since communicating is something that is done (rather than simply thought
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willing to cooperate and being able to cooperate are different dimensions of the same
problem. In cases where partners are emitting signals that are merely noise, they may not
be dancing together in the strong sense.
There is a tension in partnering between willingness and motive that makes it hard
to evaluate when something is awry (from the outside) and why (from the outside or from
the inside). Some people may come to partner because they are seeking a romantic
companion, to exercise power, to make money, or any other number of reasons that do not
actually place value on communication. Moreover, competing values such as feeling good
and attending to one’s partner may disrupt the attunement to what is being communicated.
To what extent does understanding the motives depend on familiarity with the setting and
conventions of the paradigms people are working within (e.g. international DanceSport
competition, contact improvisation jam, tango milonga, etc.) as well as the values
(aesthetic, moral, social) of the form or the preference of the dance-maker? That is, can we
really say what movement is “supposed” to look like, let alone feel like? Moving beyond
the aesthetic composition of physical interaction, partnering can understood as a practice
that explicitly values bidirectional communication on the basis of conditions that enable
partners to be receptive and response to dance together in the strong sense.
The value system of each partner will play into how movement is negotiated in
practice, including how it relates to the aesthetic conventions of the form. There are two
major incongruities here: 1) partners may communicate something other than what they
intended because of a lack of awareness and/or competence, and 2) partners may
communicate in such a way that is incongruous with the values they purport to have.
Certain values, such as such as feeling or looking good, may overshadow values such as
care for each other such that communication becomes less nuanced or overlooked
altogether. Partners interacting without explicit awareness to the ways in which their
proximity, orientation, and shared focus have normative dimensions might not be
positioned to appreciate the depth of responsiveness.
Being willing to communicate and being able to communicate are ostensibly 
manifested in different ways. Thus, it matters what partners are receptive to and the manner
and quality with which they respond. In this way, receptivity is more than just registering
what is going on (within myself, my partner, my surroundings). Receptivity suggests that
due attention and weight are committed to the phenomenon of negotiating movement on 
account of each other’s movement, which requires epistemic acceptance (i.e. both 
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previous experiences are also significant to responsiveness. My partner may be more
receptive if we share a common background. That is, if I am trying to execute a complex 
lift but my partner only has experience executing the lift (rather than being lifted), he may 
be less responsive simply because he lacks the requisite experience and/or skill.
Alternatively, I may be partnering with someone who has some certain experience, having
trained for a number of years. If I lead a movement my partner has never seen or
experienced kinesthetically, he may be less responsive simply because he is unfamiliar with 
the movement. My partner may not understand the types of movements that are appropriate
within the form, thus he may be ill-equipped to make choices because he feels there are too
many alternatives or very few possibilities. Shared focus such as timing also plays into 
responsiveness. If I move too quickly or not quickly enough, interaction will be possible
but likely unsuccessful. For example, my partner runs toward me and I anticipate catching
her by bringing my arms up too quickly. In doing so, I miss the chance to be responsive to 
her and she bumps into me. On the one hand, timing is a problem of interaction and on the
other, it is a problem of competence. The notion that something may be “unsuitable”, and
thus inappropriate, requires a refined sensitivity. In each distinct case there are myriad
options for action, that will bear physical consequences.
Proximity, orientation, and point(s) of contact can all be determined or prescribed 
in advance. In some forms, proximity, orientation, timing, and touch are established as part
of the rules of the dance such that partners will be exchanging information through multiple
points of contact while maintaining specific body postures, positions, and/or patterns (e.g.
tango). Some forms fix certain features of proximity, orientation, and point(s) of contact.
A certain dance may require partners to orient toward each in close proximity, with touch
as a point of contact by connecting palms on one side of the body and through a half
embrace on the other side. A certain dance may also involve roles, such as leader and
follower. Leaders may have a distinct task, such as changing the timing, direction, and
spatial orientation of a following dancer. In other forms, these conditions are negotiated
through the practice in real-time, without prescribed rules (e.g. improvisation). They may
also be determined compositionally, such as in complex choreography that requires
intricate timing and bodily architecture with multiple points of contact. Each condition can 
lead to fine-grained and nuanced movement, such that despite facing each other, one
partner may have a slight rotation toward or away from the other, a slight pitch forward or
backwards, a slight translation to the side, and so on. Movements may also function to
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Training and/or practice are required to hone abilities into competencies in the conditions
of proximity, orientation, point(s) of contact, in whatever form(s) individual choose to 
engage in. The quality of training and practice will further influence how abilities are
harness into competence.
Not all dancing interactions prioritize communication in a way that concepts like
responsibility and commitment are physically salient. In practice, partners may use more
force than necessary because the value of certain aesthetic conventions (e.g. more bodily 
resistance to maintain particular posture) overshadows the physical care of negotiating
proximity, orientation, and shared focus to uphold and maintain a joint commitment. Thus,
the ability to be receptive and recognize the subtle effects of movement significantly affect
partnering such that one can visibly tell when something is missing if one knows what to
look for. While partners need not have an explicit goal to communicate, there will still
always be an exchange of information. Partners obligate themselves and each other is to
understand the appropriate responses potentially available, in the moment, in ways that are
appropriate given the constraints and resources within a given form of movement.
Conclusion
To evaluate the communication between partners, it is necessary to have a stable
conception of how physical signals function as communication. To have a stable concept
means to understand the conditions that make physical interaction possible, feasible, and
fitting of an act that can be called partnering. The conditions presented here in this chapter
provide the basis for logical, systematic consideration of evaluating and assessing
communication in physical interaction in dance.
Taking a step forward into any particular practice, what happens when individuals
move together with a purpose other than to communicate, such as exercising a cultural
identity, seeking a romantic partner, fulfilling work in order to make a living, or indeed
without any particular purpose at all? An approach in which dancers are not attending to
their communication may render an exchange a different thing altogether, such as two
coordinated monologues. It is possible to extend the argument by saying those individuals
moving together without a communicative purpose are not, strictly speaking, engaging in
the practice of dancing together in the strong sense (i.e. partnering) While the practice of
moving together need not be purposeful, the phenomenon of maintaining a joint
commitment to move on account of each other is significantly different than merely moving
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In this chapter, I argued that even fine movements have communicative potential.
Partners maintain their joint commitment through communicating in conditions of
proximity, orientation, and point(s) of contact. Physical dialogue is tricky because bodies
are always changing, which is why formulaic study can be so disruptive to the act of
communication, and the subsequent emergence of connection. Assuming mutual
attunement can only emerge from responses that are contextually suitable (i.e. appropriate),
one must be receptive and responsive to change.
Having established the conditions of communication in partnering, building on the
conditions of willingness and ability from chapter four, I will turn now to examine the
evaluation of quality within proximity, orientation, and shared focus between partners.
Some partners may take their aim to be the achievement of some aesthetic ideal and believe
that cooperation is just a means to achieving that ideal. Others might take cooperation to
be a subsidiary aim. The communicative problem is that partners may signal without
attuning to feedback. The ground air traffic controller is a prime example. The signals the
controller makes to the pilot of the plane are that the space is clear to leave the gate and
move onto the runway. The only feedback the controller is attuned to is whether the plane
is moving or not. But the pilot depends on the controller for signals. There is no mutual
attunement there, only a linear exchange between the controller and the pilot. The problem
we are left with is one of attunement. In the next chapter, I will turn to the norms of
attunement to consider how partners negotiate their joint commitment when something
goes wrong.
Chapter Six: Norms of Attunement
In the previous two chapters, I argued that partners establish a joint commitment to
negotiate movement on account of each other and maintain their joint commitment by
communicating with and responding to each other. I argued that receptivity,
responsiveness, and exemplification feature in signaling between partners. But there is
more to maintaining the joint commitment than merely signaling. The previous chapter left
us with a particular problem: just because partners are signaling to each other does not
necessarily mean they are attuning to each other. Whether partnering is choreographed or
improvised, it may be the case that two partners are dancing together, signaling to each
other, but not attuning because they are not receptive to all of the relevant elements of each
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as a change of direction, relative position, point of contact(s), or timing), such that the
dancers merely do the movement that is choreographed without being receptive to each
other’s physical feedback. How partners move will influence whether mutual attunement
is feasible, but attunement may very well be feasible and partners still do not attune to the
full degree. Distinguishing the degree to which partners attune to each other based on
particular qualities of movement is an epistemic problem, connected to understanding the
relation between thought and action.
In this chapter, I will interrogate the degree of mutual attunement in partnering. I
will demonstrate how sometimes partners depend on each other for certain kinds of signals,
and I will argue that in some cases, the degree of attunement is crucial to the successful
execution of a movement. If, as argued in chapter four, dancing together in the strong sense
necessitates a joint commitment to negotiate movement on account of each other, what
does a higher degree of attunement enable partners to express and understand? Given that
the conditions of partnering include both an encounter and exchange, I interrogate what
factors of partnering contribute to negotiating dancing together well. I will begin by
presenting an example of an existing duet performed by two different pairs of dancers.
Discussion of the duet will pave the way for constructing hypothetical scenarios that further
conceptual analysis of dependence and attunement in partnering. After analyzing how the
performance of the duet varies between two couples, I will consider the concept of
affordances to further analyze the epistemic problem of what it is that dancers are attuning.
I will bring in the concept of weight and effort from dance scholar and practitioner Rudolf
von Laban, to consider the normative dimensions of partnering well.
Kylian’s Petite Mort
In 1991, Czech choreographer Jiri Kylian choreographed a work entitled Petite
Mort on Nederlands Dans Theatre for the Salzburg Music Festival. The work features a
complex and intricate pas de deux in which a male and female move together through lifts
and off-balance positions. In 1996, Johan Inger and Elke Schepers danced this duet with
the Netherlands Dans Theatre5. In 2006, Roberto Bolle and Greta Hodgkinson performed
the same duet excerpt as part of the Gala Concert of World Stars in Italy6. 
5 Available online: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-XKjgCugrT0
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Rather than focusing on the development of the piece, the underlying concept, or
even the experience of the dancers, my interest in comparing the two versions of the same
duet is to interrogate quality of movement in partnering. I will focus in particular on the
observable, behavioral expressions of the dancers in order to draw attention to physical
dependence. Basing my observation on the two-dimensional representation of the video, I
do not have access to what the dancers were thinking, nor what the choreography is
supposed to be. The only information we have is that which is available from viewing the
two-dimensional representation of the video. Since I am not providing a historiography of
the piece, I also have nothing to say about whether one couple is executing the
choreography more correctly than the other. Instead, I will focus on unpacking
distinguishable differences in the execution of the two movement passages to demonstrate
differences in physical dependence and attunement.
There are two moments in particular to which I would like to draw attention. The
first occurs about fifteen seconds into the duet. I will first roughly describe the design of
the choreography based on the way it is executed in both duets. The female dancer bends
her left leg with her foot flat on the ground (plié), moving her right leg into a bent position
at the ankle of the left leg (coupé). She then straightens her left leg pushing onto the ball of
the foot (relevé), while extending the right leg knee-first into a straight position (developé).
She proceeds to cross her left arm across her body at the pelvis. At the same time, the male
dancer frames the female dancer from behind, with his legs in a wide stance on either side
of his partner. He catches his partner’s left hand with his right hand, his right forearm
making contact with her upper right thigh. The female dancer then releases her crossed left,
and bends the extended right leg (attitude), while the male dancer wraps his left arm across
her abdomen to clasp his right hand. The female dancer then bends backwards, throwing
her head back over his left shoulder (cambré). As she straightens up out of the backbend,
the male dancer comes to the floor. He switches his right hand at her upper thigh to his left
hand, making contact as the dancer brings her left foot to the ground to straddle the male
dancer.
I will now analyze how this passage differs for the two dancers. When getting into 
the developé, Elke seems to release the weight of her leg into Johan’s forearm, such that
there is a transfer of force. In contrast, Greta seems to be holding her own leg such that
there is little or no transfer of force between her and Roberto. We can see this transfer of
force in the way the female dancers move following contact with their male partners. When
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makes contact with Greta’s leg, she shifts slightly away from his arm. Without access to
their mental states, it is impossible to explain the intention behind the movement. But the
shifts do indeed occur in opposite directions.
Moving on, in transitioning from developé to attitude, Elke’s weight shifts to the
left. As she executes the cambré, the line from her shoulder to her foot is almost completely
straight (figure 1a). This gives us an idea about how her weight sits in Johan’s left arm. In
contrast, Greta’s ribcage translates slightly to the left such that she maintains the position
of her lower body (figure 1b). While Elke’s position is dependent on Johan’s (the position 
is physically impossible to sustain on her own because of the preceding shift of weight),
Greta’s position is independent of Roberto (the position is physically possible to sustain on 
her own). The distinction between Elke’s weight shift and Greta’s ribcage translation is
subtle. However, what happens next is fascinating to consider. Greta’s heel comes down
and she begins to stumble in the cambré and the following action as Roberto comes to the
floor. Without access to Greta’s mental state, it is impossible to understand precisely why
she begins to stumble. It is possible, for example, that she stumbles on purpose. Perhaps
she enjoys the experience of stumbling. Perhaps she feels the choreography would benefit
from micro-adjustments of her foot.
From a mechanical perspective, however, it is possible that she loses her footing 
because of the way she executes the movement. It is possible that for physical reasons, she
could not maintain her original position on her own. It is also plausible that she had to 
stumble if she was not going to rely on him, because the position was too precarious. By 
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moving independently. In other words, there is no established dependence between Roberto
and Greta, despite the availability of his arm. Perhaps Roberto is not available to be
depended on. Perhaps his arm is there merely by design of the choreography, and when
Greta goes to shift weight, she feels something that makes her think he is unavailable for
support. My aim here is not to assign blame, nor is it to probe into the reasons for Greta’s
movement. I am merely pointing to the fact that the same passage is executed differently,
such that the degrees of dependence are different. There is no evidence to support why the
degrees of dependence vary from watching the footage alone.
The second passage I would like to draw attention to directly succeeds the previous
segment. I will again begin by describing the design of the movement in general terms. The
male and female dancers are sitting on the floor, facing each other. They both rise, the male
dancer holding the female dancer’s right hand with his right hand as she extends her leg
into a standing split (penchée).
As Elke rises, she fully extends her right arm and shifts her torso backwards while
maintaining the same posture. As she extends her leg, her pelvis moves backwards into the
standing split (figure 2a). The position is again dependent on Johan – the position is
impossible to achieve without the support of her partner. In contrast, as Greta rises, she
keeps her elbow bent and her torso stays almost in place as her leg extends into the standing 
split (figure 2b). Greta’s position is possible independent of Roberto. Again, without access
to their mental states, we do not know why each dancer executes the movement as they do
(though dance training, familiarity with choreography, and so on will play a role). All we
have evidence for is the degree of dependence established by each position.
From the point of view of geometry, the shapes presented in the two figures are
different. The screenshots are taken at the zenith point of the penchée. From the point of
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depending on their male partners. The way they are relating to each other is different. From
the pictures alone, we cannot tell how or whether they are communicating. We also do not
have insight about the signals that are being received by each of the dancers. Thus, there is
a limit to the kinds of claims we can make about their intentions toward each other.
The case of Petite Mort being performed two different ways offers an instance of 
observing partnering from the outside. So far, I have been primarily concerned with how
partners encounter and interact with each other from inside the partnership. In the previous
chapter I also touched on the notion of receptivity, which relates to what dancers each bring
to the partnership from their own inner experience and self-image. Turning to observation
does not discount what I have argued so far, but rather offers an illustration of what
partnering might look like. I have considered dancing together in the strong sense through 
thought experiments from an imagined position of being ‘inside’ the duet, whereas here I
am taking this analysis into the observation of an recorded performed duet. The
performance of the two duets are different, which is valuable in that the differences enable
a discussion about the subtleties of dancing together in the strong sense. In both instances
of the duet, the dancers are moving together while executing complex movement. I am less
interested here in understanding the phenomenal experience of the dancers, but simply wish
to point to the way in which the same duet can be executed such that different qualities of
dependence are visible. Though similar by design, the differences in execution reveals how
the same movement can be done differently. But what makes the execution different? As I
see it, Johan and Elke are relating to each other differently than Roberto and Greta. Clearly
the differences in execution have to do with differing physical dependencies. I believe that 
the difference in dependence reveals something important about attunement in partnering.
The pertinent question about dependence has to do with the degree of attunement
in the exchange between partners. The difference in execution of the two couples serves as
a basis for interrogating attunement in a more general sense, including how each partner
attunes to their own action, and the action of other(s). What are the physical elements or
features partners are attuning to in each other’s movement and what are they attuning to in 
themselves? What do they take as evidence of particular kinds of dependence? Having 
presented the conditions of establishing joint commitment, the nature of the agreement
based on some degree of mutual attunement, and the information being exchanged through
signals to maintain the joint commitment, I will now move to address how maintaining the
joint commitment well is contingent on more than mere signaling. I will consider how one
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responses (i.e. feedback) of one’s partner(s). Moving forward, I will consider the complex
relationship between attunement and dependence in partnering using the images as a point
of departure. I will analyze Roberto and Greta’s performance in order to further generalize
certain aspects of attunement and dependence.
Dependence
Drawing from Gilbert’s work, we can say by now that physical, behavioral
expressions may play a significant role in establishing willingness to form a plural subject.
We also know that behavioral expressions such as physical proximity may not be enough
to establish willingness because of the context of the encounter (e.g. crowded streets of
New York) or because of the intention of the other (i.e. lack of willingness). Drawing from
Elgin’s work, we can also say that physical expressions exemplify aspects of relationships
which can be interpreted by others (even if the one expressing was trying to exemplify 
something other than what is being interpreted).
While I have been focusing on the nature of joint commitment between partners, it
is worth registering that dependence is not just a mental phenomenon when the interaction
is physical. What can be said about dependence based on physical action? Gilbert maintains
that action concepts are complicated because “they refer to a species of overt behavior on
the one hand, and to intentions and other subjective phenomena on the other” (Gilbert 1989,
165). She further argues that,
if the intention does not ‘fit’ the behavior we will be inclined either not to
know what to say, or to say that the apparent action is not in fact occurring 
– no action is occurring – or to sense that we are indeed now operating with 
a revised concept, with a purely behavioral concept (Gilbert 1989, 165).
Because I do not have access to what the dancers are thinking, I can say very little
about their intentions. Nevertheless, the case of Petite Mort illustrates that when moving
together, partners can behave in different ways that gives us some clues about intentions.
This is the heart of the epistemic problem in dancing together that concerns the relation
between thought and action. One of the ways in which behavior can differ is in the way
they depend on each other. By referring to dependence here, I mean to suggest a physical
way that partners use force to rely on each other for certain movement. Independence and
co-dependence represent different types of dependence.
Whether or not they intend to, the two couples are behaving differently. The two 
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such as the case in off-balance positions. Sometimes they are physically independent, such 
as the case when there is no point of contact established or maintained. Point(s) of contact
(e.g. mutual gaze, breath, and music) suggest that partners are somehow dependent, rather
than fully independent or co-dependent. From the Petite Mort example, it seems that there
are also degrees of dependence. Based on the positions in images 2a and 2b, we can see
that Greta’s penchée requires fewer degrees of dependence than Elke’s. That Greta and
Roberto have a point of contact means that they are not completely independent, but both 
could feasibly achieve the position they are in without each other. By contrast, it is
unfeasible for Elke to achieve that position on her own without Johan.
The movements that follow the depictions in figures 1a and 1b further illustrate
degrees of dependence more clearly. When Greta starts to stumble, what can be said about
how she is depending on Roberto? Without access to Greta’s inside information, we do not
know her intention. But the fact that she stumbles gives us a clue about some aspect of her
exchange with Roberto. Importantly, Greta loses her balance and continues to adjust the
foot of her standing leg. She gives very little of her weight to Roberto, with whom she is in
contact. There is also some evidence of how smooth the movement can look based on a
comparison to Elke’s execution. Though very little can be said about Greta’s intentions
from a video, the movement of her foot is visibly discernable and reveals how she moves
independently to Roberto in comparison to the way Elke moves dependently with Johan. 
Recall that in chapter four, I proposed that an expression is any discernable manifestation.
That her adjustment is discernably manifest can be read as an expression of independence
(i.e. a lack of dependence).
Physical dependence is related to force, which can be considered in a subtle way by 
examining the use of certain everyday objects. For example, when wiping down a table
with a washcloth, I am not merely making motions along the table. I am using force to wipe
the table down. This wiping down involves continuously applying force as long as I am
engaging in the act of wiping. This can be juxtaposed with using a broom. When sweeping,
I can swing the handle to pile dirt into a corner. This can be done by continuously applying
force until I reach the corner. This can also be seen as a series of discrete signals in which,
rather than continuously applying force to get the dirt into the corner, I am successively
applying force and releasing it. I can initiate the action of the sweep through increased 
force, and then let the broom swing the rest of the way. The difference I am trying to
highlight is in the way I am applying force to complete an action, or applying force to
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work). To differentiate the two ways of moving, I introduce the term “maneuver”. The
wiping action is a maneuver; it requires continuous force. The sweeping may also be a
maneuver, but since it does not require continuous force, the action may be simply a
motion. Though both require force, maneuvers require a more refined sensitivity to force
and resistance.
Connecting force to dance, a maneuver requires a certain amount of effort. Laban
writes about force in the context of effort, which is related to time, space, and flow of
movement (Laban 1966). There is a distinguishable difference in effort between making
the motions of swinging the broom and actually sweeping. Importantly, both the broom
and washcloth cannot move on their own such that movement depends on how I apply
force, which is contingent on the effort I employ. While it might be odd to say that the
washcloth and broom depend on me to move, the point is merely to illustrate how force
functions to create maneuvers versus merely moving without force. If I do not apply force
to the washcloth or broom handle, I likely will not be doing a very good job of cleaning.
But moving with a person is different than moving with an inanimate object.
In the case of the penchée, it is visible that Elke and Johan are using more force
than Greta and Roberto. This may not be of consequence, since they may have had artistic
freedom to choose the angle of the leg and the degrees of dependence. Nevertheless, the
force both couples are exhibiting is different. But in the earlier passage, when Greta
stumbles, she seems to be fighting for balance. Though she is in contact with Roberto, there
seems to be little to no exchange of force such that Greta is moving independently. This
gives us a clue about the intentions of her movement (e.g. resilience in losing balance), but
without access to her mind it is impossible to know for certain.
Suppose that both couples have expressed willingness to form a joint commitment,
and both are constituting a plural subject. This is not enough to say that they will maintain
their joint commitment well. In the case of Roberto and Greta, it seems as though both are
moving without much transfer of force. When there is some force transferred, there is a
different kind of relation within the partnership. I propose that the difference is in how
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Attuning to Feedback
If the action of one partner has no recognizable effects on the other, the interaction 
will be physically independent. On the other hand, the interaction will be too taxing for one
partner if the other exhibits too much dependency. To understand the degrees of
dependence, partners must attune to each other. To distinguish further between degrees of
attunement, I introduce the terms “coordinating” and “calibrating”. One difference in
attunement is that in coordinating, partners move with little to no transfer of force, while
in calibrating partners move with such a significant transfer of force that they influence
each other’s movement. I will examine coordinating and calibrating in relation to the
performance of Petite Mort.
Observing Roberto and Greta, it is possible that they are able to dance together
without transferring much (or any) force between each other. Greta’s continued adjustment
in her developé illustrates this point, in which though they are in contact, the point of
contact does not seem to factor into a dependency because the transfer of force is too small.
Greta moves independently of Roberto, save for the fact that they are tethered to one
another through their points of contact. Without the transfer of force, Greta and Roberto’s
actions are coordinated such that they satisfy the requirements of the choreography. In
calibrating, partners move with a significant transfer of force such that they influence each 
other’s movement. This is illustrated by comparing Elke and Greta’s performance. Elke
establishes dependence on Johan by moving into an off-balance position, which requires a
significant transfer of force. The transfer of force establishes a physical dependence such
that each can attune to the other’s movements.
There are physical interactions in which one’s actions significantly influence the
action of the other(s). Coming back to Grice, the possibility of physically influencing others
through movement raises important questions about the quality and manner of information
being transferred between partners. In Roberto and Greta’s performance, some of their
actions can be seen as merely going through the motions of the duet in comparison with
Elke and Johan, who seem to be physically relying on each other in more significant ways.
What are the two couples doing differently?
I propose that certain movements require partners to rely on something more than
a mere signal. To calibrate, partners need to maneuver each other. This requires sensitivity
in that partners must be willing and able to be receptive and responsive to feedback, which 
establishes a different kind of dependence than coordination. I propose that feedback is the
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actions. Take the instance of being off-balance. To get back on balance, one needs to
maneuver a partner onto a sustainable axis such that they are no longer dependent. A simple
pull is not enough to do so, since being-off balance in this case, may establish a dependency 
such that feedback is required to understand where the partner’s axis is located in order to
restore balance. Feedback here is the information extrapolated from the action of being off-
balance. The maneuver required is a calibrated action, sustained in such a way that Elke is
relying on Johan to place her back on balance. Without Johan she will be unable to regain 
her balance to continue the design of the choreography. What is interesting is that she could
feasibly pull Johan to get back on balance, but this is not what happens in the duet – Johan 
and Elke rise at the same time in such a way that their attunement to each other is clearly
discernably manifest.
One could ostensibly signal without attuning to feedback. I may pull my partner 
because someone told me to, or because I saw someone else do it, or because I like pulling
on my partners. The signal of pulling may be a pre-determined symbol of the dance, where
I pull whenever she moves away from me. To attune to feedback, I must be receptive to the
information my partner conveys related to her being off-balance, such that I can maneuver
her back on balance. When dancing with a partner, maneuvering depends on partners
attuning to feedback such that they use an appropriate amount of effort to achieve the
maneuver. Mutually attuning to feedback is not only whether one attunes to a partner, but
whether partners attune to the feedback they receive from each other. Maneuvering 
exemplifies a different tactile relation when there is a calibrated transfer of force. Before
getting into the complexity of partnering beyond physicality, I will consider the
significance of degrees of attunement by considering how Greta deviates from the
choreography that Elke is executing. The problem I want to highlight is that there is more
to partnering than merely going through the motions of the choreography.
I am assuming, based on Elke’s performance, that Greta executes the transition from
developé to attitude as it was choreographically designed. In other words, she executes the
movements in the correct order. Extending her leg, Greta stumbles and adjusts her stance.
The adjustment was not part of the design of the passage, so she is adding movement. The
problem with analyzing Greta’s movement is that we cannot tell the intention for the
adjustment without additional information (e.g. interviewing her about the intention).
I propose that the constraints of successful execution for the choreographic passage
are quite strict given the complexity of the movement. How does the movement hang
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movement? To do so requires some analysis. Elgin argues that one way to perform an
impersonal, objective evaluation is to establish a magnitude. Magnitudes, according to
Elgin, “can be used as bases for comparison of members of a set” (Elgin 2017, 162).
Magnitudes have certain thresholds, which may be relative but not completely arbitrary,
and defining a magnitude “depends on what we want to do with the information we glean”
(Elgin 2017, 162). Suppose that in order to execute this passage of movement well, she
needs to push off Roberto with a certain magnitude of force in the right direction. In other
words, to borrow from physics, Greta needs to establish a vector for her movement to
stabilize herself. The vector represents the direction of movement plus the magnitude of
force toward the ground. By establishing a vector, Greta establishes a different degree of
attunement to Roberto such that she is depending on him for more than merely the
coincidence of touch. To stabilize herself with control (and perhaps something like grace),
Greta needs to oppose Roberto by using some effort. As such, doing the movement well
means more than doing the right motion at the right time. This we know only in comparison
with Elke, who is stable and controlled in her execution.
The degree of effort in order to attune to feedback means that she needs to calibrate,
rather than merely coordinate the motions. There are added dimensions that go beyond
doing the designed motions that have to do with how Greta attunes to Roberto. Without the
proper force, we can now explain why she needs to make the extra adjustment. Given her
adjustments, what sorts of claims can we make about Greta? The adjustment is corrective,
in that she needs to remain in control after losing balance. The fact that the movement was
corrective reveals something about the degree of attunement to her partner. Importantly,
there are many possibilities for why she did not rely on Roberto, but the possibilities open 
to her now are a direct consequence of actions she made up to this point.
Using Elke and Johan’s performance as the template, I propose that Greta’s stumble
is a mistake. I am assuming that it was not her intention to lose balance, and so she has
‘failed’. Drawing from Gilbert, the failure could be in obligation to her partner, as well as
in her obligation to uphold the choreography. It is, of course, possible that Greta intended 
to stumble but I will move forward assuming that it was unintentional. How do we identify
in what way Greta has failed? One way is to consider what her action exemplifies. I propose
that movements have functional significance, in that they exemplify one’s dependence to 
something or someone. Greta’s position is not functional. Her adjustment exemplifies a
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enable her to generate the requisite magnitude to extend her leg with control. I am also 
proposing that Greta is coordinating her own movement independently.
Greta’s stumble functions as evidence in that it is discernably manifest, and as such 
expresses a lack of dependence. But what evidence do we have that Greta's mistake is an
expression of something more than a lack of dependence? Is it possible that her continued 
adjustment expresses a lack of willingness to be dependent? Or a lack of understanding 
about what the movement requires? It is possible that Greta does not understand the
conditions of the joint action (e.g. what can she can count on Roberto for?). Insofar as she
takes it upon herself to do things that really ought to have been done together. It is possible
that she didn't grasp the joint commitment, just as it is possible that she did in fact
understand something such as she had to take it all on herself independently. But this does
not necessarily mean that she is not attuned to Roberto. Perhaps Roberto is a poor partner,
and she knew full well that he is a poor partner. Thus, she is actually attuned to a high 
enough degree to receive feedback that while it seems like Roberto is offering support from
outside observation, he is merely placing his arm there by design. I am assuming all sorts
of competence – for example, that she could have done the movement differently (at least
based on other performances of other duets where she demonstrates her ability to perform
complex maneuvers without stumbling). It is possible, for example, that Greta was attuned 
to Roberto such that she could tell that he was not offering enough effort for her to depend 
on him in the moment. She may have decided to move independently because he had not
offered enough effort in the past. It is possible that the particular mistake was made because
she did not take herself to be able to count on him for something. It could be that she was
wrong, it could be that he was wrong. It could be a mismatch of expectations.
The difference in the two duets is striking. Dependence seems to allow for a
different way to attune to each other, such that calibration is possible, and perhaps even
necessary. Throughout the duet, both couples seem to instantiate calibration and 
coordination. Without getting into the details of the execution, or the nuances of the
choreographic choices on behalf of Kylian, it is important to note that calibration and
coordination are two possible alternatives of attuning to feedback. To maneuver and
calibrate, partners need to be attuned to feedback to a higher degree than when
coordinating. When attuned, partners are receptive and responsive to when they are using 
less effort (coordinating, intentionally or not). The reasons for why Greta stumbled may be
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attunement, dependence, and effort. Establishing a higher degree of dependence may 
require a higher degree of attunement. But what allows partners to attune to feedback?
Affordances and Graviception
Physicists distinguish between weight and mass, though the two terms are
sometimes (mistakenly) used interchangeably in everyday practice. Weight is alternatively
defined as a scalar quantity, meaning the magnitude of the force of gravity, or a vector
quantity, meaning the direction of the gravitational force acting upon the entity
(Frauenfelder and Huber 2013, 50), which in our case is a dance partner. Weight is typically 
measured using a scale (e.g. spring, hydraulic, pneumatic), yet despite this quantitative
approach to weight, there remain discrepancies with how the concept of weight is
understood in phenomenal experience. Metaphors of heaviness and lightness abound
throughout literature, and often make their way into idioms in vernacular usage. Consider
Shakespeare’s famous line in Macbeth: “whose heavy hand hath bow’d you to the grave”
(Macbeth, III.i.4). Macbeth’s usage of heaviness implies a hand applying undue or
excessive force. This is significant when we consider how our notion, or indeed our very
sense of weight changes given different tasks. We can consider how the sense of weight
changes based on internal cues, such as one’s emotional state (the valence and the arousal),
as well as external cues such the environment (if one is standing on ice or concrete, slippery
wood floor or sticky marley). The internal perception of each individual will undoubtedly
be subject to background, experience, type and duration of training, as well as individual
idiosyncrasies of upbringing. There are many factors that will also play into the motives
for why people choose to dance together (or if others choose for them, such as a coach,
instructor, or choreographer). In this section, I will investigate the significance of
awareness and perception in attuning to one’s partner while dancing together.
The sense or awareness of weight is referred to as graviception (Mittelstaedt 1996,
61; Batson 2015, 2). Relatively little research has been conducted with respect to 
graviception, likely because it is difficult to measure. The key aspect is an awareness of
force, as weight is subject to the force of gravity (Mittelstaedt 1996, 61). Graviception
likely builds on the sense of body position (proprioception) and the sense of body in motion
(kinesthesia), to provide an added sensory awareness related to direction and magnitude for
what part of one’s body is moving and the relative position of the given area (e.g. left side
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when, for example jumping on a moving elevator. The force it takes to get lift is much
harder if the elevator is moving. If I jump just as the elevator is stopping, I will get more
lift than usual because I will be able to use the momentum created as a result of the moving
mechanism.
Laban writes about weight as an effort factor and distinguishes particular qualities
of movement, including movement that is light, heavy, direct, indirect, sudden, and
sustained (Laban 1966). I may be using the balls of my feet to push away from the floor,
giving a sort of light-weighted quality. Or I may be exploring the sense of heaviness,
pushing into the floor to achieve a similar, yet distinctly heavy-weighted quality. The
movement may be a very fine movement. In using graviception, I can attune to the floor to
vary my degree of dependence on the floor for different movements.
Attuning to the floor means understanding the properties of the floor such as texture
(e.g. rough, smooth), firmness or flexibility (e.g. hard, soft, springy), incline (e.g. flat or
sloping) as well as my own ability to interact with it. This feedback relates to the concept
of affordance, first proposed by American psychology J.J. Gibson (Gibson 1979). I propose
that graviception is one of the senses that promotes awareness of affordances within one’s
environment, in that awareness of weight influences one’s quality of movement. Consider
the act of walking. I do not need to be explicitly aware of my weight to do everyday things
like walk. When I am walking, my awareness of my weight is likely implicit, depending
on how much effort it takes to walk. My awareness of my weight is likely far more salient
if I am tired than if I am energized simply because fatigue requires more effort to move.
This is especially evident when we accidentally trip. For example, walking down the stairs,
I stumble. Perhaps there was something on the stair I didn’t see, causing me to trip slightly.
I swipe my left foot with my right and accidentally extend too far beyond myself. Lurching
forward, I flail my arms in search of something with which I can stabilize myself. I find the
railing and restore my balance. The flailing in that moment can be seen as an instance of
resilience, rather than a random movement. In stumbling, I seek control and so my flailing 
can be understood as a discernable manifestation of seeking to restore balance. With a
restored sense of equilibrium, my awareness of my weight is suddenly different. I may 
approach the succeeding stairs with apprehension, afraid I may lose balance again. My
trepidation about tripping may be related to previous balance, in which case my awareness
of my weight is likely even more salient. I may proceed with more effort (i.e. more
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will be more salient to me, and I will interact with the world differently because of this
experience.
Awareness of weight changes based on the way we relate to the environment. My 
sense of weight should not change if my eyes are closed unless something in the
environment is affecting my sense of weight. For example, if I know I am standing on ice,
I may be more cautious about how I move. The ice provides a different affordance than
concrete in terms of moving freely (i.e. limited degrees of freedom in movement because
of slipperiness). I may know this because I see the ice, or because I feel the ground suddenly 
become slippery. If I don’t know I’m standing on ice, I likely will not react accordingly.
But I may have my eyes open and still miss the ice because the ground is not salient to me.
Consider for example walking down the street in the winter and suddenly slipping. I missed 
the ice that was covering a patch of the sidewalk and so I did not respond by being more
cautious, perhaps by planting my weight and bending my knees. I slipped because of a
misattunement with the environment. Even with my eyes open, I did not register the ice
and so I slipped.
In some cases, the visual is not enough since we may miss things. Consider a
hypothetical scenario in which a couple is partnering in a state of zero gravity. What types
of actions will this couple be able to execute, and what might be more difficult given the
weightless state? The couple will be able to receive visual signals about relative position
and proximity, as well as tactile signals from touch. They will be able to potentiate
movement, but without gravity it will be difficult to make any sort of step together. The
quality of exchange will be unsurprisingly limited in zero gravity given the affordances of
the environment. The closest we have to dancing in zero gravity is synchronized 
swimming. The quality of exchange is different rather than necessarily limited, as there are
things people can do in the water that they cannot do on land (sustain lifts for long periods
of time), just as there are things we can do on land in a couple that we cannot do in water
(take steps together), given the affordances of land and water.
I propose that some aspect of graviceptive attunement is visibly perceptible. Before
getting to the question of individual dispositions, abilities, or competencies, my proposition
here is to establish that graviceptive attunement can function as a visual signal that is
interpreted by partners, as well as those outside the dyad (i.e. choreographers and audience
members). It is possible to see when someone is moving with a heavy quality and when 
someone is moving with a light quality. As one shifts weight from foot to foot, the
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The extrapolated feedback of foot pressure in contact with the floor reveals something
about the property of the floor and what kind of interaction is possible given those
properties. This involves attuning to the feedback from soles of feet, as well as to the ways
in which limbs are informed by shift in weight. This is apparent when dancers transition
from position to position if the form calls for it or if they are moving fluidly without
emphasizing or arriving at any particular position. As such, I propose that graviceptive
attunement opens a dimension of interactive affordance that can explain the difference
between what Greta is doing and what Elke is doing. Based on the quality of their
movement, we can say something about how they are attuning to the feedback from their
partners, at least in a physical sense. Graviception, like proprioception and kinesthesia, can 
be understood as a way to attune to a partner, the ground, and the surrounding environment;
particularly to the affordances of one’s body and the changing in relation to shifts of weight.
Graviceptive attunement is readily evident when we lift others. We can tell how
much effort our partner is exerting by how we attune to them through the sense of weight.
This is because bodies are subject to the laws of fluid dynamics. Fluid dynamics govern 
the way liquids and gases move through space. This includes particular laws about
conservation of momentum and energy, as well as the conservation of volume. For
example, you can pour water from a bottle into a glass. The water will conform to the
container it is in. Bodies are filled with liquid and as such are subject to the laws of fluid
dynamics. We use our muscles to move through space, jump, sit down, and stand up. The
center of mass is a dynamic element of bodies, such that muscles contribute to the quality
of movement through space.
Consider lifting someone who is asleep. The action of lifting a sleeping person will
make their internal liquid move about, making the center of mass dynamic in such a way 
that the task is more difficult than lifting a person who is awake and can help by engaging
the core and keeping the center of mass steady. In lifting a sleeping person, their mass
may shift below the body because of swinging limbs, making the lifter work much harder 
to maintain steadiness. Since bodies are subject to the laws of fluid dynamics, a partner will
feel heavier when they release all muscle tension and feel light when they tense certain
muscles to support their own center of mass. This is a precarious balancing act, because if
one makes themselves overall tighter, they can become too rigid.
Whether movement is improvised or choreographed, a main concern in degrees of
attunement and dependence is how signals invite feedback in the form of responses that are




            
            
               
             
              
          
         
  
            
         
              
         
            
                  
              
             
            
         
     
            
         
               
         
          
        
            
            
           
 
 
   
              
             
116
information because the transfer of force is too small. When Greta adjusts her stance on her
own, she is moving independently of Roberto such that he may have trouble attuning to
her. But Greta’s lack of dependence is only a failure if their joint commitment involves a
mutual attunement condition. Without knowledge of their commitment, it is difficult to say
whether she fails in her obligation. But the adjustment does reveal that they are not moving 
well together, especially in comparison to Elke and Johan’s performance. The fact that they 
both continue with the choreography seems to suggest that they are at least attuning to the
choreography.
Partners may use excessive force without attuning. This may be better illustrated
with a feedforward model. In a feedforward model, individuals plan movement without
feedback. This is what happens whenever we move or interact with the world. But
feedforward planning can reveal epistemic problems in understanding affordances. I see a
closed door and lean against it, assuming it is closed. To my surprise, the door swings open.
I took the fact that the door was closed as evidence that it was locked. I acted from a false
assumption. The same can be true of trying to open a door I think is open. By reaching for
the handle I pull hard, only to hit myself in the face with my hand because the door did not
budge. The effort I thought was required to open the door turned out to be excessive since
the door was locked. We need to plan in advance, but making assumptions may lead to
unpleasant or even disastrous consequences.
To sum up the discussion so far, partners can vary their degrees of attunement and
dependence. Such variance requires competence as well as willingness. Though calibration
requires a transfer of force, it does not follow that partners will calibrate well. The
coordinative relation can be an aesthetic choice but may lead to problems if it inhibits
mutual attunement to feedback and affordances of the joint physical action. Moreover, the
relationship between physical and mental receptivity is complex. That is, individuals may
be physically receptive, but not mentally. This returns us to the epistemic problem between 
thought and action, particularly the one raised in chapter four in Gilbert’s special
conceptions and thoughts while doing something together. I will elaborate on this the next
section.
Evaluating Receptivity and Responsiveness
Roberto and Greta seem to rely on the other as little as possible. This is qualitatively
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Roberto intends to dance well with Greta, and for whatever reason it does not work out. As
noted earlier, without access to their mental states, it is impossible to know what they are
thinking or intending. There are still a number of factors at play here that are visually 
discernable with respect to dependence, which may be contingent on the design of the
movement, and/or their own idiosyncratic tendencies, dispositions, or intentions. Perhaps
Elke and Johan had more time to rehearse than Roberto and Greta had. But time is not the
only dimension at play in partnering. If we look at partners who have been dancing together
for a long time, we are likely to see evidence of miscommunication, misunderstanding,
misinterpretation, and so on. This is unsurprising given the complexity of physical
interactions. But the subtlety goes beyond the potential for misunderstanding. Long-time
partners may certainly have more opportunities to learn a considerable range of facts about
each other. These facts may be commonplace ones, such as favorite food, number of
siblings, birthday and birthplace. These facts may also be nuanced ones relating to
personality traits, idiosyncratic anxieties, and “triggers”, resulting in the ability to push 
each other’s buttons and/or alleviate misunderstandings. As such, communication between 
long-time partners may be more nuanced because partners know relevant things about each 
other. Knowing each other’s vulnerabilities does not, however, necessitate that partners
will negotiate well or communicate with sensitivity. If the dancer knows something but
does not act upon it, then the knowledge is not being activated. The dancer needs to make
their know-how active to act appropriately in light of knowledge of that fact.
Time itself merely provides opportunities for this know-how. As Elgin argues,
know-how may be tacit, formed from experience, habit, or it may be explicitly trained
(Elgin 2017, 50-51). In either case, there is a question of when to implement this know-
how and the ability involved therein. Greta is clearly a very skilled and competent dancer.
The errors she makes in the performance may come from a number of factors outside her
skill. Perhaps she had a bad day, perhaps there was not a lot of time to learn the
choreography, perhaps she was not feeling well. There are many reasons for why she may 
not have access to her know-how.
Evaluation about attunement is complex because there are many factors at play. We
are subject to the psychological dimensions of ourselves and our partners. The ever-
changing relationship between partners perpetuates an emergent experience (physically,
psychologically, emotionally, energetically, etc.) wherein each partner affects the other.
Factors such as previous experience, aesthetic conventions of distinct movement practices
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how receptive a partner will be, but also what is salient within an interaction. My partner
may be less receptive to me because I smell bad or remind him of a hated enemy. Despite
being physically able and willing, my partner may be unreceptive because he is scared,
bored, nervous, or any other number of emotional possibilities. Thus, even though the focus
here is on physical interaction, there is clearly more at play than pure physicality.
One way to understand the receptivity of one’s partner is through investigating 
effort and physical resistance. Resistance can be experienced by applying pressure to any
area of one’s partner (palm-to-palm, shoulder-to-shoulder, pelvis-to-pelvis, etc.).
Resistance offers a way to maintain a joint commitment of mutual attunement if one senses
the other is falling, and so adds resistance in order to offer support. Investigating resistance
in this way reveals something about the affordances of the joint physical action, as
resistance may be contingent on multiple factors, including one’s environment (if one is
standing on ice versus if one is standing on concrete) and one’s emotional state (if one is
upset versus if one is content). If I am upset, I may take things more personally and be less
physically forgiving. This can translate to using more force than necessary to execute an
action. It may also translate to moving more slowly than I would were I not upset. The
same is true if I am excited – I may be too emotionally aroused to be receptive to my
partner. Making emotional or physical resistance salient can significantly influence the
physical interaction because partners can create a frame of reference for understanding the
qualities of interaction. This includes how partners depend on each other for particular
movements.
Not surprisingly, distinct movement practices (i.e. classical ballet, International
DanceSport, contact improvisation, etc.), have their own constraints, which constitute a
particular normative structure (and often a distinct etiquette) for what is salient, which can 
be learned. This is fundamentally tied to an ability to respond in a particular way (for
example, a response that is efficient in that it conserves energy and angular momentum).
Appropriate responses may be studied and practiced, sometimes with immediate results
and other times with a fair amount of effort. Ultimately, what constitutes as suitable or
unsuitable, as right or wrong, in each given case is subject to the constraints of the particular
culture; an etiquette which may very well be tacit.
Since I have argued that partnering is a fundamentally cooperative act, it is not
enough to move independently. Nor is it enough to establish co-dependence. Given that
partners have an obligation to uphold, I argue that good partners are interdependent. This






       
          
         
              
           
          
          
             
      
            
            
          
       
            
             
             
         
         
            
         
             
    
      
                   
           
          
              
        
           
           
           
      
          
          
119
dependence, when partners do everything together. By interdependent, I propose that
partners maintain their own sense of attunement to the ground and to the environment,
while integrating themselves to each other. To maintain their joint commitment, partners
must attune to the relevant features of their dynamic. This is an epistemic problem. Elgin
argues that epistemic interdependence “extends epistemic reach: more data can be gathered,
more experiments run, more matters investigated, more factors considered, more
perspectives accommodated” (Elgin 2017, 130). I propose that partners can do more when 
they dance together in the strong sense, but joint physical action also requires a higher
degree of attunement to feedback and affordance. By mutually attuning to feedback and
affordances of the joint physical action, partners can move with more control and be more
resilient than if they merely coordinate their actions at the right time and place.
Recalling Gilbert’s argument, there are both physical and mental factors at play
when doing something together. One can be physically receptive, but not mentally.
Consider an example in which one is physically competent but unwilling. A novice dancing
with an expert is a prime example. It is possible that the two can dance together, given that
they both have the dispositions to dance. But the expert might find dancing with the novice
too boring, and so is unwilling to commit. One can also be mentally receptive, but not
physically. The novice is excited and mentally receptive to dance with the expert. When
the expert attempts certain movements, the signals do not register such that, though the
novice is mentally receptive, she does not attune to feedback and is unable to understand 
the affordances of the joint action. She is unable to physically interpret the signals and is
thus less physically receptive.
Experience and attunement to feedback and affordances are not necessarily always
linked. Part of this may be personal chemistry, if partners do or do not get along well or are
willing or unwilling to get along well because of their interpersonal dynamics. This is the
case in which partners may dance together for a long time without ever attuning to each
other. Experience alone does not necessitate that partners will attune to a high degree. If
partners only practice coordination, they may never develop ways of attuning since in
coordinating, movement and timing are independent of one another. Consider a case in
which an expert dancer has always been paired with another expert dancer who does all of
the adjusting and attuning to feedback such that the first dancer never learns to attune to
feedback and affordances. In dancing with another expert, the dancer might considerably 
struggle to maintain the joint commitment because of his practice of coordinating.
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In calibrating, timing and movement is contingent on a transfer of force between dancers.
Partners must be receptive to feedback in order to calibrate and attune.
One of the key components that distinguishes merely moving together from
partnering is whether partners negotiate joint movement on account of the other. Partners’
willingness and ability to commit will be subject to attunement to the affordances of the
physical interaction and the changes therein. This includes physical elements such as
proximity, pace, direction, and so on, as well as the manner and quality of movement and
relation between partners. Partners mutually attune to each other’s movement, sensing the
affordances through feedback such that physical negotiation is possible on account of the
movement itself, which is not true when merely dancing together in the weak sense.
From the perspective of normativity, aesthetic conventions dictate the method and 
form of movement (e.g. classical ballet, contact improvisation, Argentinian Tango, etc.,),
some of which may be perceived from the outside. Take for example a weight shift that
occurs when one partner needs to physically adjust in order to accommodate the other(s).
The adjustment may occur when transitioning between movements (such as preparing to
lift or coming out of a lift), as well as changing direction, timing, or orientation. Within
improvisation, the small shifts may be aesthetically admissible as partners follow the flow
of energy and focus on supporting each other as best they can in the moment. Within
choreographed passages, however, a physical adjustment may not be a part of the set
choreography and so it can be seen as a transgression. This depends on a number of factors,
including whether a choreographer gave guidelines for appropriate ways to attune and
execute physical adjustments. In one instance, consider a dancer lifting another dancer such 
that the aesthetic concerns of the lift become the primary focal awareness, while the
concerns for the safety of the partner become the secondary, subsidiary awareness. It is
possible, given the loci of attention, the aesthetic drive negates the awareness of the partner
in such a way that leads to consequences that range from minor stumbles to serious injury
Of course, situations may arise wherein adjustments are necessary to support each
other, and so the space of aesthetic normativity is liminal and difficult to evaluate outside
of contextual examples. One such example is when the environment is different than 
expected, such as the floor is slipperier than before, a partner’s palms are sweatier, attire
has come undone, and so on. Consider for example the raked stage. The slanted surface
creates a different set of affordances than a flat surface, which for dance makes an already 
complicated task even more arduous given that dancers must also negotiate the problems
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dancer makes an adjustment, it may be to prevent harm from falling on the incline, an
aesthetic choice, the result of incompetence, or something else entirely. Another context
may be where individuals are learning to partner. The introduction of a novel movement
pattern presents difficulty that may make the aesthetic values more salient. It may be more
acceptable for dancers to adjust in performance because the raked stage presents more
difficulty than dancing on a flat surface.
In some cases, evaluation is supported by comparison, such as the case of Petite
Mort being performed by the two different couples. Evaluation from the outside is limited
since there is missing information about intention. Aesthetic normativity in dance
partnering is particularly complex because of the physical interactions that may literally 
put one another at risk. However, if norms are only evaluated at the stage of gross,
observable, and potentially dangerous movement, we ostensibly lose the nuanced
thresholds at which partners mutually attune to feedback and affordances.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I conducted an analysis of a recorded duet performed by two
different couples to illustrate the challenge of evaluating expressions of dancers in the
physical joint action of dancing together in the strong sense. The juxtaposition of the two 
duets revealed important nuances about attunement to feedback, including clues about
dependence and affordances of the partnership. Though these clues are visibly discernable,
without access to the mental states of the dancers it is impossible to be certain about the
intentions behind the movement. Nevertheless, the differences in quality of movement
revealed a distinction between coordinating action and calibrating such that attunement to 
feedback is visible from the outside.
In the next chapters my focus will be on the epistemic value in relation to the ethical
dimensions of dancing together in the strong sense. I will focus on the epistemic inquiry of
partnering as a discourse with its own value system that is applied differently in different
contexts and in different forms of movement. To mutually attune to one another,
individuals need to understand the range of possible alternatives. This may mean
understanding something about conventional responses within a given form, or it may be
simply attending to nuances of the physical action, including pace, direction, and proximity,
as well as the manner and quality of the movement itself.
Communicating well can thus be understood as a relationship that comes to be when




       
              
               
          
               
            
            
          
             
            
              
       
           
            
             
           
              
              
               
















Communicating well requires each partner to attune to feedback and the affordances of
their joint physical action. In the subsequent chapter, I will argue that partners need to
recognize that they can harm each other and there are tools to make deliberate choices such
that they will successfully adapt if circumstances change unexpectedly. That partnering can 
cause harm means the ethical dimension relates to the aesthetic one, but it does not
necessarily mean that the product will be ethical. The converse may also be true such that
the aesthetic dimension furthers the ethical one, since performances that are alike ethically
might diverge aesthetically. There can of course be non-communicative ethical norms in 
partnering. “Don’t injure your partner” is an example of an ethical norm that partners can
abide by without communicating anything about it to each other. Moving forward, I will
continue to focus on the ethical norms that adhere to the communication between partners.
Making assumptions about dependence may set partners up for disastrous
consequences. Assumptions may be habituated, such as the result of many years of practice
with one partner and assuming the same will be true for another partner. This is likely also 
the case even without a partner. What are the norms of developing sustainable patterns of
interacting physically with others to be ethically and aesthetically good? Part of this, I
argue, is a matter of establishing interdependence. In the next chapter, I will examine the
role of vulnerability in dependence, as well as the mental states partners may form in
dancing together. I will argue that if there is a positive obligation to contribute to the
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Chapter Seven: Moral Norms in Partnering
In the previous chapters, I have argued that dancing together in the strong sense,
which I refer to as partnering, involves a joint commitment to negotiate movement on
account of each other through mutual attunement. I have argued that there are fine-grained 
levels of attunement, which enable partners to maintain their commitment to each other by 
being receptive and responsive to the information conveyed (signals), the effects of the
information (feedback), and the affordances of their physical interaction and their
environment. Based on Gilbert’s notion of exclusionary principles in commitment which
introduce failure as a possibility, I have argued that dancing together is a special kind of
joint action that has an obligation to register each other’s actions. The exclusionary 
properties relate to the normative constraints of social action, which serve to delineate
erroneous or inappropriate action. Building on Grice, I have suggested that this obligation
is maintained through communication in a cooperative manner. Drawing from Laban, I
proposed that the normative dimension of dancing together is further manifest in the quality
of movement. An emergent question with respect to mutual attunement to feedback is that
the joint physical action warrants particular actions (i.e. responses) and excludes other
actions. Having established the nuances of communication and attunement in Chapters five
and six, I will return now to the complexity of appropriate action in partnering.
In this chapter, I investigate the ways in which partnering entails a certain kind of
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luck, requires moral epistemic agency. To build this argument, I will ground into the work
of moral philosopher Annette Baier, including her notion of trust, vulnerability, and
discretionary power. I will examine the significance of trust in dancing together, and
question what, if anything partners ought to trust each other to do. I will then turn to the
notion of moral norms, to examine what it means to understand harm in a partnered 
situation, and I will present the kinds of harm that partnering may inflict, such as exclusion,
objectification, and manipulation. In particular, I will examine the significance of resilience
in light of errors, as well as the willingness and ability which allows dancers to calibrate to 
each other to adapt and better prepare for any situation.
Ethics
My view of normative ethics is based on the question of evaluating what is “right”
or “good?” There are two branches of normative ethics that I will distinguish between in
this chapter. One is deontology and the other is virtue ethics. Deontological ethics is based 
on obligation and duty, often relating to the principle of ‘doing no harm’ and avoiding poor
or bad consequences (Kagan 2018, 70-73). By contrast, virtue ethics is based on the
principle of ‘doing good’ and going above and beyond the avoidance of negative
consequences (Kagan 2018, 25-27). In this thesis, I have been slowly building an argument
for dancing together that is based on the virtues of attuning to feedback and affordances
and on communicating cooperatively. In this section, I will touch on the distinction in
normative ethics for the context of dancing together before moving on to consider the moral
norms that apply to joint physical action.
A standard paradigm within deontological ethics is the trolley problem, which
describes a rogue trolley heading down a track where five innocent people are tied up (Foot
1967). One can either a) do nothing and allow the trolley to kill the five innocents or b)
make a choice to push a button to switch rails where only one person is tied up, thus killing 
one individual while saving the lives of the five innocents. The problem challenges
respondents to ascertain whether one choice is more ethically acceptable, or at least less
objectionable than the other. While perhaps useful for opening dialogue about ethical
reasoning, the biggest criticism is that the dilemma is unrealistic and thus proves too
difficult to draw meaningful conclusions that are practical. The trolley problem is not one
of skill, but rather an extreme scenario meant to stimulate thought and discussion about
ethical reasoning. The question is whether it is ever morally acceptable to kill, such as when
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trolley case with an organ transplant case, where a physician harvests the organs of one
healthy person to save five ill ones. The issue Foot presents is whether the good of the many 
outweigh the good of the one.
My search into morality is based in virtue ethics, and as such is less extreme given
that the consequences within partnering need not necessarily result in injury (though they
can), but rather result in misconnection or misunderstanding. The trolley problem reveals
something about the way deontological dilemmas can be designed as forced choice. As the
name suggests, forced choice designs require respondents to choose between the options
presented without the opportunity to voice a "nonresponse" answer, such as "no opinion"
or "I don't know”. Rather than follow the deontological model, I will consider the problems
of virtue that arise in partnering. In some cases, perhaps partners are tasked with deciding
out of a limited number of choices. It is more likely, however, that partners face a multitude
of appropriate ways to act. This opens a subtle discussion about harm.
The normative dimension of appropriate action cultivates particular expectations
for how an interaction can, or indeed should, unfold. But expectations need not be explicit.
As Elgin points out, communities are made up of “practitioners who share a discipline”
(Elgin 2017, 140). As such, expectations may be driven by social conventions, individual
preferences, or even the rules of a practice. While rules may seem too strong here, Elgin
argues that rules can be open to interpretation, which constitute the criteria for how 
communities function together. Rather than focusing on how individuals practice dancing
together, which would follow under the branch of practice theory, I am interrogating what
is being reasoned about in order to build the epistemological foundation. Consider for
example how an invitation to dance can take many different forms. One can walk over and 
stretch out a hand. One can spot another from across the room and understand sustained
mutual gaze as indicative of a joint commitment. One can walk over and ask “would you
like to dance?” The rules of a practice will govern how practitioners reason, but the fact
that dancing together has rules or norms at all is part of what I explore here. As she is rooted
in epistemology, Elgin points out,
The fact that we agree about how particular cases are to be decided and how
precedents apply shows, it is urged, that the members of the community
bring to bear a common set of criteria. Without criteria, tacit or explicit, our
verdicts would be jointly inconsistent and at odds with the verdicts of other
members of the community. Indeed, if no agreement antedated our explicit
statements of rules and criteria, those statements could get no purchase; for




      
       
 
       
               
          
            
       
           
         
             
  
          
              
          
        
            
         
           
      
 
          
           
             
           
          
         
           
            
          
           
           
    
126
statements were consistently and correctly applied. Nothing would provide
them with a univocal interpretation (Elgin 1996, 63).
Before getting to the agreements and verdicts of practitioners, we need to 
understand what it is that people are agreeing to do when they dance together in the strong
sense. For practitioners who seek to negotiate movement on account of each other, there
are already some criteria that come into play in order to determine whether movement is in
fact mutually attuned to feedback such that partners are responsive to each other. The
criteria create expectations about interactions, which are subject to interpretation. But what
about a partnered interaction is subject to norms and expectations? Rather than create
criteria, I focus on the epistemic problem of what the criteria refer to in terms of
expectations and norms.
Expectations can be predictive. One can expect a partner to move a certain way 
because one has partnered with them before. This may be the result of habits, such as when
one’s previous training informs the types of movements they choose to enact. This may 
also be the manifestation of aesthetic preferences, such as when one tends toward certain 
movements because they like the way they feel or look. Aesthetic preferences may shift
based on one’s interests, or form habits which may be more complicated to reform.
Expectations function from a feedforward rather than a feedback model. If one’s
feedforward model is false, then they may have trouble in successfully interacting with a 
partner.
Expectations can be normative. In other words, expectations can form around the
way an interaction should unfold. This may be the result of the practice rules or conventions
of a form. Consider for example how a codified dance like the Argentinian Tango involves
some kind of normative expectations about proximity, orientation, and points of contact.
The dance hold, also known as an embrace, is a recognizable norm in which partners stand 
close to each other, facing each other, perhaps making eye contact or perhaps each looks
over the other’s shoulders, with multiple points of contact through the pelvis, side-body,
hands, and upper body. The dance hold offers a certain kind of rule, such that it forms
criteria around how partners interact. Dancers can form these expectations because they
have seen others move in this way, or they have been taught how they should move
together. These norms can be broken, with the understanding that forms have their own
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‘Can’ and ‘should’ are different notions. Consider how the statement ‘you can trust
your partner’ and ‘you should trust your partner’ differ. 'Can' implies possibility – the fact
that in moving together you can indeed trust your partner is an emergent factor of the
conditions of interaction. 'Should' implies a norm – it is somehow better to trust your
partner. The word ‘should’ figures into the broad domain of normativity, which includes
subcategories of standards, such as aesthetic, epistemic, and moral norms. When someone
says “you should trust your partner” they may be making an aesthetic claim: you should
trust your partner because it will look or feel better, or because trusting your partner will
lead to better form (adhering to the rules of conventions of a particular practice or aesthetic
preference). They may also be making a moral claim: you should trust your partner because
it is the moral thing to do. They may also be making an epistemic claim: you should trust
your partner because she is reliable, and by trusting her you have less to worry about. What
makes trusting your partner better? In these aesthetic, moral, and epistemic norms, we
register that there are ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ ways to partner. Given that dance has ideal
forms—the particular movements or ideas which dancers strive to achieve or execute in the
act of moving together—there is a question of how to distinguish when dancers are making 
aesthetic claims and when they are making moral ones. Part of this is a contextual,
phenomenological problem that must be addressed in practice. That is, practitioners may
be concerned with the experience of moving together and the feeling of mutual attunement.
Part of this problem, however, is an epistemic one. Drawing from Elgin, I have argued that
partnering involves epistemic acceptance of joint action on the basis of willingness, ability,
and access to know-how. Thus, it is necessary to distinguish between who partners ‘can’
trust and who partners ‘should’ trust.
It is perfectly possible to trust a partner. Barring any sort of previous trauma,
personal predilection for suspicion, or negative advice from a trusted source about a
prospective partner which would make trusting unfeasible, we can trust anyone. In other
words, there is no conceptual barrier to trusting anyone. Whether one should trust a partner
is a different story. Ascertaining whether one should trust a partner entails a particular kind
of evaluation. What do partners need in order to determine whether a partner is trustworthy?
Moreover, what kind of relationship does trust afford such that we should want to trust a
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Trust and Reliance
In the previous chapter, I identified the significance of physical dependence in how
partners mutually attune to feedback and affordances. I used dependence to refer to the way
in which partners physically rely on one another to achieve certain joint actions. Moving
forward, I will refer to dependence and reliance interchangeably, in order to draw attention
to an ongoing debate in philosophy about distinguishing trust from reliance. This
distinction was first introduced into the ethical discourse in 1986 by Annette Baier. As
introduced in the literature review of chapter three, one of her arguments is that if we
assume trust and reliance to be interchangeable, we may stand to lose subtlety in
systematically accounting for subtle forms of trust (see page 43-44 of this thesis). 
Baier argues that there are forms of reliance without trust. The problem of trust in 
physical interaction can be deconstructed by looking at trust toward an object. For example,
a couch is designed to hold weight, similar to the problem of weight-sharing in partnering.
By sitting down, I am giving the couch control of my weight such that it holds my body 
up. This is a one-way street because the couch cannot make choices. I can still say I trust
the couch colloquially, but this may mean something other than mere reliance. I am relying
on the couch to hold my weight, but if I say I trust the couch, then I have some beliefs about
the sturdiness of the couch. This moves us back into the realm of mental states and beliefs,
despite the physical nature of the interaction.
In the previous chapters I introduced encounters with a wall with the purpose to
practice leaning, shifting, and displacing my weight to build strength, coordination, or even 
courage to be off-balance. I also examined acting upon a clarinet and a broom to attune to
feedback. But acting upon a washcloth, broom, wall, chair or clarinet, however, useful as a
means to practice attuning, is significantly different from dancing with another person.
What makes an encounter with a wall or chair different than an encounter with a person?
Obviously, the exchange between a wall and a person will be different given that people
can make choices. But what about the encounter itself? Encountering a person may be in
some significant way different than encountering a wall because one is inanimate. But one
can probably encounter a wall as one would a person. What does this mean? Even without
getting into the ontological problem of animate versus inanimate matter, this question is
fraught with cultural and historical problems.
Consider how a person may be perceived as an object (e.g. property), just as an
inanimate object (e.g. clarinet) can be personified into a subject. Subjectivity, including the
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specific belief about the entity, which subsequently informs the way one approaches an 
encounter. A musician playing an instrument and a blacksmith wielding a hammer are
clearly interacting with materials in different ways, yet both can encounter the materials as 
subjects by personifying the subject of the interaction. Encountering an entity as a subject
opens a different sort of physical relation than encountering an entity as an object or prop.
This difference may be more than merely a different intention, for individuals can think (or
feel) they are doing one thing but in actuality do something else. Suppose that Joe, a strong,
muscular dancer, approaches Jack, who really enjoys dancing with others because he enjoys
being off-balance. Joe and Jack begin dancing together and Jack takes advantage of Joe’s
strength by using him to achieve off-balance positions. In other words, Jack is relying on
Joe’s strength in order to achieve his own selfish interests. This kind of behavior may be
normatively inappropriate, particularly if Joe is not on board with being used in this way.
This may lead to problems such as manipulation or exploitation, which I will address later
in the chapter.
Physical reliance may be a matter of giving up control to some other object or agent. 
It is possible that moving together need not necessarily present a significant physical
influence on partners, such that they do not need to physically rely on each other. Close
proximity, mutual gaze (eye contact), and perhaps even physical contact may simply be an
instance of two atomistic individuals sharing space. Consider a scenario in which two
dancers are moving together, holding hands and independently coordinating (i.e. not
calibrating) their action to something other than to each other (e.g. to the choreography,
rhythm, or conventions of a particular dance). Because they are independently 
coordinating, if they let go of each other their movement will continue in much the same
way. Thus, while we may be relying on some basic elements of proximity, relative position,
and points of contact, it is not necessarily the case that dancers are trusting each other. They
are merely relying on each other for some kind of action.
In my view, reliance is thus an action and trust is a mental state. Attitudes toward a
partner significantly influence how one relies on another, as well as whether each finds the
other(s) reliable. Thus, trust and reliance are not interchangeable in the philosophical sense.
If partners are merely using the term trust to refer to reliance, then there isn’t really a
problem about mental states. If I have a particular attitude (e.g. trust) toward my partner to
physically attune in a certain way, however, then the nature of the agreement in the
partnership complexifies. One way to distinguish trust from mere reliance is a matter of
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will of another. Baier builds her claim about good will by suggesting that we feel betrayed 
when others do not act out of good will despite having the option to do so, while only 
disappointed when others let us down despite having tried their best. The distinction can 
be illustrated in a few ways in the following scenarios.
Consider relying on a partner to be on time during a duet, in which they accidentally
stumble and go off-beat because the floor was unexpectedly slippery. Knowing they were
trying their best and the floor was slipperier than expected, one may simply feel
disappointed because the one who stumbled may still have been acting out of good will.
Juxtapose this with a partner who is off-time to sabotage the performance because they 
would rather be dancing with someone else. Baier would argue that one is left with a sense
of betrayal because the motives were not of good will.
Another example is about the subject of reliance. We would likely feel disappointed
by an amplifier failing such that it disrupts the beat of the music, but we do not feel betrayed
since the amplifier could not betray our trust as it has no good will (or ill will for that
matter). Juxtapose this with the reliance on the good will of a band to play a fixed tempo
so that we can perform a particular dance. Instead, the band plays at a continuously 
changing tempo because they don’t like our dancing. We feel betrayed by the band because
of their lack of good will. There may also be a case in which the band plays at a
continuously changing tempo because they are incompetent. Then we are unlikely to feel
betrayed, because there was no ill will. Implicit normative expectations about trust with 
respect to physical attunement may lead to unwarranted feelings of betrayal because the
relational agreement is unclear, ambiguous, or unspecified.
Baier points to the problem in specifying what counts as good will. One might think
that good will means any kind of motive that is positive, but consider a scenario in which
Jack has a motive to make Joe happy. Jack thinks that the only way to do so is by
manipulating Joe or lying to him. If Joe is relying on Jack, it is not to promote his happiness
by such devious means. As Baier points out, “where one depends on another’s good will,
one is necessarily vulnerable to the limits of that good will. One leaves others an
opportunity to harm one when one trusts, and also shows one’s confidence that they will
not take it” (Baier 1986, 235). According to Baier, confidence further opens a relation 
between trust and vulnerability.
In response to Baier, philosopher Richard Holton argues that we can trust without
a presupposition of good will. In other words, good will is not a necessary condition for






            
             
              
              
             
              
            
        
       
        
       
              
            
             
            
            
       
             
         
             
               
          
           
        
              
              
        
       
            
                                               
                




take care of their kids, even though (or despite the fact) they have no good will toward each
other7. This suggests that trust, the mental state, is plausible with varying motives of
reliance as an action. But Baier could argue that the parents, despite no good will toward
each other, are confident in one another’s good will toward the kids. What, if anything,
would be the difference if the father was just completely confident that the mother would
never harm the children? This brings us back to the worry about what counts as good will.
So how do we go about specifying relational norms that have physical manifestations?
There are physical interactions in which one’s actions significantly influence the
action of the other(s). The possibility of physically influencing others through movement
raises important questions about the quality and character of relation between partners.
Partners can establish physical dependence which allows them to calibrate and maneuver. 
Returning to the example of Petite Mort, the maneuver required to get Elke back on balance
after her penchée is a calibrated pull, sustained in such a way that Elke is relying on Johan 
to place her back on balance. Without Johan she will be unable to regain her balance,
inhibiting her ability to continue with the choreography. But without accessing to what they 
are thinking, we cannot claim that Elke has any particular attitude toward Johan.
In responding to Baier’s work, philosopher Karen Jones adds an expectation
condition to reliance to form trust, such that the truster expects the trusted agent will be
“directly and favorably moved by the thought that someone is counting on her” (Jones
1996, 8). As a general point, this is probably false. The trusted person may be completely
unaware of the trust or be indifferent to it. But partners need to take a stronger stance toward
each other in order to satisfy the conditions of partnering. Since partnering requires
establishing a joint commitment to mutually attune and negotiate movement on account of
each other, there is an expectation about the obligation itself. By going through the motions,
partners fail to recognize that they are relying on the other to do more than merely execute
the movements. This is as much true of choreographed partnering as it is of improvisation.
If Roberto is merely moving next to Greta by holding her hand, facing her and in close
proximity, then their interaction is physically limited because Greta cannot rely on Roberto
to maneuver and calibrate, and vice versa. The mutual attunement condition for physical
7 This is adapted from an example of philosopher Richard Holton’s: “one member of an estranged couple
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contact sets up a particular kind of dependence, which may trigger particular beliefs about
trust and responsibility.
When partners are moving together, they rely on each other to do the right
movement at the right time, which sometimes requires more than the mere uptake of
signals. Assuming again that dancing together in the strong sense involves having a shared
goal of cooperating (as argued in chapter 5), then partnering requires relating in a
continuous and attuned way such that partners are both receptive and responsive to 
feedback and affordances of their physical interaction and of their environment. In certain
movements, signals need to be reciprocal such that physical attunement is established,
which, as argued in chapter four, is based on physical readiness and ability. Consider the
fact that I can turn by myself. I can set myself up with a functional position to use the floor
and create my own torque to execute multiple revolutions. I can also turn myself while in
contact with a partner. When a movement requires a partner to turn me, however, I am
relying on him in a particular way. This is more than merely a signal, since the movement
requires him to maneuver me to turn. This includes the impetus to initiate the turn, as well
as the force to execute a full revolution (or multiple ones) and the force to stop on balance.
In such a scenario, I am relying on his skill to maneuver rather than simply leave me on my
own, or worse, manipulate me by generating motions that are not functional. In other words,
maneuvering should achieve calibration in order to be functional. Building on my argument
in chapter six about the functional significance of movement, I propose that the
functionality of movement is a product of calibrating such that the continuous attunement
creates the potential for the movement to happen at the right time in the right way. Since
the movements are contingent on the laws of gravity and force, graviception will be the
sense that allows partners to functionally rely on each other and thus mutually attune to
feedback.
Good partnering involves more than signaling. From chapter five, we know that
communication in partnering is bound to signals that emerge from proximity, relative
position, and point(s) of contact. An individual’s range of responses for signals needs to be
appropriately broad enough to account for maneuvers that require special forms of reliance
(e.g. receptivity to feedback). If the range of responses is too narrow, partners will betray
trust by failing to uphold the agreement of the commitment to dance together. This
supposes that partners are capable of a broader range of responses, and that the broader
range is appropriate. It also supposes that partners are willing and able to be receptive to a
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In chapter four, I noted that willingness is an expression of voluntary intent. Elgin
points out that, “voluntary actions are subject to constraints” (Elgin 2017, 96). Some of the
constraints, Elgin maintains, are “enterprise-specific”, such that the enterprise “both
enables and limits the range of a participant’s voluntary actions” (Elgin 2017, 96). Taking 
forward Elgin’s proposal about ‘enterprise-specific’ constraints within the enterprise of
dancing together, I propose that partners can choose to constrain their movement through
coordination or calibration, since neither is inherently right or wrong. But lacking the skill
to physically differentiate between calibrating and coordinating means lacking the skill to 
partner well. In other words, someone who lacks the skill cannot make choices that depend 
on being able to draw the distinction. But trust may not be purely voluntary. Consider the
fact that partners may say something like: “I don’t know why, but I trust him even though 
he has a poor track record of dancing with others” or “I can’t help but distrust him, even 
though there may be a perfectly innocent reason for his behavior”. An emergent question 
is how the decisions partners make to rely on each other influence, and are influenced by,
the attitudes they form toward each other in their joint physical action.
Deciding to Trust
Contemporary philosophers Paul Faulkner and Thomas Simpson (2017), present a
standard problem in the philosophy of trust related to the notion of deciding to trust. In
general, we can decide to trust all sorts of people. We can decide to trust a doctor to perform
a physical exam, decide to trust a partner to be punctual, or decide to trust a friend to look
after the cat. Circumstances like these entail some kind of reasoning about whether
someone is worthy of our trust. If the product of this reasoning is favorable, it is fitting to
describe ourselves as having decided to trust. Our reasoning is in error if the person turns
out to be untrustworthy. 
The decision to trust brings us back to the notion of joint commitment being a
necessary condition for partnering. When partners enter into a joint commitment with a
partner, they may also be deciding to trust that partner. The commitment itself upholds the
constraints of mutually attuned joint movement, such that if both have expressed 
willingness that is common knowledge, they are entering into an agreement with each other
to uphold the commitment or display a signal (verbal or otherwise) that they are no longer
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A standard paradigm in the philosophy of trust distinguishes between two- and
three-place predicates (Faulkner and Simpson 2017). In a two-place predicate, an agent
broadly trusts another agent. This would follow a logic such as “I trust my partner”. No
other clauses or claims need to follow. This is juxtaposed with a three-place predicate, in 
which an agent specifically entrusts another agent with some special task or belief. This
would follow a logic such as “I trust my partner to catch me if I fall”. When partners claim
they trust each other, are they speaking about two- or three-place predicates? It seems,
given the way partnering involves the specific act of moving together, a three-place
predicate fits best.
There are certain things partners need not entrust to each other. For example, in
partnering, I do not need to trust my partner broadly such that if my house caught fire he
would go save my cat from dying. The agreement partners make is such that each of their
actions will support moving together for the duration of their dance. Thus, partnering likely
involves a contextually constrained trust. From the discussion of joint commitment in
chapter four, we know that we are in a position to rebuke a partner for not upholding the
commitment. If partners have been dancing together and trusting each other for a long time,
their trust might extend to non-dance situations, like rescuing cats. We are not, however, in
a position to rebuke a trusted partner if he does not save our cat during a fire because the
agreement likely does not cover random unfortunate scenarios. But there may be those who
treat the trust in partnering as a two-place predicate. What would this mean? If trust in 
partnering is a two-place predicate, then partners are committing to broad, open-ended 
trust. Even if this is a personal disposition for trust, deciding to trust opens an important
distinction between trust and belief.
I see Sue and Jack dancing together. Sue is trying really hard, making an effort to
attend to Jack’s movement. I form a belief that Jack is merely going through the motions,
executing the pre-determined patterns at the right time that he and Sue have rehearsed.
When they are done dancing together, Jack approaches me and invites me to dance. I can 
choose to trust Jack even if I believe that he is only going to go through the motions. I can 
choose to trust Jack in partnering because it will help me hone my own skills of calibrating
or attuning to feedback even Jack does not attune to feedback from me. I can choose to
trust Jack because I believe that if something were to actually go wrong, he would be there
to catch me. The choice to trust need not be explicit. My choice to trust Jack may simply 
be the result of wanting to dance with a friend. In watching Jack and Sue dance without
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simply believe that Jack will dance differently with me. I can believe that Jack has an
ambivalent attitude toward the aesthetic ideals of partnering. I can even know this to be
true, that Jack chooses to partner in order to fill time that he considers would otherwise be
boring. I can also believe that Jack is a good person even if he does not care about partnering 
as much as I do. This is problematic when considering precisely what I am choosing to 
trust Jack to do. The fact that he is a good person may make it reasonable to trust him not
to allow me to get injured. But that is very far short of what I have been talking about. If
he is just going through the motions in the dance, then all I can reasonably trust him to do
is go through the motions and help me if I am in serious danger.
Am I merely relying on Jack to do the choreography then? Would this be
constitutive of partnering? If we are both willing to establish a joint commitment to 
mutually attune and negotiate movement on account of each other, then we are satisfying
the conditions of partnering. Knowing what the conditions are makes evaluation possible.
But we may be partnering poorly. As argued in chapter five and six, establishing an
agreement to mutually attune and maintaining the agreement are different things. This is
where the distinction between partnering and partnering well begins to develop. Partnering
well involves more than merely going through the motions with the willingness to mutually
attune. Partnering well means partners must attune to each other at a high enough level that
they can sense and perceive the information they convey (i.e. signals) and the effects of
that information (e.g. feedback). Going through the motions may mean missing particular
signals to make the joint venture not only more aesthetically pleasing, but more morally
responsible. This is where the deontological and virtue ethics distinction comes into a
sharper focus – is partnering well contingent on avoiding negative consequences or on 
bolstering the virtues of attunement and cooperative communication? I argue that when my
aim is to partner well, I am trusting my partner with something more than merely avoiding
negative consequences and going through the right motions at the right time. What is the
nature of trust in a good partnership given the joint commitment to dance together? By
trusting my partner, am I merely relying on them to do the right thing at the right time?
Why do partners need to claim trust at all? One argument is because trust is a virtue.
We can say that partnering involves physical reliance that takes a three-part predicate, such
that we are relying on our partner to be on time and to do what is necessary to uphold the
joint act of dancing together. Why is reliance not enough? For one, because not all
movements involve reliance each other in significant ways. Moreover, the physical relation
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of movement. I propose that physical reliance plays a key role in the notion of trust as a
three-part predicate in partnering in that partners can make a choice to rely on each other
even when they need not. While partners may trust each other overall, they ought to (at
least) trust each other to mutually attune. This is especially important for when things
happen that are unexpected.
In responding to Baier’s work, Holton (1994) further unpacks the nature of trust by
examining the attitudes we hold of each other, especially when we are relying on someone
to do something specific. He maintains that trust involves reliance plus an attitude of
readiness to feel betrayal (or gratitude) based on the outcome of the action. Holton relates
this attitude to what he calls “participant stance”, arguing that in our interactions with others
“we are ready to take particular reactive attitudes should they act in certain ways” (Holton 
1994, 4). Holton does not clearly define exactly what a participant stance would be, but he
suggests that it “can require engaging in a whole network of further attitudes and actions,
and perhaps beliefs” (Holton 1994, 4). Holton himself understands that this analysis is
reductive, and I point to it here because it opens a significant view of how it is possible for
people to regard each other in their interactions. This is important to consider in the act of
dancing together in the strong sense because taking a participant stance (or not taking one)
likely influences the quality of the movement. Returning to the Gricean categories of
information presented in chapter five, the quality of movement will subsequently influence
the quality of information being conveyed, as well as the manner, quantity, and relation to
information between partners.
This can be illustrated by examining what happens if we are relying on a partner to
do something specific. For example, if I am relying on my partner to place me back on 
balance after a lift and she merely places me on the floor and moves on, then I feel betrayed.
It is more than disappointing, as in the case when my partner went off-time because the
floor was slippery. By merely placing me back on the floor, my partner has betrayed my
trust because I was relying on her for balance such that I formed a belief that she would 
ensure that I was on balance before moving on. Recall that trust is more than just reliance.
There may be many reasons why she did not place me on balance, but let’s say that one of
them is because she fails to register the way in which I was trusting her. She may be
unwilling or unable to be receptive such that the is a low degree of mutual attunement. This
failure to register my reliance may mean that she had the right sort of stance but made a
mistake in overlooking one of my expectations. It may also mean that she fails to take a
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to one another, I am in a position to rebuke her for not placing me back on balance. But
there may be more going on with respect to her approach. She may be subscribing to a
deontological view of avoiding harm, rather than following a virtue-based view of trying
to do good. Perhaps my expectations are too high, perhaps hers are too low.
The expectations mutual attunement open up are tied to the ways in which physical
reliance plays out in negotiating movement on account of each other. When partners fail to
take participant stances toward each other, they are in essence treating each other as objects
rather than participants within the interaction. Thus, there is a question of whether the
ethical dimension is a matter of the technique (e.g. physical tools employed to solve the
problem of moving together) that is inherent to a form of movement, or is it another layer
altogether related to joint physical action in a broader sense? The ethical dimension
underscores a complex relationship which I will examine through a specific lens wherein 
being right or wrong about oneself (in terms of relative position, direction, timing,
graviception), significantly influences the affordances of the partnership.
Responsibility
Following the three-place predicate line of inquiry in trust, to what extent can a
tenable claim be made about whether partners ought to be responsible to relate well to each 
other? As Elgin points out, “one familiar requirement on responsibility is ‘ought’ implies
‘can’: x is responsible for y only if whether y obtains is under x’s (direct or indirect) control”
(Elgin 2017, 91). Given the joint commitment, partners are directly obligated to uphold 
mutual attunement. While there may be scenarios that are outside their control (e.g. the
floor being too slippery), it is up to partners to negotiate their movement on account of each 
other such that they are mutually attuned to feedback and affordances.
Consider an example of a well-trained dancer making a mistake. This seems to be
what is happening in the case of Roberto and Greta as discussed in chapter six. Should we
hold Roberto and Greta morally accountable for their errors in choreography? Gilbert
argues that the commitment to do something together is not yet to factor in a moral
responsibility. Recall Gilbert’s hypothetical example of Joe and Liz dancing together I
presented in the literature review, when Liz’s shoe gets stuck and Joe comes to Liz’s rescue.
It need not be the case that Joe is acting out of good will, but rather upholding the agreement
of dancing together. This is distinct from partnering, because Liz and Joe’s agreement may
have simply been to dance together in a weak sense (in which they are willing to do
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may full-well have expressed willingness to establish a joint commitment of doing 
something together. But my view of dancing together in the strong sense has a tighter
restriction on mutual attunement to negotiate movement on account of each other. As such,
to what degree do the aesthetic and ethical overlap when we consider partnering to fulfill
certain complex choreography? Where is the threshold between moral and aesthetic norms
in partnering? A part of this responsibility refers back to the problem of willingness plus
ability, especially in relation to care (as a shared goal, as well as an individual goal). As I
argued in chapter five, there is a difference between communicating a lack of care because
one does not care (i.e. is unwilling to care) and communicating a lack of care because one
lacks the requisite communicative skills (i.e. is unable to manifest care physically). Partners
may be putting each other in the way of physical, aesthetic, or moral harm if they lack the
skills to communicate well.
The inquiry opens the door for discussing negligence, particularly in relation to
culpability. While expert partners know how best to negotiate misunderstandings in 
context, there is still a question about accounting for the ability to do good in negotiating
physical interaction. Being willing and able to establish a joint physical commitment based 
on a high degree of attunement does not mean that partners will necessarily do good. They 
may satisfy all of the conditions and choose to adopt a deontological view such that their
actions avoid negative consequences rather than upholding virtues. Following Gilbert’s
arguments that I set up in chapter four, the joint agreement of partnering entails mutual
attunement to negotiate movement on account of each other. Failure to uphold the
obligation can result in entitlements to rebuke. Partners who are not mutually attuned to
feedback and affordances, but feel that they are may be setting themselves up for problems.
If things go well, then it is only by luck that nothing goes wrong.
To summarize the points so far, we can see that trust is a special form of reliance
that emerges through a certain kind of relation. This relation may take time, but as shown 
in the previous chapter, time is not the only factor at play. The temporal dimension is
necessary for maintaining the attunement continuously as part of the process of dancing 
together, and it is where change will register. But trust does not necessarily need time to 
develop as in the case of strangers who feel an instant bond upon dancing together8. In
some cases, partners can simply choose to trust each other. What benefit is there from
8 Scholar-practitioners such as Vermey (1994), Novack (1990), Manning (2009), Harman
(2019), and many others write about instant bonds in which dancers, knowing nothing
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dancers trusting each other when dancing together? What detriment? What happens when 
I trust my partner to establish mutual attunement, but my partner does not trust me? These
questions circle around the virtues of trust. I turn now to consider the fact that trust may 
not be all that virtuous in dancing together in the strong sense, particularly when trusting a
partner to establish a relation independently. Having satisfied the conditions of willingness
to establish joint commitment, what underlies the normative dimension of one trusting the
other without the evidence to do so?
False Beliefs
One problem of trust is that it is typically considered a distinctive state of mind
(Faulker and Simpson 2017). The problem with trust as a state of mind is that maybe
humans are not reliable introspectors about their mental states. As such, we can create false
beliefs. In other words, I can decide, with some degree of confidence, that I will trust my
partner to catch me if I fall. This may lead to problems down the line if I have entrusted 
you despite having no reason to do so. I may have a belief that I am not justified in having.
I can further this belief that my partner will catch me gracefully, making us both adhere to
a particular quality of movement. The predicate comes with an aesthetic contingency: not
only do I entrust you with my safety, I do so with the trust that it will be adhere to an
aesthetic standard (e.g. grace). How do we account for the relationship between dancers
physically relying on each other in the moment and the mental states (e.g. beliefs, attitudes,
etc.,) such as trust and responsibility that are formed and inform the interaction?
Partnering may become second nature to dancers, such that making a joint
commitment to mutually attune is easy. On the other hand, partners may come to take
attunement for granted, such that they form false beliefs that a partner is always attuned.
Partners may also think they are attuned, but are actually not attuned to feedback or not in
a fine-grained way so as to sense and act within the affordances of the partnership. As I
argued in chapter five, partners need to understand what movement exemplifies, otherwise
they are merely going through the motions.
In the physical act of dancing together, the skillset to initiate action is distinct from
executing and completing action. Consider for example how the act of lifting a partner and
placing the partner down on balance are two distinct, though interrelated skills. The
willingness to place a partner down on balance and the ability to do so are not always 
congruent or emphasized equally. What kind of reliance does the act entail, and what kind
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not necessarily something that partners should be striving for if they do not have evidence
to support the belief. Trust is not all that virtuous if one is blindly trusting their partner to
place them down on balance. A dancer may be setting themselves up for injury because
they have formed a belief such that they are relying in a way that relinquishes their own
responsibility. Acting from the trust, the dancer will not place themselves on balance
because they are leaving it to their partner. In this case, the dancer is relinquishing the
control over their own body, which ought to be their own responsibility. Building on the
argument of communication in chapter five, I argue that partners have responsibility in how
much information they convey, in what manner, with what quality of movement. This
responsibility satisfies both the deontological view of doing no harm and avoiding negative
consequences, as well as the virtue-based view of the positive dimensions that open when
partners strive to communicate well. This blind trust opens a kind of reliance that makes
one vulnerable, which is irresponsible on their part even if their partner also fails to uphold
the obligation to mutually attune to feedback.
Trust opens one up to vulnerability, and since the act of partnering involves physical
reliance, the potential for harm is ever-present. The problem with false beliefs is that
dancers can think they are doing one thing, but actually do something else. Consider for
example how dancing with a partner, Sue suddenly feels uncomfortable. Sue feels she
needs to choose whether to continue the dance or end it. Afraid to hurt her partner’s feelings
by ending the dance in the middle of their interaction, Sue chooses to continue dancing 
despite her discomfort. Thus, she adopts a deontological view where she believes she is
avoiding harm. But in choosing to continue the dance, suppose Sue starts to mentally
“check-out”. Sue receives signals and responds appropriately up to a certain threshold but
no longer fully invests in the dance. As such, she is still expressing willingness to dance
together, but no longer in the strong sense since she is withholding certain physical
information and not attuning to feedback. By diminishing her dependence on her partner,
Sue is relying on her partner only enough to go through the motions. She may even start
paying attention to grounds for suspicion, and in so doing directs her attention away from
the bases of trust. Though she has the ability to attune to a high degree, she is now attuning
to whether she has grounds for suspicion beyond her feelings of discomfort. By merely
going through the motions, Sue is coordinating. But this form of coordination creates a
different kind of relation, such that Sue is interrupting their mutual attunement – Sue has
ceased calibrating. Her willingness to continue dancing in order not to hurt her partner’s
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willingness that may negatively influence the interaction. Her deontological view may be
preventing her from dancing together in the strong sense.
Sue’s feeling about the physical interaction makes the interaction limited. Perhaps
Sue begins to develop distrust of her partner, which further means that she avoids relying 
on him other than to go through the motions. By choosing to coordinate in response to 
discomfort, Sue makes maneuvering more difficult because there is no longer a high degree
of continuous attunement. She is relying on her partner only to give signals about direction,
proximity, and perhaps timing. By relying in this way, Sue figures the motions into her
plan to continue dancing together despite discomfort. Coordination in this way is a sort of
“checking-out” in order to continue the dance without investing dependence on her partner.
In other words, she begins to move independently. Sue’s caution may be well-meaning but
may also be the result of a false belief. By withdrawing from reliance, Sue may be missing 
out on important signals that are important to her safety, as well as the safety of her partner.
As Elgin argues, “to be trustworthy, an agent needs to be both competent and well-
intentioned” (Elgin 2017, 127). Furthermore, by coordinating independently and 
interrupting mutual attunement, Sue makes herself vulnerable to the motions of her partner.
In distinguishing trust from reliance, all we have been able to do is show one
person’s attitude, stance, or belief about something or someone. Certain beliefs may be
unfounded, such that one’s blind trust makes one vulnerable to harm. Both partners may
operate from trust grounded in experience (rather than whatever is happening in the
moment), having danced together before such that they take mutual attunement for granted 
without necessarily checking-in with each other. Given the subtle reciprocal relation
between partners, viewing trust as unidirectional hinders understanding about what partners
stand to gain by both trusting each other, especially when treated as a three-part predicate. 
Discretionary Power
Baier seems particularly interested in trust relationships where there is some kind
of inequality in power between the agents. One major shortcoming in Baier’s work is that
she treats trust as unidirectional. Baier’s examples of trust are limited in a relation sense,
as she examines trust in postal workers, grocers, and day-care providers, between enemies
in war, and between strangers when asking for directions (Baier 1986, 234). The reliance
in partnering is far more intimate, even if it involves complete strangers, by virtue of the
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ill-equipped to deal with physical intimacy, since there are standards for evaluating
interactions in sound and tenable ways.
Contemporary philosophers Fay Niker and Laura Specker Sullivan have critically
engaged with Baier’s discourse, suggesting that trust “can be understood as a property of
the relationship itself” (Niker and Sullivan 2018, 2, emphasis in the original). In response
to Baier, Niker and Sullivan distinguish between thick and thin relationships, where thick
relationships are characterized as “parties [that] have a certain shared history” (Niker and
Sullivan 2). By looking at thick relationships in particular, Sullivan and Niker show that
there are circumstances in which it is desirable to make choices on behalf of a partner which 
would otherwise be considered inappropriate or unethical. A standard example could be
something such as a healthy spouse making financial decisions on behalf of a sick spouse.
Given the considerable length and “thick” quality of the relation, such a scenario would be
considered ethical. The sick spouse may in fact be capable of making the decision, such
that the scenario seems less ethical on the surface. What makes the relation “thick” is years
of experience making decisions together such that one has confidence in what the other
would decide.
We can relate this to a problem in partnering. Jack lifts Sue and carries her across
the floor. From her viewpoint, she can see that there is a puddle ahead of them. Because
Jack does not see the puddle, Sue needs to decide about how to move forward. This can be
a pre-determined signal, such as a squeeze or a clicked tongue. Let’s say the partners have
not determined a signal in advance. Is it acceptable for Sue to jump out of the lift in order
to save herself and her partner? The case seems to suggest yes. But suppose that neither of
them sees the puddle. As soon as Jack reaches it, he stumbles. Since he is holding on to 
Sue, he decides he can save her by holding on. Being mutually attuned, he catches her and
all is okay. Without mutual attunement, Sue could have lurched forward and ended up 
hitting the ground face-first because Jack held on to her rather than letting go. In the
extended hypothetical situation, Jack acted on behalf of Sue and ended up preventing Sue
from deciding on her own. When partners rely on each other for safety, they make
themselves vulnerable by relinquishing their own responsibility. Through relying on
another in physically precarious ways, partners make themselves less independently 
accountable by surrendering responsibility to the other. This vulnerability pays off when
the desired movement is achieved without issue.
Safety in dancing together involves the skill to maneuver carefully, which requires
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words, each adjusts his/her own behavior in light of what is reasonably expected of the
other. This is often the case in crowded dance floors, where one dancer may make decisions
about maneuvering for the other(s), in order to avoid injury. The success of making
decisions on behalf of someone else, for the benefit of those parties involved, is contingent
on mutual attunement, but also on the thickness of the relation. The more dancers have
practice in maneuvering together, the thicker their trust can become.
Elgin maintains that trustworthiness is contingent on being competent and well-
intentioned. But this does not yet reveal why partners ought to trust each other. Elgin holds
that,
Because of the division of cognitive labor, epistemic agents need to depend
on one another. So epistemic agents should be trustworthy. This involves
having and properly using appropriate background assumptions and know-
how. Having them can perhaps be construed purely cognitively, but being
willing to properly use them is a matter of volition (Elgin 2017, 127)
Partnering can create all sorts of power asymmetries. To agree to partner, dancers
may be consenting to a relinquishing of control over certain things like direction,
orientation, timing, and point(s) of contact. But just because they are giving up some power,
does not mean that they are losing the ability of choice. The quality of movement in 
executing shifts in direction, orientation, timing, and point(s) of contact are contingent on
a partner’s competence in responding. The greater the competence, the greater the range of
possible responses. The greater the range of possible responses, the more choices a partner
has to express willingness and make that willingness manifest (e.g. with care). The problem
of power is still present, however, since partners can take advantage of each other,
dominate, and repress the ability to make choices by overpowering, manipulating,
objectifying, and exploiting each other. I propose that willingness to dance together in the
strong sense means willingness to be vulnerable in a certain way. There is a trade-off in 
vulnerability such that being vulnerable can be seen as a virtue to do good, but being
vulnerable without the ability to do so responsibly may place individuals and their partners
at risk.
Harm
There are at least two types of harm that occur within partnering paradigms. One is
physical and the other psychological. Given the complexity of human interaction, the
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distress, just as psychological harm likely manifests in physical ways. Keeping with the
synthetic distinction, physical harm is the result of physical action. There are perhaps quite
obvious forms of physical harm, such as dropping one’s partner from a lift or accidentally
tripping, yanking, shoving, or any other bodily action. Psychological harm is perhaps more
subtle than physical harm. It is less obvious and sometimes very difficult to evaluate or
even observe since we do not have access to the minds of other people. Psychological harm
may be accidental and short-lived, deliberate and enduring, or a range between these two
extremes. Psychological harm may be the cause or root of the physical attitude toward a
partner. Consider for example objectification as a demoralizing or dehumanizing attitude.
In objectification, partners effectively treat each other as props, degraded to the status of
an object. Though they may have made a joint commitment, their behavior does not match 
the intention. They may be willing to dance together but may be unwilling to be vulnerable
(e.g. unwilling to be up control) such that attunement to a high degree is unfeasible. The
attitude may be a product of conventions, such that the effort needed to change direction,
which is some kind of subtle pull or push, becomes an excessive yank or a shove.
Objectification is a subtle pervasive attitude that infects partnering, since terms such as
pushing, pulling, shoving, yanking refer to somewhat relative, subjective actions. One
might believe that they are softly pulling, while their partner is convinced they are
intentionally yanking.
Another form of psychological harm touched on in this thesis is exclusion. Similar
to objectification, exclusion is an attitude relating to one partner (or a group of partners)
while imposing negative constraints on others. Partners can form exclusive ultimatums
through movement, such that constraints become negative rather than generative. This may 
be the case in using excessive force, where partners feel forced to respond in coercive,
excessive ways so as to avoid injury. Partners can be uncomfortable and thus
psychologically remove themselves from the situation. This may be a way of signaling to
a partner that one wishes the dance to end. Unfortunately, not all partners will be sensitive,
and by psychologically checking-out, they may miss important signals that can prevent
injury.
Both exclusion and objectification fit into a class of harm I will call manipulation.
One manifestation of manipulation is in the physical sense, as in the point I was making
above when partners feel they have to use excessive force to avoid injury. For example, if
I sense my partner is falling, I may yank on her arm to prevent her from falling. What could 
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involves some negotiation of power, manipulation relates to control for some instrumental
aims outside of the partnership. This manipulation can be a form of deception, such as
withholding or lying about relevant information. Consider for example how a partner can
coordinate independently such that the other doesn’t receive relevant information about
weight placement and center of mass. Deception can be unintentional, such as a social
convention of performativity. Consider the fact that when Greta continues to readjust her
foot independently, she is obscuring information about her center of mass such that if
Roberto wanted to offer physical support in a nuanced way, he would not be able to because
the manner and quality of her movement prevents a transfer of information. As another
example, consider how a social dance form can use signals that are completely idiomatic
to the form itself. A great dancer that is a novice to an unfamiliar form may accidentally be
withholding information about center of mass because they are imitating what they see
others are doing. In other words, the act of merely going through the motions constitutes a
sort of performativity without establishing dependence or reliance on one’s partner. Using
Elgin’s terminology, this may be because the act of emulating prevents one from
understanding what the movements exemplify. I have seen this in my own teaching of
ballroom techniques to professional ballet dancers. Drawing on my argument in chapter
six, I have observed how the skillset of ballet includes highly refined proprioception and
kinesthetic awareness, but does not necessarily mean that dancers will have refined 
graviception when partnering. Thus, they may accidentally be withholding information and
unintentionally deceiving their partners about crucial information such as weight placement
and center of mass. Dancers end up manipulating each other to emulate movement, rather
than develop understanding of what a push or pull signals or exemplifies in upholding the
obligation to dance together.
There is negative empathy, which is sensitivity to cause harm and deciding to do so
in the moment. For example, I know how much force it takes to lift my partner. Having
gotten into an argument earlier in the rehearsal, I use excessive force to keep her in place.
Using excessive force on purpose may already signal that the joint commitment is no longer
one of mutual attunement, but something else. Perhaps I am merely trying to execute the
design of the choreography, and in so doing, I am no longer willing to make a joint
commitment. My willingness to attune to my partner has changed because of our earlier
argument. I have seen this many times in rehearsal as well. Since partners end up spending 
a lot of time together, they know how to use information against each other. Their
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self-interest, which is engaging in partnering for one’s own personal gain. This form of
manipulation may also lead to one objectifying their partner, because one facilitates one’s
own ease and comfort at the expense of others.
Harm may sometimes require intense scrutiny, because it is not always readily
visible. Partners can believe all sorts of things about the partnership and act from that belief.
This is one reason why skill in partnering is so important – partners need to be able to
distinguish when beliefs about a partner are false and when they are true. They need to
exercise opportunities to understand whether a partner is trustworthy and develop some
kind of objective standards to evaluate the thickness of the relation. As Elgin argues,
“objectivity emerges from the self-reflective activities of epistemic communities. It is
neither mere correlation of an opinion with mind-independent facts nor a matter of pure
consensus” (Elgin 2017, 159). The notion of objectivity that emerges with evaluation of
norms, as well as from self-reflective activities, is important to consider in the context of
what it is that dancers are reflecting about in the joint physical act of partnering.
Breaking down the forms of harm, although perhaps reductive and inexhaustive,
reveals the ways in which good partners need to be mutually attuned to each other. If good
partnering is more than mere signaling (e.g. maneuvering, calibrating, attuning to feedback 
and affordances), and requires partners to make decisions about 1) modes of effort and 
dependence, and 2) when and how to entrust each other with specific actions, then we
finally arrive at the foundation of moral epistemic agency in dance. Good partners are
responsible to themselves and each other and understand how to 1) mutually attune and
interpret signals, either at face value or as implicatures when appropriate, 2) exercise a
broad and relevant range of dependence, and 3) decide, in the moment, about expectations
set forth by the joint commitment (whether it is implicit or explicit). Attunement, in the
form of receptivity, responsiveness, and resilience form the epistemic norms that partners
exercise in the act of partnering.
Conclusion
In the preceding chapters, I have hinted at the ways in which partnering is within
an ethical domain simply because of the reality that the act of moving together can cause
harm. Given the idea that there are appropriate and inappropriate ways to respond, an 
interaction is ethical if and when 1) partners respond to each other appropriately, 2) do not
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considered morally objectionable. This is rightfully so, since some kind of harm has been 
done. I have presented the distinction of a view based on doing no harm and one based on
attempting to do good. Investigating the conditional underpinnings of partnering has
demonstrated the significance of willingness and attunement through concepts such as
receptivity, responsiveness, feedback, affordance, and vulnerability. These concepts also
move into the realm of normative ethics when we evaluate the positive and negative
consequences of the joint physical interaction. There is also the simple fact that partners
can cause each other harm. The problem is what partners do with the moral objection and
how they resolve harm.
There is a trade-off in vulnerability when partners do not attune to each other. By 
doing things independently, partners open themselves up to being wrong and thus inflicting
harm that is accidental. By doing things together, partners open themselves up to harm that
is intentional. As Baier points out, “the one in the best position to harm something is its
creator” (Baier 1986, 236). The question we are left with is about making reasonable
choices in partnering, including those related to responsibilities, obligations, and trust.
Baier maintains that “the truster, who always needs good judgment to know whom to trust
and how much discretion to give, will also have some scope for discretion in judging what
should count as failing to meet trust, either through incompetence, negligence, or ill will”
(Baier 1986, 238). Considering the overlap of moral and epistemic norms in dance informs
how reasonable and responsible agency can be developed. But while dancers may employ
the rhetoric of trust and responsibility when they speak about their interactions, this does
not necessarily mean that they will be able to discernably manifest or critically evaluate
moral norms in practice. Even if they are able, it does not mean that they necessarily will.
The challenge remains with articulating the reasoning around why a response was
appropriate or not. If we take a relativist view of the problem, then anything can be
inappropriate or appropriate depending on context. If we take an absolutist view, then we
significantly narrow the range. Taking a pluralist view allows us to broach the range of
possible appropriate responses. While this seems to be a phenomenological problem, there
is an epistemic problem embedded inside: what are the standards for appropriate responses
in a partnering paradigm? Thus, the final question is what dancers reason about within their
interactions. What does it mean to exercise agency to be moral epistemic agents? What are
the embedded virtues in receptivity, responsiveness, and resilience? These questions will
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Chapter Eight: Reasoning in Relation
Partners make all sorts of decisions when making a joint commitment to dance
together and negotiate movement on account of each other. As argued in the previous
chapter, one of the decisions relates to whether or not to trust a partner. From discussion in 
chapter four, we know that another decision that partners make is whether to express
willingness to dance together, just as one can decide whether to accept another’s
willingness to dance together. Choosing to express willingness or accept the willingness of
another does not yet tell us whether the interaction will be mutually attuned, even if partners
are willing to be receptive and responsive to each other. Dancing together involves a
normative dimension in that partners can mutually attune well or poorly. Articulating and
parsing the normative questions of partnering well lends support for discussing at least
some of the ways by which claims about mutual attunement between partners can be
reasonably and justifiably evaluated. Normativity of this kind is a form of relativism: the
standards which determine what is right for one partnership are likely quite different from
the standards which determine what is right for another. Yet the matter of standards persists
in practice, and so a critical investigation of the normative dimensions can elucidate deeper
understanding of the structures within dance partnering (i.e. power dynamics within social
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reasonable pluralism that defines a range of acceptable behavior without specifying a set
of standards. I will proceed by assuming that standards exist, and investigate the underlying
structure by which standards can be developed.
In this chapter, I will consider the problems of being willing and able to make choice
in setting intentions. I will return to Gilbert’s notion of plural subjecthood and intentionality
and I will interrogate Elgin’s notion of moral epistemic agency, epistemic responsibilism,
and reflective equilibrium in the context of dancing together. I will elaborate on Gilbert’s
concept of intentionality to demonstrate the ways in which responsible partners
systematically reason about their physical interaction in partnering. I will interrogate what
it is that partners are reasoning about in their physical interaction, and I will conclude by 
considering the matter of pedagogy and education in dancing together.
Intentionality
Individuals can and do make choices about how they encounter and respond to the
subject of their interaction. From the discussion in chapter four, we know that acceptance
is a matter of willingness, ability, and understanding that is accessible rather than inert. The
possibilities open to partners are a consequence of actions and decisions they made or did
not make earlier. As I argued previously, to partner, or to dance together in the strong sense
rather than merely dance together by luck or happenstance, dancers must be willing and
able to accept a joint commitment to dance together and negotiate movement on account
of each other and in mutual attunement to feedback and the affordances of the physical
interaction.
Gilbert argues that in the strong sense of doing something together “each must
intentionally act in his/her capacity as a constituent of a plural subject of a certain goal, a
subject whose other constituent is the other person in question” (Gilbert 1989, 166). Within
the act of dancing together in the strong sense, there is a major problem that concerns how
intention and behavior relate to each other. As we have seen throughout this thesis,
intentionality may not match behavior. Yet Gilbert maintains that “human beings appear to
be in an important sense powered by their ideas and views of their situation” (Gilbert 1989,
12). For the purposes of understanding partnering, Gilbert’s position has to be further
elaborated and further constraints need to be recognized. How does intentionality play a
role in negotiating movement on account of each other? Is intentionality enough to be able
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To do something intentionally is to do something on purpose, which is to have some
kind of idea of what to do. The skill to do something on purpose in dance requires some
kind of accessible understanding. As Elgin argues, understanding is not enough if it is inert,
because it will not feed into the action itself. Consider a simple example of doing a single
turn. If I set an intention to do a single pirouette, I will attempt to do one turn on purpose.
To do so intentionally means to be powered by a mental state that aligns with my desire.
But I may lack the skill to do so. Then, unless I am lucky, I won’t have done a turn. I merely
would have tried to do it. Thus, despite my intention, I may generate too much force for a
single turn, I may fall out of the turn, or I may fail to complete a full revolution. To be
deliberate, I need to know how to achieve control in executing the turns, such that I can do
a single, full turn. I need to know how to prepare the turn (using the right magnitude of
force to generate appropriate torque), how to correct myself if I feel I am falling out of the
turn, and how to finish the turn once I’ve completed a full revolution. Something more than
intention is required. As I’ve argued throughout the preceding chapters, ability to attune
and respond to feedback is required as well.
Gilbert alludes to a distinction between deliberate and intentional practice, but she
does not directly spell it out. Her example hinges on a made-up practice of zigging, which 
involves brushing one’s teeth at the same time as someone else. Her example is as follows,
It is true of zigging, then, that one cannot zigg on one’s own, or without the
participation (in some weak sense) of another agent. Now it is possible for
someone to zigg deliberately. That is, he deliberately brings it about that he
cleans his teeth while someone else in the house is cleaning hers. Two 
people could even deliberately zigg, in relation to each other, each expecting 
the other to be engaged in teeth-cleaning at a certain time, and hence
cleaning his own teeth at that time. Meanwhile it is obviously perfectly 
possible that two or more people zigg entirely by accident. They really do
zigg, none the less (Gilbert 1990, 156).
It seems then that to zigg accidentally is to intentionally brush one’s teeth at a time
that coincidentally someone else is brushing their teeth. To zigg intentionally is to be
powered by an idea or view of brushing one’s teeth at the same time as another. By 
extension then, to zigg deliberately is to ensure the conditions of brushing in relation to
another are satisfied. Drawing from Gilbert, I propose that to be intentional is to do
something on (or with) purpose, while doing something deliberately is to ensure the
conditions of relation (i.e. attunement) are satisfied. In my view, being deliberate requires
resources to realize intentions, whereas being intentional is merely to do something on
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needs the resources to realize intentions in action. For dancing together in the strong sense,
this is a matter of pairing willingness and ability.
To be deliberate means having some awareness of false beliefs and
counterintuitions. One example in partnering is the use of force. For example, I may believe
that the only way to bring my partner upright from an off-balance position is to pull her
toward me by using my upper body strength. While this may be a way to restore my
partner’s equilibrium, it may also overly strain my arm and lower back. Another way to
restore my partner’s balance is to use my own center by lowering my arm and moving my 
pelvis toward my partner. In the latter example, a dancer can avoid using excessive force
of pulling by using one’s own center and thus having more control through a high degree
of attunement to return a partner on balance. Using one’s center is valuable wherever
partners are moving off-balance and provides a counterexample to using brute force. There
may of course be aesthetic reasons for using brute force. Exchange of force becomes
problematic if the dancer takes upper body strength as an absolute (i.e. this is the only way 
to return a partner to balance). The absolute comes from a false belief that successful
weight-sharing comes from the upper body alone. Some may reason that brute strength is
necessary to achieve certain actions (e.g. lifts), and in some cases this is true. But in other
cases, action may be contingent on the right alignment for the bodies involved such that no
excess force is needed. False beliefs may be born of good intentions that fail without the
appropriate competence.
Communication in partnering opens a question of what information partners are
able to access in each other’s movement. In chapter five, I pointed to how Gilbert responds
to Wittgenstein in distinguishing between thin and seriously intended communication.
Wittgenstein introduces a problem that there may be information that is private to the
world, accessible only to the individual (Wittgenstein 1953). The discourse on private
language is fraught with complex ideas, but it is worth mentioning here because dancing 
together in the strong sense might possibly involve intentions that are private and those that
are public. Without getting further into the private/public debate, I propose that in
partnering, intentionality has to be manifest publicly, because partners need to make their
communication accessible to each other. In other words, since dancers have to
communicate with each other in order to establish and maintain their joint commitment,
they need to make signals publicly available to each other through established conventions,
long-term experience, or even a quasi-contract made on the spot. Partners need to know
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communicate with each other. Thus, it is not really a great idea to worry about what is in
people's minds in dance because it is possible to publicly access what they are (or are not)
doing. There can be various misattunements regardless of whatever was in someone's mind.
In the context of partnering, it does not necessarily matter what people thought they were
doing considering the fact that dancing together involves discernably manifest physical
expressions. Returning to Greta’s stumble, it does not matter for the success of the
performance in the moment what she thought she was doing, because she did in fact
stumble. Thus, I propose that having an intention is not enough to partner well. The
resources required to be deliberate are necessary to move with skill. The problem is that
people make mistakes, about themselves and each other. There are certain things that are
knowable, but not with absolute certainty. Thus, partners need to understand something 
about each other to successfully negotiate joint action.
Understanding involves more than mere isolated facts. Given the necessary 
conditions of joint commitment and communication, as well as the conditions and norms
of attunement, it would follow that these are the concepts that need to be understood, and 
furthermore exemplified in movement. Understanding can be contingent on years of
experience and training, but it may also be realized without any previous training. Consider
for example how novice dancers may exhibit attunement to feedback without being 
explicitly taught or trained. This is unsurprising given that attunement in physical
interaction is not unique to dance. The epistemic dimension of partnering suggests that
whether someone has the requisite abilities can be predictable if partners know what to look
for in the interaction.
Elgin argues that predictive success is epistemically credible if predictions are
“borne out considerably more often than chance” (Elgin 2017, 112). Thus, there is some
aspect of understanding that needs to be accounted for in successful interaction to make a
prediction more secure than mere coincidence. To interrogate if this works in partnering,
consider that if I want to influence my partner’s timing, direction, or orientation I need to 
understand where his weight is. One way to do so is by placing my hands on his pelvis (or
wherever his center of mass is). A novice may be unfamiliar with this way of negotiating
direction, and so may try to influence their partner by applying pressure to the shoulders
causing the facing to shift (orientation) but not necessarily accessing weight and center
(direction). Influencing my partner’s timing, direction, or orientation requires more than
being certain about weight placement – I also have to feel in which direction and with
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place at the right time. I need to be aware of the range of actions possible while moving, as
well as my goals for influencing my partner, perhaps in accordance with a particular score.
Even if I know what is coming because of the pre-determined score, I will still have to
negotiate proximity, orientation, and point(s) of contact in real-time to execute the action
in the right time in the right place. To add the layer of negotiating joint action in the right
way for the right reason reopens the question of being virtuous in dancing together.
Predictive success in partnering functions in all sorts of different paradigms. For
example, a rule-based system will hold that actions are governed under certain imperatives.
Consider how a certain dance has particular rules such as conventions about proximity,
orientation, touch, rhythm, and patterns of movement. To execute the particular dance
means following the rules of the practice. Juxtapose this with a discovery-based system in 
which there are very few rules (or at least not very specific ones). Partners can modify
proximity, orientation, and point(s) of contact as they see fit, and as long as they are
negotiating movement on account of each other, it will be considered dancing together.
This is a simple, reduced way of viewing differences between codified and improvisational
practices. In all cases, the ends of the interaction are important to consider when
understanding the capacity of each partner to make decisions in the moment. If, for
example, my intention in partnering is to be disruptive or subversive, I will ostensibly 
encounter my partner differently than if I intended to be cooperative or communicate well.
If I am not looking to cooperate, then I may merely be moving alongside another rather
than partnering. Being deliberate may also contribute to understanding and preventing 
harm. Rather than focus on the problems of practice in how partners make decisions, I turn
to what it is that partners make decisions about.
Agency
I propose that agency in partnering is a capacity to make and satisfy choices, where
degree of weakness and strength is based on the range of possible alternatives. Agency here
is not treated as a binary, on-off aspect of interaction, but rather a continuum from weak to
strong where one can determine degree based both on the quality and quantity of the choices
each agent is able to make. That partners can make decisions makes them agentic. But just
because they can make decisions, does not mean that they will be able to in the moment.
How partners negotiate unpredictability depends on their ability to differentiate
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then they may be able to fairly easily accommodate unpredictability. There are many more
possible choices for how to act with a dance partner than with a wall, clarinet, or cat, at
least because humans have more agency. Partners cannot know what is not accessible to 
them, and moreover cannot control what will be accessible. Thus, partners have to attune
to what is being exemplified, whatever information is salient to them in the moment
including feedback and the affordances of the partnership.
In normal circumstances, when I approach a person and there is no relationship
between my actions and hers, I would quickly understand that we are not interacting, or at
least in very limited way. This is likely to be true about how we engage with all sorts of
other things that behave unresponsively. This is true even of the way infants engage with
others, which we can here consider as human agents with limited agency. In a simple study,
Brazelton et al (1975) demonstrated that after several minutes of interaction with a non-
responsive (e.g. straight-faced, expressionless) parent, an infant (as young as six months)
“rapidly sobers and grows wary [..] makes repeated attempts to get the interaction into its
usual reciprocal pattern. When these attempts fail, the infant withdraws [and] orients his
face and body away from his mother with a withdrawn, hopeless facial expression”
(Brazelton et al 1975). This simple study demonstrates how one might act in an encounter
with someone who is unresponsive. Yet people do, however, choose to engage with
unresponsiveness. For example, unresponsiveness can be an aesthetic choice and does not
necessarily delimit the way partners negotiate on account of each other. If Jack becomes
unresponsive by falling still, Sue may fall still also. She may try all sorts of ways to
negotiate movement on account of his unresponsiveness.
Agency and predictability thus modify the quality of a physical interaction. I am
unlikely to make certain choices if I cannot predict what will happen. Unless I am not as
interested in knowing what is going to happen, in which case my relationship to agency is
somewhat unusual because I am either a) less concerned with the effects or consequences
of my actions or, b) very concerned with the effect of my actions, but not particularly
moved by the probability. For example, I think there is a slim chance that my maneuver to
lift my partner across the floor will work, I am concerned with its working, but willing to
take long odds that it may not work.
One might object to this point about not being able to interact with unpredictable
things by asking about the role of certainty in improvisation. There is indeed something
strange going on in the situation when we encounter randomness and chance such as the
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of activity. Ostensibly one’s priorities are with a different aspect of the interaction than
predicting what will happen. Thus, unpredictability contributes to the interest in how the
interaction will unfold, which is worth the potential risk that something will not work.
Unpredictability and uncertainty are both particular exercises in agency. Consider for
example that Sue lifts Jack over her head with one arm. She may have never done so, but
she is curious to see if she is strong enough to get Jack into the air and, if not, whether she
is skilled enough to get him safely back on the ground should she fail. Jack may be having
an anxiety attack for being lifted in such a precarious way, but he may also be invested in
Sue’s development as a good partner. They might recognize that it is risky but agree that
if they can pull it off, the result will be worth it. So the risk is worth taking. Thus, Sue is
exercising her agency in a way that has less to do with whether she can predict the outcome,
and more to do with the associated inquiry to see what will happen.
The other kind of objection to making choices in the face of unpredictability is that
human agents are only somewhat predictable. Acting in the face of uncertainty is a
particular challenge when interacting non-verbally. But partners can glean a lot of
information within the nuances of physical interaction in order to negotiate
unpredictability. It is not how well partners can predict what the other(s) will do, but how
well they will be able to adapt to what a partner will do given an unexpected encounter or
circumstance. This is a matter of harnessing ability with competence. Partners can never
be absolutely certain if a partner will be ready to respond, so they must attune to ongoing, 
continuous communication through proximity, orientation, and point(s) of contact. Acting
with certainty may mean acting from expectation, which can further inhibit mutual
attunement to relevant stimuli, particularly if something unexpected happens. Knowledge
may be inert in that one can assume that because something worked a particular way before,
it must always work this way. Inert knowledge detracts from the process of mutual
attunement to relevant stimuli because the know-how is inaccessible. With inert
knowledge, one is not actually responsive to the situation, but rather acting from a place of
expectation or idealization.
Here we get into an interesting problem about agency in partnering. If partners are
merely reacting to one another, does this imply that they are bound to each other’s
constraints? That is, given the relationship to each other, are partners free to make their
own choices, or are they in some way bound, unable or unwilling to make choices? Elgin 
borrows language from Kant, to highlight the difference between autonomy and
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while someone who behaves heteronomously is bound by constraints he neither makes nor
endorses” (Elgin 2017, 92). If partners are autonomous then they are free to make choices,
independently and on account of each other. If an act is autonomous, it is done because the
agent endorses it. It is a product of reason. If it is done heteronomously, it is a product of
desires or emotions that are not legislated or endorsed by reason. In the extreme case, the
heteronomous subject is a victim of his desires, emotions, and drives such that he cannot
make a choice. The dancer who is attuned to the actions of his partner, and behaves as he
does because he is suitably attuned, acts autonomously. The autonomous dancer can make
decisions independently of whatever his partner is doing, or he can make choices on 
account of what his partner is doing. It is also possible that the autonomous agent can ignore
what one’s partner is doing. Elgin argues that agents can “decide whether on reflection to
endorse considerations that present themselves as candidates for acceptance” (Elgin 2017,
92). Either way, he can reflectively endorse them, rather than just being driven to do what
he does because of unfettered desire or emotion. If an individual is heteronomous, then her
actions are a product of unfettered desire or emotion, bound and limited by particular
factors. This distinction is useful to analyze insofar as we can understand the awareness
each partner has of the constraints elicited by the other, as well as those potential
conventions and values ascribed by any given form of partnering while allow individuals
to make decisions on their own and in concert with each other. 
Consider the way partners act toward and react to each other. Agents make choices
about how to constrain particular elements including timing, direction, and orientation— 
sometimes constraining many elements together, and at other times less so and in different
amalgamations. Within partnering, understanding is manifest physically. In each case, the
actions of each partner will reflect the quality of their agency, but extenuating
circumstances can turn an autonomous agent into a heteronomous one. For example, my
partner, while perhaps bound to my constraints, has the autonomy to decide the quality of
her response, as well as the agency to accept that my action warrants a particular reaction 
in the first place. If, in an overhead lift, my partner suddenly becomes afraid, then her
unfettered fear may cause her to react by becoming rigid. Her fear prevents her from
responding, and by merely reacting she is no longer able to reflectively endorse trust in me
as a partner. Assuming that enough information is available to her in the physical situation 
such that she can be confident that I will not drop her, then it is possible for her to make a
choice. But her fear makes certain choices unfeasible, they are unlikely to happen. She does
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keep her safe. On the other hand, her fear may also be a rational and autonomous reflection
on her situation. She is afraid because she has reason to believe that I am not in control and 
or in a position to keep her safe. After all, epistemically grounded emotions can lead to the
same situation as heteronomous ones. In either case, my ability to attune to my partner’s
sudden rigidity, and my competence in dealing with it appropriately to keep us both safe,
will contribute to how our interaction unfolds (e.g. whether or not will be successful).
Successful interaction is contingent on actions having recognizable effects, in 
which recognizable effects exemplify the type of dependence within the interaction. For
example, a wall is independent given that my actions have no recognizable effect on it.
Although a wall is dependable and predictable, it is odd to say that the wall is interacting
with me, and even odder to say that the wall has agency. But I can successfully interact
with the wall insofar as my action of leaning is supported by the recognizable effect of the
wall withstanding and supporting my weight. My action on a clarinet has more options for
recognizable effects, such that certain actions will lead to a sound while others will not.
The clarinet has distinct joints and keys that react to certain parameters, many of which
require specific knowledge. Having an aim to play the clarinet in a certain way, or indeed 
lean against the wall to practice being off-balance, are cognitive objectives. Elgin maintains
that “it is reasonable to ask whether, or to what extent, the acceptance of a given premise
or rule furthers the agent’s cognitive objectives” (Elgin 2017, 22). In the case of the wall
or the clarinet, my engagement serves to offer opportunities to practice my cognitive
objective of sensitivity and attunement, which can subsequently support how I listen and
respond with a partner. But the wall and clarinet are fairly predictable, as compared to a
human.
Animate subjects are far less predictable than inanimate matter. Nevertheless, we
can learn something about agency when we consider the ways in which inanimate matter
is reactive to our actions. While the clarinet cannot play without me, it reacts differently
given the way I interact with it. But to say that the clarinet has agency is odd, because it
cannot make decisions. Human interaction is more complicated, at least because of the fact
that individuals, unlike inanimate matter, have agency. It is useful, however, to consider
the difference between weak and strong agency. This will depend on the types of 
constraints that are present for each partner. If Jack comes to a social event of a movement
form he has no experience with (e.g. tango), interaction with a partner may be limited
because he will find their movement potentially random or too complex. Similarly, an 
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that their actions have no recognizable effects on me. While the interaction is ostensibly 
possible, the lack of experience may be what limits agency.
Gilbert offers an example of a man and a woman doing a waltz together, such that
it is recognizable as the waltz from merely seeing them on the dance floor. If those
observing can recognize that the couple is dancing together, Gilbert questions, “how can
the fact of their dancing together be in any way dependent on their thinking any particular
thoughts? (Gilbert, 1989, 165). She counters with the following statement:
Unbeknownst to the observer, she is moving automatically, while her mind
is a complete blank. Are they waltzing together? Are they doing anything
together? Is she doing anything at all? That she is, is not obvious to me,
except in the sense in which mere physical movements are doing” (Gilbert
1989, 165, emphasis in the original).
Since Gilbert’s work is focused on the conditions of doing something together, she
is questioning whether the female dancers’ automaticity can disqualify the act as a joint
one. Gilbert’s automatic dancer problematizes the act of dancing together if there is no 
underlying thought or conception of togetherness, but mere automaticity. How do we
account for the relationship between physical conditions and thoughts or conceptions in
order to say that individuals are partnering? The question is about what partners exemplify 
in their movement and through which senses this is perceived. From the discussion in 
chapter six, we can say that graviception allows partners to attune to feedback about shifts
in weight, which change the affordances of the physical interaction.
Returning to the performance of Greta and Roberto, what is interesting to note is
that Greta continues to stumble after her first adjustment in the attitude. That she continues
to stumble exemplifies independence, and as such indicates something about her orientation
to Roberto. Without access to her mental state, very little can be said about what she was
endorsing or whether she acted autonomously (e.g. she chose to stumble on purpose).
Supposing that she wanted to do the choreography well, her continued stumble signals that
she reacted heteronomously to losing her balance – she felt herself falling and reacted by
adjusting her stance. I bring this point up to propose that Greta’s orientation to Roberto in
that moment is not that of an agentic partner. In continuing to stumble, the stumble reveals
insight about her training, habits, and disposition to dancing with a partner; she adjusts on
her own to save the choreography without relying on Roberto. Perhaps she had no other
choice because Roberto somehow made it clear to her that he would not help out. It is also
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responsibility to rely on Roberto in that moment. In other words, it might not have occurred
that he could have helped her out. Through comparison with Elke’s performance,
something about Greta’s performance is recognizable in terms of her agency and the way
she accepts responsibility by limiting the agency of Roberto in the moment of readjustment.
It is also important to note that, despite the continued stumble, both continue the
choreography and do not quit mid-performance. Both exemplify their commitment to the
choreography by continuing the piece as if nothing happened. It is necessary to
acknowledge that the moments that I have pointed to are extremely fleeting, and very likely
are non-deliberative. Thus, it is likely that Greta’s training and habits take over as her
primary resource to be resilient in the face of choreography.
The epistemic dimension of moving together leads to a familiar problem in
epistemology: there is always an unknown element in doing anything, which is especially 
true of doing anything together with others. The unknown element leads to an important
kind of uncertainty: individuals generally do not have the resources to be absolutely certain
what others are going to do next, so they must launch inquiry about what is going to happen.
This may seem too intellectualizing in the context of dance. But if individuals are attending
to expressions of willingness in an ongoing, continuous way (subject to changes in
proximity, pace, or other actions that call willingness or commitment into question), then
some kind of inquiry might be a necessity.
The degree of agency partners can exercise is sometimes governed by the form of
partnering. For example, in some forms certain features of proximity, orientation, and
point(s) of contact are fixed, yet each partner can still make choices, albeit a limited
number. A certain dance may require partners to orient toward each in close proximity,
with touch as a point of contact by connecting palms on one side of the body and through 
a half embrace on the other side. A certain dance may also involve roles, such as leader and 
follower. Leaders may have a distinct task, such as changing the timing, direction, and
spatial orientation of a following dancer. If the action of the leader has no recognizable
effects on the follower, negotiating movement on account of each other may be unfeasible
because the follower is too independent. Though each ostensibly has agency, their decisions
may have little to no influence on each other such that each acts independently. On the
other hand, the interaction will be too taxing for the leader if the follower exhibits too much 
dependency. Having too much agency can be paralyzing because the choices are too broad,
just as too little agency can be paralyzing because the choices are too narrow. Some
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Sometimes constraints depend on the aesthetic and formal conventions of the genre
being practiced, at other times constraints are something dancers can explicitly negotiate.
For partners to physically negotiate both their individual agencies and their joint agency as
a plural subject, they need to be able to differentiate their own individual actions, as well
as their joint action, with respect to proximity, orientation, and point(s) of contact. In part,
differentiation of action means that partners recognize the physical effects they have on
each other’s movements. If I am unfamiliar with the form of partnering, interaction may 
prove to be too difficult or perhaps unfeasible if I perceive movements as random or if I
am unable to differentiate them because they are too complex. What is perceived as random
or complex will likely depend on the context, as well as individual backgrounds and
personal histories.
There is a distinction in being prepared for uncertainty by being prepared for
anything versus preparing for the worst. This distinction is particularly important to
consider when identifying the willingness qua physical readiness and the ability to be ready.
When partners prepare for the worst, they may be operating from a feedforward model that
prevents them from attuning to feedback because they have already formed beliefs about
the partnership. The ability to be prepared for anything in dancing together is as much 
contingent on physical ability as the kinds of mental models partners operate from. Thus, I
turn now to examine the nature of reflection in dancing together.
Reflective Endorsement
As agents, partners can reflectively endorse their choices. But Elgin argues that
“reflection does not occur in a vacuum. It involves sensitivity to epistemic ends and means,
capacities and limitations. It is imbued with (often tacit) background assumptions and is
responsive to epistemic circumstances” (Elgin 2017, 99). I propose that the epistemic
circumstances relate to the affordances of the partnership. When partners attune to the
information conveyed (i.e. signals), and the effects of the information on each other (e.g.
feedback and affordances) at a high enough degree, they are able to understand what is and
is not possible. They can reflect, in the moment, on the choices they have available to them.
Nuances in agency are contingent on how partners are attuning to each other. To be attuned
to one’s partner is to be aware of the possibilities within the interaction, including both the
limitations and the resources (e.g. physical, psychological). Sometimes this has to do with
the degree and quality of experience of dancing together or previous training leading up to
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much so that partnering paradigms may be avoided in favor of simply dancing together. It
may be easier to move together without the added condition of negotiating movement on
account of each other. On the one hand, previous experience (e.g. growing up with siblings
or in environments in close proximity with others) may make joint action familiar and
natural, but each individual case is different. On the other hand, even when partners have
danced together for a long time, there are plenty of reasons why they may be unwilling or
unable to negotiate movement on account of each other on any given day. As Elgin argues,
“people have inner lives replete with motivations, perceptions, emotions, and thoughts.
Because a variety of combinations of psychological elements might yield the same outward
behavior, it is impossible to uniquely determine the underlying psychological states from
observations of overt behavior alone” (Elgin 2017, 240). Nevertheless, there are aspects of
overt behavior that reveal insight into feasibility of mutual attunement.
Since movement in partnering can exemplify all sorts of different aspects of the
relation between dancers, partnering has multiple levels of interpretation for behavior,
including (at least) kinesthetic, tactile, and graviceptive. Assuming these levels of
interpretation are significant in the physical interaction, there emerge particular tensions
with respect to quality of attunement, including:
1. One can feel attuned without being attuned
2. To look attuned is not necessarily to be attuned
3. Some movement may look more attuned than actually being attuned
That one can feel attuned without being attuned is a phenomenological problem –
people can feel all sorts of things for any number of reasons. The second and third problem
are more complicated from an epistemological perspective. Gilbert’s example of the
automatic dancer is an illustration of the last two tensions. Without access to other people’s
minds, we cannot tenably account for intention. But there is more at play than knowing
what other people are (or are not) thinking. Long-time partners may know each other's
opinions on certain matters such that they know what they're going to say or do, but that
does not mean that they are attuned. They simply have experience. An epistemic problem
is how partners rely on what they think they know, rather than attuning to the information
available in the moment. This relates to the cases of false belief, where a partner forms a
belief about the way in which they can rely on their partner that is not rooted in evidence
such that they think they know something but are mistaken. This can also relate to the
feedforward model, in which partners act from previous experience rather than from the
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executed a lift many times and has come to the conclusion that there is a particular point of
contact that is most efficient to successfully execute the lift. In going for the point, the
partner acts from a feedforward model and misses information that the point of contact is
different than usual. Perhaps the other dancer is sweatier than usually or wearing a different
material. By acting from a pre-planned, feedforward model the dancer misses valuable
feedback and is unable to perform the lift. This may result in a misstep or even serious
injury. The problem is that partners may take their interaction for granted such that they no
longer reflectively attune to feedback. As partners become more comfortable within their
interaction, there are ostensibly more possibilities to attend to nuance and subtlety, just as 
there are more opportunities to take joint movement for granted. But partners may be
comfortable simply because more time has passed together, or because they are trusting
people without the necessary reasons to justify this trust. As I argued in the previous
chapter, trust is not a virtue if it leads to blind reliance. While on the one hand, more time
means partners have more opportunities to understand what any given movement
exemplifies and interpret relevant information to mutually attune to one another, it does not
mean that partners will necessarily take advantage of the opportunities.
As Elgin points out, “an agent’s reflective endorsement is a willingness to be bound 
by an epistemic commitment (an opinion, method, or standard) because, given her 
background epistemic commitments, she thinks that her epistemic purposes will be served 
by her being so bound (Elgin 2017, 99). The background epistemic commitments in
partnering are the agent’s responsibility to reflectively endorse. But an agent can 
reflectively endorse something and still be wrong. Since epistemic agents have little control
over their environment, they are not negligent if they turn out to be wrong, as long as they
gathered all the information they could. One of the problems with mental states is that there
is no way to be absolutely certain what someone is thinking without monitoring their mind.
There may, however, be some valuable insights gleaned from observing how others move
by interpreting what the movement exemplifies.
The information partners need to interpret to mutually attune contributes to their
ability to have good form, which can be tied to aesthetic, epistemic, and moral norms.
However, there is no universal aesthetic requirement of concern for what partners are doing
together. But even without a universal aesthetic requirement, I propose that the moral
requirements are still there. Regardless of whether we pursue a virtue-based ethics or a
deontological one, partners take on certain obligations when they dance together in the
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it may simply be an aesthetic choice. Partners may have agreed to do so in advance. Without
mutual attunement, however, dancers will merely be moving together. Each may be using
the other, but since each has agreed, there is no problem in the commitment. Moreover,
they can, and do, reason about how they behave when treating each other as props. I believe
that dancers should develop the ability to partner well, so that the range of possibilities
within the partnership expands.
Partners can be aware that the standards and norms they set for themselves will
influence how they negotiate joint movement, and indeed how they accept and endorse
joint action. But just because they can be aware of the standards, does not mean that they
will be, or that they will exercise agency in accordance with those standards. Presumably
partners want to have as broad an aesthetic range as possible, so they will not want to
foreclose their options in dancing together. The capacity for responsiveness is grounded in
movement histories and abilities to reflectively endorse those histories in appropriate ways.
Reflective endorsement is a process of strategic bodily iteration, drawing on one’s unique
disposition and movement history to maneuver through the expectations of other bodies in
a given situation. Thus, I turn to the question of responsibility. What are the tools partners
can learn in order to satisfy their epistemic and moral obligations to each other?
Moral Epistemic Agency
The idea that partners can, as epistemic agents, reason about their interaction needs
further clarification. I have numerous times pointed to the fact that partners are mutually
attuning to their ongoing joint commitment. As such, I now propose that their joint action
can be considered a physical inquiry. For Elgin, the onset of inquiry involves a commitment
that include “hunches, rules of thumb, superstitions, and old wives’ tales as well as
confirmed generalizations, proven theorems, firmly established principles, and solid 
evidence” (Elgin 2017, 64). In the moment when Sue realizes that someone is dancing
alongside her, she begins a physical inquiry. If she continues dancing, she may have a
hunch that the encounter is an expression of willingness to dance together. When she
glances over, her hunch is proven right as she realizes that it is Jack Smith. She continues
to dance alongside Jack, constituting a physical proximity and orientation toward Jack, and
in so doing establishes a physical willingness to dance together. As they continue to dance




       
    
       
        
      
          
           
            
             
         
          
         
          
           
           
         
         
            
            
              
        
      
                 
           
          
            
          
                
           
            
          
              
           
          
164
ongoing attunement to feedback and affordances for both Jack and Sue. But inquiry
involves systematically ruling out or refining commitments.
Partners exercise moral epistemic agency by accepting a commitment in which joint
movement is established and maintained well through a high degree of mutual attunement
based on receptive and responsive communication. In chapter six and seven, I demonstrated 
how physical dependence plays a role in negotiating movement as well as underlying 
mental states such as trust. The point of agreement the negotiation presupposes can be
considered as the space where inquiry begins. Decisions made in real-time by each party
are based on interpreting the physical actions they direct at one another. Movements like
weight-shifts and weight-sharing are negotiated on account of each other, individually and
in concert with others, regardless of whether the movement is extemporaneously generated 
or choreographed. For successful communication, there must be agreement between each 
agent about which signals are meaningful and what constitutes an appropriate response.
This agreement may be largely unspoken, simply by following the conventions of a
particular movement form. That is, in partnering, to be able to communicate physically and
to engage in a calibrated mode of attunement, dancers cannot simply be moving randomly,
even if movement is improvised. Agreeing on the appropriate conventions by which 
partners negotiate movement raises a concern of what partners reason about within their
interaction. Reasoning here is not in reference to the verbal exchanges that occur between
partners, although those too are valuable. Rather reasoning here is in reference to the means
by which partners understand and interpret each other through their joint action.
Elgin distinguishes between available reasons and accessible reasons. Available
reasons are those that an agent recognizes as relevant as those the agent can “call to mind”
(Elgin 2017, 100). I have an available reason to believe that Sue is trustworthy because I
just saw her lift Jack and place him back on balance before moving on to another action.
Accessible reasons are those she as an agent can readily draw on, which is information that
is obtainable in an “epistemic milieu” (Elgin 2017, 100). An accessible reason is asking 
someone in the studio if Sue is trustworthy, if I realize that I do not have the information
myself. Elgin further argues that “reasons are considerations that can properly be adduced 
to support a conclusion […] reasons thus are public” (Elgin 2017, 100). Extending to
dancing together, Elgin’s claim suggests that one’s own ideas and hunches may inform how
one moves but if the ideas, hunches, beliefs, and so on, do not emerge from the information
I have accessible and available, then I am no longer reasoning and may be setting myself
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physically available and possible given the affordances of their partnership. They are able
to adapt to suitable modes of interaction and to accommodate each others’ abilities.
One’s ability to reason when something is unsuccessful may yield more successful
results. The problem is that we may be successful by accident or by coincidence. Consider
how one might be successful in executing multiple partnered turns, because of strength and 
dexterity, but not because of refined senses of graviception. We can consider even more
subtle examples in which success may be a result of the material of the interaction with the
floor because of footwear (e.g. socks or dance shoes) or the type of floor itself (more or
less slippery). By switching to a different studio space, different material of footwear, or a
different partner, one might fail to execute the turns that were otherwise (accidentally)
successful. Without deliberate reasoning, one may never come to understand why one was
successful in the first place. Thus, it is up to partners to hold themselves and each other
accountable. The range of alternatives is there, but the question is what enables access to
it. A successful partnership will be grounded in partners’ willingness and ability to
intentionally and deliberately access the part of their knowledge that is relevant to the
current situation, which unfolds in real-time. But this reasoning need not be deliberative,
given that dancing together involves sensing and perceiving information through the body
in real-time. As such, moral epistemic agency is not a brute application of previously
learned ‘inert’ knowledge, but a responsive, embodied understanding of how individual
movement possibilities are accessible and appropriate. It is in this conception of reasoning
that we come to virtue ethics.
Elgin argues that “virtues are relatively stable dispositions to think and/or act well,
where a disposition is not merely an ability to do something, but an ability combined with
a propensity to do it” (Elgin 2013, 136). Elgin’s claim moves beyond ability to suggest
propensity. This is particularly relevant to partnering, as individuals might be willing and
able to dance together in the strong sense, but may not have the disposition or propensity
to follow a virtue-based model of doing good. Virtues in partnering must be related to the
disposition and propensity to attune to a high enough degree such that feedback and
affordances are accessible, which includes fine-grained responsiveness and exercising 
responsibility in one’s own actions in relation to others. Virtuosity in partnering is
necessarily relational, since negotiating movement on account of each other well requires
an epistemic exercise of understanding relevant features of the interaction. Virtuosity is a
disposition to think and act well, which means being deliberate in the dexterity and
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maneuver each other, whether passages are choreographed or improvised, reveals insight
about excellence in attunement. The problem with virtuosity is that different forms have
different value systems, and different observers may have different histories which limit
the classes of comparison or the ideology of what’s appropriate in physical interaction. As
such, virtuosity may be something that needs to be negotiated as part of the joint
commitment established between partners when they agree to move together. Elgin further
argues “internalizing the norms of a practice does not just engender a disposition to behave,
but a normative disposition—a disposition to hold oneself accountable” (Elgin 2017, 52).
This is one of my personal interests as a practitioner and educator. By internalizing the
norms of partnering, dancers engender the disposition to mutually attune and hold
themselves accountable for their attunement. This includes how partners exercise their
agency in negotiating joint movement on account of each other, with virtues such as
respect, empathy, generosity, and caring. Thus, as I argued in the previous chapter, success
in dancing together in the strong sense means adopting a virtue-based view of moral ethics.
Since the shared goal is to negotiate movement on account of each other, part of the
virtuosity is also the propensity for mutual understanding. Thus, virtuosity in partnering is
keyed to reasoning in the moment.
Elgin points out that “the agent, along with other members of epistemic community,
sets standards of evidence and thresholds for acceptance” (Elgin 2017, 98). This is
problematic if the standards are too low or the evidence is undefined. This is why Elgin
endorses epistemic responsibilism – it is a responsibility of agents themselves to exercise
choice to set the standards. For partnering, where the standards influence well-being in joint
action, the standards need to be appropriately defined so as to ensure good form to support
cooperation and safety. Responsible partners recognize how their own actions influence
others at least in so far as they uphold and maintain their joint commitment to each other.
To be responsible is to understand the range of appropriate responses potentially available,
in the moment, in ways that are ethically suitable given the constraints and resources of the
agents.
Certain forms will have more rigid conventions about how to respond given certain
actions, while other forms of movement may provide more freedom for constituents.
Dancers may also be able to innovate within a form, finding ways to adhere to aesthetic
conventions while pushing the boundaries of a form to new possibilities. As long as
partners are willing and able to cooperate, and they have the ability to deliberately bring
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interaction unfolds, they will have opportunities to revise their commitment. As Elgin
argues,
if an opinion is supposed by a tightly woven tapestry of reasons, and the
opinion turns out to be erroneous, more than that particular opinion must be
revised or rejected. The question arises: how could it be wrong? What have
we been missing, or overlooking, or underestimating, or misconstruing? The
realization that this is not the way things are in a particular area can afford
avenues of insight into the way things are at the very least, it enables us to
focus attention on particular aspects of our system of commitments (Elgin 
2017, 305).
It is likely impossible to directly address the tensions of attunement practically in a
prescriptive sense because there is no way to be absolutely certain in advance whether one
will be attuned or not. There are, however, signals that reveal insight about whether
attunement is feasible and likely. Using Elgin’s language, partnering is a pure procedure.
She states that “only if the procedure is actually carried out are its performers and products
determinate” (Elgin 1996, 16). To evaluate the pure procedure of dancing together in the
strong sense is to examine the course of the actions that occur – attuning to feedback and
the affordances of the partnership throughout the procedure. Partners ought to aim to
evaluate as objectively as possible, to reflectively endorse the information they are
receiving.
There is an important distinction worth clarifying. The difference between being 
deliberate and deliberating. To deliberate is to engage in thoughtful consideration. Elgin
further argues that,
Being duly sensitive to circumstances involves being sensitive to the norms
of a practice. Such sensitivity is a part of knowing how to participate in those
practices, for the norms govern what may be done, what must be done, and 
what must not be done within the practice. If this sensitivity has become
second nature, we need not deliberate, and may not be able to articulate the
norms that constrain or guide us” (Elgin 2017, 51).
Thus, it is possible to be deliberate without necessarily deliberating about one’s
actions. Moreover, one need not necessarily be able to articulate what one is doing well.
This effectively characterizes those who partner well without conscious awareness of what
it is they are doing. They are negotiating movement on account of each other because it is
internalized, and as such, requires no extended deliberation. Moral epistemic agents in 
partnering resist the lure of certainty by engaging in physical inquiry to attune to and
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Drawing from Aristotle’s concept of virtue, Elgin suggests that doing the right thing 
in the right way, at the right time for the right reason can become internalized. As such, an
agent “does not, and need not, deliberate about what to do. She need not even be conscious
or expressly aware of why she does what she does” (Elgin 2017, 50). Understanding in
partnering means that responsible partners make choices about how to communicate,
exercising moral epistemic agency to adhere to a joint commitment to move together
responsibly.
To be able to approach partnering systematically requires understanding the inner
logic of ever-changing physical information, such as subtle shifts in spatial relationships,
forces of energy, and so on. By referring to logic here, I do not mean to suggest a purely 
deliberative process. Rather, logic in this sense refers to analysis built on foundational
principles emerging from an embodied process of sensing, interpreting, and evaluating
physicality. From the previous chapters, we know that this is complex because of the
underlying motivating factors for why partners seek to establish joint commitments in the
first place. Elgin argues, “in agreeing to work together, people engender obligations to one
another—obligations whose content is determined by the objective they are jointly pursing”
(Elgin 2017, 139). In this way, logic in partnering is driven by the joint goal of negotiating 
joint movement on account of each other. Thus, an adequate theory of partnering must
account for what is already happening when partners’ movement is negotiated on account
of each other. A descriptive theory of partnering must also account for what it is that
partners are after in their shared goal of dancing together in the strong sense.
There are two goals that I want to spell out further here, one is efficacy and the other
is efficiency. By referring here to efficacy and efficiency, I am referring to the idea that in
each case of partnering, there is a way to conserve energy (i.e. be efficient) as well as satisfy
aesthetic criteria of a given movement form (i.e. ballet, contact improvisation) or a
particular choreographer. There are at least two notions of energy here. One is the
conservation of energy, which points to the laws and principles of physics (e.g. inertia,
force, angular momentum, and so on). Another notion is how energy is conserved such that
dancers do not get fatigued, which can be quite a strange guiding question given that certain
forms of dance often require complex and effortful sensory multi-tasking. One of my
favorite ballet teachers used to say, “if you are worried about efficiency, stop practicing 
ballet because this form is about complexity”. Whether or not he was right, we can consider
a simple example. A tendu—one of the basic movements in classical ballet—involves focus
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if relevant) when executed at barre, center, in choreography or in improvisation. Despite it
being a seemingly simple movement, a tendu will expend quite a lot of energy, as compared 
with just moving the foot out without any such concerns. This is why efficacy is parallel to
efficiency—one attempts to conserve energy in tandem with the aesthetic concerns of the
form. The aesthetic concerns of one form (e.g. contact improvisation) may have a stronger
focus on effortless, energy-saving movement than another form (e.g. classical ballet) given
varying emphasis on specific bodily positions and formalized choreographic patterns and 
figures. These aesthetic concerns will influence how partners engage with each other,
which may not always be explicit.
When people do things together, they may have a host of goals, intentions, and
motives underlying their joint action. Divergent motives don't matter as long as they don't
get in the way of responsiveness, receptivity, and resilience. Though we may not have
access to what people are thinking, we do have clues based on what is manifest in the act
of dancing together. There is also a function in doing something together, a means to an 
end such as walking together to get to the store or dancing together to build community, as
well as intrinsic value such as walking together or dancing together for the sake of doing
something together. This is where the distinction between efficiency and efficacy becomes
more important. Partners may be willing to dance together, but not to make themselves
vulnerable by giving away (at least some) control of things like direction, orientation,
timing, point of contact, and so on. Though being vulnerable may in the end be less
efficient, it may also lead to more effective cooperation. By being vulnerable, partners are
able to establish and maintain higher degrees of attunement and exercise better and more
respectful choices in light of the affordances of the partnership.
Conclusion
The aim of this chapter was to demonstrate the normative significance of deliberate
actions and responsible reasoning with respect to mutual attunement. I unpacked the
underpinning claims of efficiency, efficacy, and ethics, and I argued that it is the precision 
and coordination of these three concepts that makes partnering different than other kinds
of interactions that are physical such as merely moving together. I drew in particular on
Elgin’s concept of reflective endorsement and moral epistemic agency, expanding Gilbert’s




        
           
          
          
            
          
           
            
                
          
         
       
              
              
             
            
        
            
          
          
           
          
             












intentional action–to do something on purpose, and deliberate action—to do something on
purpose with the added complexion of having the competence to be able to do so well.
Responsible dancers attune to the way their partners respond and/or react, to 
evaluate and reason about whether a partner’s proximity, orientation, and point(s) of
contact are appropriate and constitute an expression of willingness to form a joint
commitment. Sensitivity to the responses or reactions prepares partners for the unexpected. 
As Elgin argues, a skilled reasoner “constructs sound arguments, draws on relevant
evidence, holds herself responsible for flaws in her reasoning. The corrections she makes
or accepts, as well as the principles she adduces, are indications of the norms she takes
herself to be answerable to” (Elgin 2017, 53). This depends on how nuanced partners’
choices are in understanding the available range of responses. In whatever partnering
paradigm partners choose to practice (e.g. lead/follow, improvisation, predetermined 
choreography, etc.), responsible partners must accept the constraints of the form as well as
the fact that actions are always communicative. I often use the maxim “everything you do
matters—it doesn’t matter what you do” to remind dancers that all of their actions have
consequences, and it is a responsibility to evaluate what is appropriate in the moment.
Within the physical interaction, aesthetic conventions also significantly impact the
different possibilities with regard to which partner has the agency to accept, reject, or ignore
actions. Having particular aesthetic goals about how they move together within their
interaction, in addition to negotiating movement on account of each other, will further
restrict what constitutes as appropriate. Willingness, ability, and understanding need to be
satisfied in order to dance together in the strong sense, but individuals will not necessarily
make good decisions even if all the conditions are satisfied. Thus, I argue, non-deliberative
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Chapter Nine: Conclusion
Throughout this thesis, I have interrogated the act of dancing together as a joint
physical commitment. I identified sufficient conditions to establish a commitment, which
served to distinguish between dancing together and partnering. I defined partnering as
dancing together in the strong sense. In making this distinction, I argued for mutual
attunement as an additional condition, which plays a role in how partners maintain their
joint physical commitment of dancing together in the strong sense. Further, I have argued
that mutual attunement is a relationship where partners are receptive to feedback and the
affordances of the partnership such that they can be appropriately responsive. In so doing,
I have laid a foundation for evaluating normative dimensions of establishing and
maintaining a joint physical commitment. This foundation serves as an epistemological
framework from which to create a descriptive theory of partnering.
The previous chapters have sought to make clear the conditions and normative
dimensions of dancing together. In this final chapter, my goal is to explore the implications
that emerge from this epistemological foundation. I will consider how this foundation
provides effective terminology to support critical evaluation of physical joint commitment.
I will examine embedded values of establishing and maintaining joint physical
commitments, including empathy, generosity, and care. I will conclude by demonstrating
that partnering is discursive – though different forms of practice have their own rules and 
conventions, the basis for joint commitment in the physical domain makes partnering a
discourse in and of itself that is relevant and applicable across genres that value joint action
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Evaluating Predicates in Partnering
Throughout this thesis, I have argued that maintaining the joint commitment in
partnering is reliant on fine-grained mutual attunement, in which communication,
dependence, and agency play a key role. The joint commitment in partnering requires more
than just the conception of attunement that partners envision when dancing together. By
extrapolating epistemic problems in partnering, I demonstrated that partners have evidence
to reason about the quality of the interaction. Evidence can be coarse or fine-grained,
depending on the competence of the individuals. Since the relevant concepts of attunement
are complex and multi-faceted, partners may use the same words in inexact, vague ways
based on inadequate understanding. Thus, terms need to be defined and stabilized in order
to be on the ‘same page’ and to evaluate successfully what is and is not working.
The main concepts I have identified throughout this thesis are willingness, ability,
understanding, attunement, commitment, receptivity, responsiveness, and affordance. In
chapter seven, I introduced the distinction between two- and three-part predicates. I argued
that trust in partnering is a three-part predicate, where partners trust each other to be
receptive, responsive, and resilient when things go wrong. Having laid out an
epistemological foundation, I propose that that the other relevant terminology, namely
willingness, ability, understanding, attunement, commitment, receptivity, and
responsiveness, are also three-part predicates. As such, we can ask: willing to (do) what?
Ability to (do) what? Committed to (do) what? Receptive to what? Responsive to what? 
The affordances of what? Understanding these terms as three-part predicates supports the
evaluation of my main research questions, mainly what it means to dance together and what
it means to dance together well. Together the relevant terms coalesce into a framework that
supports my main aim of developing a generic philosophy of dancing together.
In chapter four, I argued that for an interaction to be feasible, partners need to have
a base level of attunement to each other, as well as their environment and others around 
them. Though a base level of attunement may satisfy the conditions of joint action, it is the
focus and the degrees of attunement that will differentiate dancing together in the strong
sense. Thus, it is not just that dancers express willingness, but that they express willingness
to do something in particular (e.g. to be receptive to relevant signals). Moreover, partners
must be able to be receptive, contingent on physical readiness and bodily disposition to 
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encounter obstacles, physically, emotionally, or even energetically, which will render their
interaction unfeasible even if they have expressed willingness to dance together. For
example, partners may fail to establish a common timing necessary for the interaction, run
into other couples on the dance floor at a social event, or be unaware of aesthetic
conventions of a given movement form such that their interaction breaks down. By 
mutually attuning to each other, partners can maintain their joint commitment by
deliberately responding to each other’s signals that are formed through proximity,
orientation, and point(s) of contact.
Partners may form a joint commitment to mutually attune and negotiate movement
on account of each other, but their actions do not align with their intentions. This, too,
requires critical evaluation of whether they are actually moving on account of one another.
On the one hand, there is the phenomenological experience of dancing together. Partners
can feel attuned without necessarily satisfying the conditions of mutual attunement. This
can be for a number of reasons, but the experience of dancing together is not what I have
been after in this thesis. Rather, I have been asking how the phenomenon of dancing 
together is different when partners are negotiating movement on account of each other.
Since partnering is a physical act, the understanding of aspects such as transfer of
force, graviception, timing, effort, and so on needs to be exemplified and manifest in the
action. This is observable and discernable from the outside, as well as from inside the
partnership. I have considered how individuals exemplify particular kinds of relationships
in the act of dancing together. Competence in exemplifying these signals does not
necessarily mean competence in discerning these signals. This is how we can account for
dancers that are good partners within certain relationships, and not so good partners within
other relationships. A major problem is that partners can attempt to mutually attune without
the skills to do so. I have explored how while they have set an intention and establish a
joint commitment, their attempts to partner are unlikely to be successful without the
requisite skills to do so.
I have argued that it is important to note that from merely observing it is impossible
to tell the exact intentions of others because we do not have access to other people’s minds.
Nevertheless, there are clues that offer evidence about aspects of attunement, including
receptivity, responsiveness, and agency. Evaluating the two recordings of Petite Mort
provided the opportunity to conceptually analyze dancing together from a real scenario.
Returning to the case of Roberto and Greta performing Petite Mort, both Roberto and
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the moment of the performance. That Greta stumbles is a misstep that happens often in
dance. That she continues to stumble reveals her orientation to Roberto, opening insight
about her training, habits, and disposition toward dancing with others in a broader sense.
As I discussed, without access to Greta’s thoughts, we don’t know why she continues to
stumble in the way she does. But by evaluating the continued adjustment and readjustment
in light of concepts such as receptivity, responsiveness, and resilience, there are clues that
support claims about her agency. My analysis showed how Greta limits Roberto’s agency
in the moment that she continues to stumble on her own. The continued adjustment and
readjustment of her foot reveals that she is taking responsibility for herself, and in so doing
limits the agency of Roberto. Attributing limited agency means limiting the responsibility.
Even with familiar movements, such as existing patterns or set choreographies,
there is a limited set of individuals who have insight about what the movement should be.
Observers thus need to be informed (such as a choreographer, coach, or instructor) such
that they know what they are looking for. I have proposed that without relevant information,
observers must withhold the temptation to ascribe meaning about intentions based on overt
behavior alone. But observers can respond by saying something such as ‘I cannot make a
claim because I do not know what the dancers partnership is predicated on’. By viewing
Greta stumble it is impossible to say whether or not she intended to trust Roberto, or even
whether she actually trusts Roberto in that moment. Perhaps she does, and the mental state
is not aligning with her behavior. While the distinction between dancing together and
partnering is real, it may actually be difficult to discern from the outside. Thus, I have
focused on the terminology of interrelated concepts to support more critical evaluation.
In chapter four, I explored how forms of practice, including those that involve
choreography, regimented systems, or even improvisation, set necessary conditions but not
sufficient conditions. There are a vast number of degrees of freedom and fine-grained 
choices that go into how partners do what they do. Dancing together is a realm within which
they have choices. This is discernible, in that expressions are physically manifest such that
they can be visible to others. I believe that dancers must appreciate how much room for
choice is open to them regardless of the prescription of the form.
Experienced dancers may come to genres where they do not understand the
conventions and rules of the practice, and so merely emulate what they see. They may make
all sorts of mistakes based on conceptual errors, from bumping into a partner from poor
negotiation to bodily harm. As I argued in chapter eight, competence and propensity are
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necessarily behave well. Moreover, sometimes dancers do not realize how much agency
they've got because they might be focused on being efficient according to standards that
they follow too dogmatically. Things gets murky when the how and the what are
collapsed. Thus, I have focused throughout this thesis on the conditions that satisfy dancing
together in the strong sense, and what norms contribute to partnering well.
In chapter seven, I noted the distinction in moral ethics between deontological
views that value a ‘do no harm’ principle, and a virtue-based view that values a ‘do good’
principle. Drawing on Gilbert’s concept of plural subjecthood, we are left questioning the
singular subject in dancing together. Understanding the two terms, singular and plural, as
a continuum provides the basis to qualify interaction. This satisfies the concern in this thesis
to describe the kinds of attitudes and range of movements individuals can exemplify in
dancing together in order to more critically evaluate what is happening.
In chapters seven and eight, I attempted to untangle the complex idea of what it
means to be a plural subject through constructing hypothetical scenarios and thought
experiments. A complicated scenario that is particularly compelling to dissect is when two 
interacting individuals retain their individuality, rather than forming what would be a plural
subject. Within dancing together, there are at least two ways in which agents can behave as
individuals. The first is perhaps quite obvious: individuals can make selfish choices. For
the purpose of getting across the point, consider the following hypothetical scenario: when 
presented with a situation in which a couple may get injured if they continue dancing, a
selfish partner will abandon the partnership and move away from the situation. The second 
way in which an agent behaves as an individual is less obvious. Taking the same situation,
if the partner is ready to protect his partner above himself, then his selfless action is still
singular – he thinks only of his partner. In both cases, a partner behaves with one individual
aim. We can consider less reductive examples. Consider how a social event may attract
individuals to socialize through dancing. Upon entering the event, a singular partner will
focus on their own aims to socialize, behaving in a way that is either entirely selfish (doing
the majority of talking without waiting for a partner’s response), or entirely selfless
(listening to a partner without offering anything of their own). These reductive examples
do not show the depth or breadth of mentalities in partnering, but simply serve to illustrate
how a partner can behave within a physical interaction. This returns to the predicate
problem of what it is that dancers are willing and able to do, and what they understand 
about the joint commitment of dancing together. Their understanding might prevent
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attunement to feedback and affordances. As I argued in chapter seven and eight, this
requires willingness to be vulnerable.
In chapters five through eight, I have considered a plural mentality. As a plural
subject, each partner behaves in a way that supports themselves and their partner. Plural
agency upholds the relation between partners above and beyond individual aims. In a
situation where the couple may both be injured, a responsible plural agent will reason, in
the moment, about the available choices to protect the partnership (and those within it). As
argued in chapter eight, to be responsible in partnering is to have both the disposition and 
the propensity to act well. I have also argued that people make mistakes. The crux of the
problem is how partners adapt to each other when something unexpected or erroneous
happens; partnering involves an obligation to negotiate movement on account of each other
(chapter four) and this obligation requires communication to maintain and uphold the
commitment (chapter five). By synthesizing the arguments about obligation and
commitment, I can unpack how partnering might be understood as a civic practice.
Limitations
This study has a number of limitations worth mentioning. One is that it may be
perceived as ableist. Willingness and ability have featured prominently as two keys
conditions of establishing and maintaining a partnered interaction. This leads to questions
such as, who is and who is not able to partner and how does the condition of ability exclude
certain populations from partnering? While these questions are certainly valid and critical,
the aim of this study has been to distinguish between dancing together and partnering. My 
conception of dancing together is broader, encompassing various styles and forms.
Partnering, on the other hand, is more specific, such that certain approaches will be
excluded in order to distinguish the act of doing something together for the sake of
togetherness, and doing something together with mutual attunement. There are many
reasons why people might not want to mutually attune. There are dispositional reasons why 
people will be unable to mutually attune. What those specific reasons are and who they
impact has not been included here, since my aim was to argue for how ability itself features
into partnering as a necessary condition. We can take blindness as an example. Those who 
are clinically diagnosed as blind cannot see, but this does not necessarily have bearing on 
their ability to comprehend or deeply interact with others. This is true of partnering as well
– the disposition that prevents individuals from mutually attuning is the disposition that
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is not to align ability with particular bodies. That is, my point about mutual attunement
does not rest on societal expectations of normalcy.
There is also a limitation in this study on two particularly complex notions: one is
performativity and the other is consent. I do not speak explicitly about performativity in
partnering because the notion that partnering is whatever we say it is, is necessarily limited
in a practical way. When two people decide they are partnering, they may have reasons to 
believe that they are. If they are merely dancing together without mutual attunement, then
my study offers tools by which onlookers and partners alike can evaluate their performance
in a way that breaks down whether or not the reasons are plausible. The feeling of
partnering, as written about by phenomenologists and practitioners, is different than the
phenomenon of partnering that is contingent on the satisfaction of certain conditions
(namely mutual attunement).
I see ways in which partnering need not necessarily be performed exclusively by 
two bodies, nor exclusively in Western forms of dance. The thought experiments and 
hypothetical scenarios throughout this thesis have drawn on the work of Margaret Gilbert,
as well as the comparison of the Petit Mort duet. I do not see these necessarily as the only
instances in which partnering is performed or enacted. There are instances of mutual
attunement in forms that are call and response, that do not even involve physical contact
through touch. It is for this reason that my conditions of communication name proximity,
orientation, and point of contact as generic conditions. As I argued in chapter five, the point
of contact could be breath, eye contact, music, or even choreographic structures. As long
as the dancers have the means to mutually attune to each other, then they can satisfy the
conditions of partnering. I think this is applicable in many forms of dance, outside of those
I have mentioned or those that are even well-known or documented. Gilbert’s paradigm
case of walking together clearly frames the argument that individuals can be doing
something together in the strong sense as long as they satisfy the conditions of willingness
in common knowledge (which I argued in chapter four). My extending point is that to dance
together in the strong sense requires mutual attunement. Any form that permits mutual
attunement can be considered partnering. Those forms that involve physical interaction 
without mutual attunement would, according to my theory, be considered dancing together
but not necessarily partnering.
As for consent, who has the power and privilege to consent to mutual attunement is
a significant topic for future studies. In my own practice as a professional dancer, I think
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while fascinating and crucial, interfere with the broader epistemological inquiry into
necessary and sufficient conditions that I sought to establish. That is, the idea of consent
only makes sense given that there are certain commitments that obligate partners to each
other. Before getting to consent, it was necessary to lay out the foundation for those
commitments and obligations. While this study was limited to laying out an 
epistemological framework for establishing, maintaining, and evaluating partnering, I look
forward to taking up the critical questions of ableism, performativity, and consent in my
future work.
Partnering as Civic Practice
By attending to subtle shifts in proximity, orientation, and point(s) of contact,
partners prime each other to make movement matter. In chapter eight, I argued that
responsible dancers reason about the quality of the interaction by launching ongoing
inquiry. This includes whether a partner is going through the motions of partnering as a
code dictated by an aesthetic convention versus intentionally and deliberately
communicating through proximity, orientation, and point(s) of contact. Sometimes this is
apparent immediately, as dancers lack the differentiation to understand how their
proximity, orientation, and point(s) of contact influence their partner. Other times, partners
may move together for a long time without ever realizing that they are merely upholding
the conventions of a practice, rather than negotiating movement on account of each other.
Throughout this thesis, I have demonstrated the value of joint commitment,
communication, dependence, and moral epistemic agency. I have also argued that the
aesthetic and moral dimensions are already situated within the act of moving together. In 
chapter four, I argued about the shared goals partners commit to in dancing together. By
seeking something like beauty in the joint act, partners are manifesting their own aesthetic 
values. Whether this is creating particular shapes or avoiding effort, the aesthetic values of
partnering are manifold. Within the physical act, however, there are ways to inflict harm,
intentionally or not, such that the moral dimensions are ever-present. There are more
complex issues at play when we consider the aesthetic pursuit of harm, which opens up a
culturally-saturated slew of questions that are beyond the scope of this thesis.
I have argued that to partner well means understanding actions toward each other
as part of an ongoing inquiry, not as affirmation of absolute truth. In other words,
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significant responsibility in partnering. It means entering into a joint commitment to be
responsible for oneself and for others. For dancing together in the strong sense, the
predicates that are instantiated and exemplified by the partnership are not available to the
individuals alone. It is important to note that dancing together and partnering are different,
not necessarily better or worse. Because of the willingness and ability to establish 
dependence, and willingness and ability to be receptive, those who seek to establish a joint
commitment to partner can make certain things manifest that were not available to the
other. But the same is true of the opposite, by doing something together they sacrifice
something that could be manifest of doing it apart. My framework supports the claim that
dancing together in the strong sense extends the expressive powers of the partnership in
that those partnering can do things that those merely dancing together cannot. The success
of a physical interaction will be based on one’s willingness and ability to attune to the
feedback from signals that exemplify features of attunement.
Given that partnering involves multiple people negotiating movement together on
account of each other, previous histories, expectations, assumptions, and motivations
inherently infuse the practice. The fact that partnering can be evaluated as a range from
good to bad, successful to unsuccessful, and so on, makes the joint act subject to questions
about which values are good, worthwhile, or appropriate. The pursuit of partnering as an 
ideology, in which there is some margin of success to respond appropriately in moving
with others, makes the joint act value-laden. The multiplicity of perspectives in partnering,
even if the scenario is simply a dyad, makes evaluating value problematic. The larger
problem is that genres of partnering have their own ideologies, so what works for tango
might not work for contact improvisation on an aesthetic scale. But the values of partnering
with respect to mutual attunement, communication, and agency may be beyond the
aesthetic.
As a civic practice, negotiating movement on account of each other may lead to
salience such that practitioners are more aware and attuned to elements of physical
interaction in a broad sense. By civic practice, I mean that partners orient to each other as
responsible, moral agents. By dancing together, individuals can embody the traits of being
good citizens. I have shown how one way to understand the standards of communication
and attunement is to consider how signals function between partners in conveying more
information than relative position, proximity, and point(s) of contact in chapter five.
Signals between partners function as symbols that exemplify attitudes such as trust, respect,
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metaphor or representation for relationship, the act itself requires relating. As such,
upholding a joint physical commitment to be vulnerable, to be respectful, to be caring, to
be responsible, and so on, can be understood as a practice of negotiating physical
interaction that might build skillsets related to empathy, generosity, and other virtues.
In chapter eight, I argued that responsible partners exercise moral epistemic agency 
to adhere to a joint commitment to communicate with care, treating their partners as agents
who are capable of acting and responding from their own individual dispositions and 
complex histories. I asked, how do dancers shift from using the words to actually
exemplifying the concepts? This is partially an empirical problem, which would require
testing out what is happening when dancers say one thing but do something else. Given the
necessary conditions of joint commitment and communication, as well as the norms of
attunement, reasoning, and agency, it would follow that these are the concepts that need to
be understood, and furthermore exemplified in movement.
My framework offers the basis for developing strategies for ethically interacting
with a partner. These strategies should focus on making certain aspects of movement
salient, such that physical interaction becomes a practice of attuning, setting intentions, and
developing precision and control to deliberately realize intentions in action. Maintaining
mutual gaze, sustained physical contact, isolating and synchronizing particular body parts
are all examples of features that require strategies and tools to be efficient and ethical. The
strength and dexterity necessary to execute particular elements also features into partners’
ability to negotiate their movement on account of each other with ease and precision. How
well partners maneuver each other, whether passages are choreographed or improvised,
reveals insight about excellence in relation. The problem with virtuosity is that dance
genres have different value systems, and different observers may have different histories
which limit the classes of comparison or the ideology of what’s possible in physical
interaction. As such, virtuosity may be something that needs to be negotiated as part of the
joint commitment established between partners when they agree to dance together.
The arguments I have developed have formed in part through reflecting on my own
experience working with ballroom dancers, I have often heard the rhetoric that ballroom
dancing leads to better communication skills. But I have also seen firsthand how ballroom
dancers preparing for competition focus so much on winning that they forgo
communication and negotiation in order to physically excel. I have seen a similar sort of
situation at contact improvisation jams, where practitioners are so focused on the aesthetic
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These examples serve to demonstrate the possibility of singular agents despite the rules or
conventions of a practice. To address this kind of attitude, I have examined how partners
need to make the goals of their commitments explicit and look out for patterns that signal
lack of attunement. If the commitment is merely to do something together, in which dance
is happenstance, then there is not an obvious problem since there is no commitment to
negotiate movement on account of each other. But dancing together may have an implicit
agreement that leaves some people feeling dissatisfied or misunderstood. I have shown that
the motives for doing anything physical together are problematic when motives diverge
such that a shared goal is impossible to uphold.
Dancing together may present a tension between an individual motivation and a
collective one, and it is sometimes (if not always) impossible to glean the motives of others
without explicitly asking. The tension between the individual motives and the collective
ones further opens the space for considering the normative dimensions of physical
interactions as they correlate to civic practice (e.g. how people relate to each other as
citizens of the world). The situation in which one may be at fault for having individual
motives that misalign with the collective ones are the places in which implicit social
contracts are prevalent.
Throughout chapters five, six, seven, and eight, I demonstrated that the competence
to partner well requires technical understanding. Competencies such as fine-grained
attunement and subtle communication skills may also point to how partnering can have
utility beyond itself. This is a rhetoric that appears in claims such as dancing together leads
to improved memory, happiness, better communication skills, and so on. The implication
of utility means orienting to transfer skills, beyond the dancing itself. But this form of moral
epistemic agency need not transfer over outside of dance, or otherwise all great dancers
would be great people (which we know is not the case). While some of these claims may
be purely rhetorical to attract newcomers to a form, what would need to be true in order for
partnering to be considered a civic practice? One obvious cross-over may be the way in
which partners practice communicating with one another. The kind of communication
would have to be basic and general enough that it would be applicable in circumstances
outside of dance. Although the specifics of this thesis involve dance, physical interaction 
is not peculiar to dance—there are all sorts of interactions from which individuals want to
be attuned, to be calibrated rather than just coordinated.
Virtues like responsibility, empathy, and trustworthiness are success terms,
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a dancer need in order to claim empathy in partnering? The dancer needs to understand 
how things look from a partner’s point of view. This is different than thinking about what
things look from a partner’s point of view. A dancer needs to understand how the transfer
of force influences a partner’s movement, whether it inhibits or facilitates movement and
to what degree. The dancer needs to understand how the quality of movement, including
weight (graviception) and time, influences a partner’s movement as well as their own
movement. In other words, a dancer cannot empathize if s/he is clueless. Certain aspects of
the interaction need to be available and salient to a partner in order to successfully 
understand what things look from another’s point of view. Reflective equilibrium emerges
from practice since reflection is possible only after the fact.
Virtuosity will play out differently in different genres of dance, but I argue that the
principles of communication, mutual attunement, and moral epistemic agency are common
to partnering as long as partners aim to cooperate. If the aim is to enact particular
choreographies or ideologies, then aspects of mutual attunement and agency may fall away
because the satisfaction of ideology trumps communication. Thus, we distinguish between 
dancing together and partnering. The distinction accounts for how partners discern the
quality of dependence and attunement they experience. In other words, the responsiveness
in negotiating movement on account of each other.
There are many concomitant concepts to consider with regard to negotiating
movement on account of each other, such as strength, dexterity, care, curiosity, and so on.
A large part is selective attention and mutual attunement to feedback and affordance,
specifically on how dancers depend on and relate to each other in the act of moving
together. It involves identifying where plausible complacent beliefs were false. In other
words, what made one think that a certain action was appropriate. There should also be an
identification of how to prevent something from happening again if it was inappropriate. 
In some cases, the obvious thing to think is not right so responsible partners should account
for counter-intuitions. Good partners should provide opportunities for each other to ask 
where they went wrong and how to avoid going wrong again. My framework upholds a
virtue-based model rather than a deontological one, to support moral epistemic agency.
Perhaps individuals do not want these opportunities to uphold a virtue-based
approach. But the solipsistic dancer who does not care about attunement will likely not get
the same opportunities as the one who does; a difference which will be visible in the way 
they execute movement. Individuals may have competing values about what movement is
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pulls against mutuality. Sometimes things are not competitive, but people still behave in a
competitive way as a result of practice. What individuals can do is create contexts that
manifest why caring, responsibility, commitment, communication, and mutual attunement
matters. After all, partners’ individual motives and teleological concerns will influence how
they perceive, interpret, and articulate their actions, which begs the question of what people
are committing to. This returns us back to the three-part predicate problem. Since dancing 
together necessarily involves joint action, the skill to coordinate and calibrate by choice
can be seen as a basic tenant. The quality of movement and the form and techniques used
to move together will likely vary from practice to practice, within and across forms
depending on context, history, and personal idiosyncrasies and dispositions. The fact that
there are basic principles of establishing joint physical commitments supports my claim of
a generic theory, which can now be spelled out in greater depth.
Value, The Discourse of Partnering, and Future Research
I have shown that good partners understand that dancing together is a serious matter.
As a discourse in and of itself, partnering can be understood as having an ideal form related
to how dancers communicate, mutually attune, and exercise agency in their physical
interaction. This is evident when dancers strive for ever-better levels of communication,
dependence, and agency in the act of moving together. My argument has concluded that
dancing together in the strong sense is contingent on generic, discursive conditions to
negotiating movement that is applicable across forms. However, dancing together is
frequently complex because of the elements that require attention such as coordinated steps
or movements, the environment of the interaction, music (if applicable), aesthetic
conventions, underlying motives, and so on.
I have been interested in examining what partners are doing when dancing together,
beyond interacting with other aspects such as social conventions or pre-determined
choreography. In some cases, if partners dance together solipsistically, then they are
guaranteed that they will dance together because the choreography serves as a template for
joint action. By following the template, partners need not explicitly worry about the signals
or the design of the choreography. But templates often fail to account for the unexpected.
Therefore, partners need to be in inquiry to negotiate change, whether it is unexpected or
not. I propose that practitioners that care about developing their own responsible partnering 
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(e.g. aesthetic, ethical, epistemic) tethers and how those tethers dispose them to valuing
certain physical choices and possibilities over others. With the epistemological foundation
set, I propose that partnering is a discourse that values attunement, responsibility,
communication, and intentions being realized deliberately. By discourse, I mean to suggest
that by coming together through partnering, individuals form and inform a particular set of
values based on negotiating movement on account of each other.
I have shown that one value that partners can uphold is the aesthetic convention
within a particular form (chapters four, five, and six). Consider for example the conventions
of tango in tandem with those of contact improvisation. One values fixed points of contact
(the standard tango “embrace” or “frame”), while the other places value on rolling points
of contact. Neither is inherently right or wrong and partners may experiment with both 
fixed and rolling points of contact, which does not bear significant influence on the
aesthetic conventions of the forms themselves (unless enough people decide to form some
new conventions such that there is some kind of paradigmatic shift).
When viewed as discursive, partnering thus takes on a broader value system.
Though movement need not be formally learned, it needs to be practiced together with
others. Individuals without any previous specialized training can ostensibly negotiate their
joint movement and attune their movement to others in quite nuanced ways, but it will only 
be through doing that this comes to be. Through practice, partners can continue to develop
deeper conceptual understanding. As long as dancers are agentic, with some base level of
attunement, they will satisfy the conditions of partnering such that negotiating movement
together on account of each other will be both possible and feasible. This accounts for the
ways in which a couple performing a jive can be similar to a couple practicing contact
improvisation, or how tango vocabulary is congruent with that of classical pas de deux. 
While the movements themselves may be different, as well as the cultural meanings and 
identities of the practices, my focus has been explicitly on the quality of the interaction.
That is, how partners execute the movements in relation to and on account of each other.
Partnering can be evaluated as a range from good to bad, successful to unsuccessful,
and so on. This makes the joint act subject to questions about which values are good,
worthwhile, or appropriate. The multiplicity of perspectives in partnering (whether it is
simply a dyad or more than two individuals), makes evaluating value problematic. One
question I have asked is whether there is a reason we ought to value partnering. The
absolutist would say yes, there exist independent reasons for people to value partnering.
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physical interaction”. This could exclude other forms of value, such as beauty, grace,
dexterity, exercising cultural identities, and so on. The relativist would say that any reason 
to value partnering is a valid reason to partner. This is problematic when we consider the
ways in which partners may injure each other because of unrefined awareness or a lack of
care. My research into this complex area has led to me adopting a pluralist position, in 
which I argue that there are right and wrong reasons to value partnering, especially when
we take into account the nature of a joint agreement between partners. If the willingness is
predicated on basic engagement for one partner and on vulnerability for the other, partners
will run into problems. These problems need not necessarily make partnering wrong, but
they may result in miscommunication. If the miscommunication results in injury, then
partnering may be wrong within a moral/ethical domain. Since I have argued that partnering
is ultimately a joint, communicative act, then the reasons to value partnering are entangled 
with communication. To practice partnering is thus to practice communicating.
The ultimate point to consider is that participating in physical interaction may have
no other value than itself. This is an intrinsic view of partnering. From this intrinsic view,
one can begin to explore the limitations and detriments to partnering within any given 
context. If partnering simply has value in and of itself, one can ask what movements or
attitudes lessen the value in practice. The simple, reductive response is anything that
inhibits either the willingness to engage in the joint act or the available common knowledge
between all the partners involved.
By using the terms individual and plural subject, I have shown that it is possible to
qualify partnering interactions through the lens of analytical approaches. In setting up this
frame, I show that it is possible for future research to conduct empirical research of
partnering, to gauge and measure particular shifts from novice to expert, or how
communication skills differ between genres of partnering. From the framework that I have
developed, researchers can be prompted to further ask how trust is developed between
individuals in practice and what might be the emergent aesthetic properties of an ethical
partnership. That is, questions might include; how does an ethical practice inform
biomechanics that can then be interpreted (observed and evaluated) visually, as well as
experienced physically (proprioceptively, kinesthetically, graviceptively)?
In this thesis, I have constructed a unique in-depth analysis of partnering as a
framework intended to make not only a contribution to practice, but also to philosophy 
itself, by expanding on the notion of establishing and maintaining joint commitments in the




       
            
         
         
           
               
           
             
          
            
            
































interaction in dance, which I propose is dependent on an acute understanding of
communication and ethics. This, in turn, tells us more about those values in the context of
human interaction beyond dance. By arguing that partnering is a practice of listening and
responding, I propose that individuals can build deliberate communication skills that are
ethically grounded. This is pertinent to sensing the changes that occur on a daily basis, as
well as those that occur more rarely. We all have a particular way of moving when we are
excited, angry, upset, and so on, and being able to differentiate that in a family member,
partner, colleague, or others around us can help raise questions about what is different and
how to support each other. I have been examining the conditions of physical interaction
itself, regardless of the form, social conventions, and so on. This thesis can make dancers
better equipped to reason about their physical interaction in and beyond dance. It is up to
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Appendix 1: Partnering as Rhetoric
Vidrin, I., (2018). “Partnering as Rhetoric”. In A World of Muscle, Bone & Organs:
Research and scholarship in dance. Ed. Ellis, S., Blades, H., & Waelde, C. Coventry, UK.
Abstract
Bodily rhetoric is a burgeoning field, with scholars investing attention to the ways in which 
non-verbal communication mediates change between individuals and groups in complex 
scenarios, including political settings. Scenarios in which individuals move together— 
whether in completely extemporaneous situations or in existing forms such as Contact
Improvisation, Argentinian Tango, or Classical Pas de Deux—pose a similarly complex
communicative problem. Drawing on the work of Lloyd Bitzer, I demonstrate how
rhetorical theory provides methodological insight by which we can better understand the
dynamic practice that is always already happening in situations where individuals move
together.
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Introduction
When considering the act of dance partnering, whether a dyad, trio, or large group dynamic,
it is reasonable to wonder about the character of non-verbal interactions between moving bodies.
That is, the movement idiosyncrasies of each individual, as well as the quality with which they 
engage each other in and through movement. For example, people can move together in a way that
is dialogic – a (non-verbal) coordinated effort between two or more individuals – as well as a sort
of “polyphonic” monologue, wherein multiple bodies interact as one while retaining their own
distinct movement quality. Polyphony here is an extension of the musical concept; though bodies
are not strictly speaking voices, it may be a useful term to describe how nuanced cues, with or
without physical contact, provide the space to retain individuality while moving together. In both
scenarios, individuals rely on a process of listening and responding to impulses and cues, be they 
physical or perhaps even energetic. Whether through coordination, harmonization, synchronization,
or other communicative efforts, this essay investigates the potential for cues and impulses to
function as persuasive elements that impact communication between partners. While it is beyond
the scope of this paper to parse the nature of dance partnering itself, I move to present partnering 
as a rhetorical act that relies on a certain type of non-verbal persuasion between two or more
individuals moving together physically and/or energetically.
By invoking the work of prominent scholars of rhetoric, namely Lloyd Bitzer and 
George Kennedy, I will attempt to construct a theoretical understanding of bodily (physical and 
energetic) discourse. To set up this argument, however, requires understanding how a rhetorical
framework offers a relevant methodology to parse the ways in which partnering explicitly 
necessitates critical (bodily) discourse. The framework is one in which rhetoric is understood 
in basic Aristotelian terms as the “available means of persuasion”.i Subsumed within this
definition is an attention to quality – not only how a particular articulation (be it verbal,
physical, or energetic) functions persuasively, but also the potential to discern properties such 
as tone, character, attitude, and so on. Positioning scholars such as George Kennedy and Lloyd 
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which I take to be a prominent feature of dance partnering. This structure is hermeneutic, as its
content models how partners can potentially interpret each other and how each partner will (or
will not) reciprocate. That dance can be communicative in a performative way, to an audience,
is an argument articulated by leading scholars including Maxine Sheets-Johnstone,ii Susan 
Leigh Foster,iii and Graham McFee,iv as well as countless movement and dance practitioners.
The arguments presented in this paper, however, explore how dance partnering facilitates (or
inhibits) the transfer of information between the very bodies that move together, extending the
traditional concept of audience to a more intimate setting of those within the practice. I ask 
how partners act as performer and audience for each other, in real-time, and how discrete
movements, continuous as they are in practice, lend themselves to the rigorous study of non-
verbal (physical) dialogue. To probe the conditions by which partners interpret cues and 
impulses from each other, I ground specifically into the work of rhetoric scholar Lloyd Bitzer,
who demonstrated the significance of situations from which rhetorical discourse emerges.
It is important to note here that examining dance through a rhetorical framework is not a
new approach. Cases are visible as far back as Plato in the ethical concerns of Greek choraia
(a term designated for both music and dance),v and more recently endeavored by the work of
rhetoric scholar and choreographer, Cynthia Roses-Thema. Following her claim that dance
performances function as rhetorical situations,vi this essay utilizes a similar rhetorical
framework to understand the conditions by which partners interpret and understand each other.
Conversely, examining rhetoric through the lens of movement is also not a new approach.
Speaking of movement and mobility more generally, rhetorical theorist Helmut Pflugfelder
claims:
Rhetoric is very well suited to addressing mobility concerns in part because
movement in the world – as enacted by the coordination of people and technologies
– is argument. That is, when people move, they take part in and comprise rhetoric.
Rhetoric is not limited to the language arts, but is epistemic. Rhetoric occurs
whenever we create meaning, link meanings together to form systems, or engage
in a productive art. This rhetoric is never just the intervention of people into 
situations, nor the application of meaning to cold, dispassionate objects, but a
process that occurs whenever people move in the world.vii 
What does it mean in this context for rhetoric to be epistemic? Robert L. Scott, a theorist who
famously championed the rhetoric-as-epistemic doctrine, noted that, “man must consider truth not
as something fixed and final but as something to be created moment by moment in the
circumstances in which he finds himself and with which he must cope”.viii The epistemic in this
case refers not to static, a priori knowledge, but perhaps closer to understanding that is gleaned in
the moment. Scott posits, “if one can be certain, then one needs no commands or urgings (either
from oneself or from others)”.ix Acting in the face of uncertainty is a particularly cogent point for
interacting non-verbally. For one, we can never truly know if a partner will be ready to respond, so
we must attend to physical and energetic cues and impulses that communicate our partner’s state of
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attending to relevant stimuli, particularly if something unexpected happens. Fixed knowledge, or
assuming that because something worked a particular way before it must always work this way,
detracts from the process of attending to relevant stimuli. Thus, this is a study on the ways partners
discern cues and impulses from each other; basically understood as listening and responding, or
alternatively still, action/reaction. Cultural anthropologist Ray Birdwhistell developed a vocabulary 
for such cues that allow individuals to communicate and respond to one another, which he called 
“paralinguistics”.x These bodily cues include touch (haptics), eye contact (oculesics), personal
space (proxemics), culturally meaningfulxi gestures (kinesics; such as a wave or a thumbs up),
culturally appropriate response timing (chronemics), and so on. This is particularly relevant for
partnering, as these are the cues that one senses (visually and/or kinesthetically) and subsequently
interprets when moving with other(s). Thus I ask, how are partners convinced by subtle movements,
such as a lingering or avoidant gaze, and how does a rhetorical framework provide a model by
which to make these tropes salient to practitioners, as well as observers?
Taking a step beyond paralinguistics, bodily movement itself need not have a narrative
or one-to-one linguistic mapping to be considered rhetorical. As rhetoric scholar Jennifer
LeMesurier suggests, the body can be understood as a “functional, inventional actor and bearer
of ideological weight, capable of producing rhetorical influence […] our range of rhetorical
actions is guided by our embodied memories just as much as our training in argument or
analysis”.xii It is here that we can begin to explore the nature of bodily discourse.
Rhetoric and Energy
Expanding on the Aristotelian definition of rhetoric, George Kennedy, known for his expert
translations of Aristotle’s work, offers the following view:
Rhetoric in the most general sense may perhaps be identified with the energy 
inherent in communication: the emotional energy that impels the speaker to speak,
the physical energy expended in the utterance, the energy level coded in the
message, and the energy experienced by the recipient in decoding the message. In
theory, one might even seek to identify some quantitative unit of rhetorical energy 
- call it the “rheme” - analogous to an erg or volt, by which rhetorical energy could 
be measured.xiii 
Though Kennedy is being somewhat provocative, perhaps even facetious with his suggestion
of the “rheme”, we are still left with an open question of interpretation. How can the emotional and
physical energies be interpreted and experienced, particularly non-verbally, when moving together?
Harvard philosopher Catherine Elgin positions her epistemology in conversation with this kind of
emotional understanding, noting “self-knowledge enables us to access the information our emotions
embed”.xiv How does one become aware of one’s own emotional energy in movements such as a
particular gesture, look, or other non-verbal cue? How does such awareness impact the quality of a
response from a partner? That is, the character of physical dialogue between two or more people,
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on? Elgin suggests, “if we can identify our emotions, assess our level of expertise, and recognize
how sensitive we are, we can profit cognitively from their deliverances. Reflective self-awareness
pays epistemic dividends”.xv Though Elgin is situated within the field of epistemology,
identification is a crucial concept to rhetorical studies. Indeed, according to eminent rhetoric scholar
Kenneth Burke, identification provides the space for rhetorical discourse, as one is persuaded by
content in which one can identify with another.xvi Many concepts have been used by different
cultures throughout history to describe such emotional, energetic identifications in relation to body
and time. Wuwei in ancient Chinese philosophy xvii and duende xviii in flamenco are two prominent
exemplary concepts, wherein an individual somehow transcends oneself (perhaps by channeling a
divine presence) such that action flows seamlessly. Within the tradition of rhetoric, this seamless
flow of time is referred to as kairos, which often translates as “felt” or “experienced” time.
Rhetorical theorist Debra Hawhee holds, “kairos is thus rhetoric’s time, for the quality, duration,
and movement of discursive encounters depend more on the forces at work on and in a particular
moment than their quantifiable length”.xix Viewing partnering as a discursive encounter through the
rhetoric-as-energy lens provides the framework by which we can explore the emergence of rhetoric
that is non-verbally mediated.
To ground the argument, I turn to Lloyd Bitzer, who in his well-known (1968) paper
introduces the reader to the notion that rhetoric is situational. Bitzer notes the pragmatic nature
of interactions that seek a goal beyond themselves (such as inspiring action or inciting change), 
and names three constituents that together comprise a rhetorical situation: a) an exigency (or
urgency to solve a particular problem), b) an audience that must be able to act as a mediator of
change, and c) constraints that limit decisions and actions.xx What follows is an outline of the
exigencies, audience, and constraints pertinent to partnering.
Exigency in Partnering
Bitzer maintains that the first constituent of a rhetorical situation is the demand of an
exigency. He notes, “any exigence is an imperfection marked by urgency; it is a defect, an obstacle,
something waiting to be done, a thing which is other than it should be”.xxi So what, then, is the
exigence in partnering? In dance, the exigence is often a product of the problems a given form
makes for itself, such as particular shapes, postures, or relationship to rhythm and music. Bitzer is
careful to note that “an exigence is not rhetorical when its modification requires merely one’s own
action or the application of a tool, but neither requires nor invites the assistance of discourse”.xxii 
The obstacle a partnering situation presents, at the very base, is to successfully interpret the quality 
of shifting and sharing weight of others. One cannot simply rely on one’s own action to move with
other(s) because one must acts toward and react to other(s). The reasons are myriad, from satisfying




               
 
              
             
          
             
         
              
             
            
            
           
               
           
            
          
    
         
       
         
         
         
            
         
         
          
     
          
        
            
       
           
             
            
               
              
            
       
196
of bodies moving together, the act of partnering itself seems to invite the assistance of bodily
discourse.
Before we can entertain the meaning of a particular movement, we must first be aware
that each movement, no matter how small, can be significant in the process of communicating 
with others. These minute bodily movements form the discourse that is the primary 
communicative medium of partnering. The appropriateness of each action, be it an assertion,
response, proposition, and so on, is an especially relevant concept to Bitzer, who notes, “the
situation dictates the sort of observations to be made; it dictates the significant physical and 
verbal responses; and, we must admit, it constrains the words which are uttered in the same
sense that it constrains the physical acts”.xxiii Any movement form, such as Argentinian Tango, 
classical ballet, Kathak, or Contact Improvisation, will have its own set of conventions, which 
dictate how bodies can respond to each other. Bitzer states, “although rhetorical situation 
invites response, it obviously does not invite just any response”.xxiv In other words, “to respond
appropriately to a situation” means that one “meets the requirements established by the
situation”.xxv Each situation is fairly unique, so it is difficult, if at all possible, to be able to 
prescribe appropriate responses divorced of context. The ability to notice how dancers are
compelled to respond based on particular qualities, both kinesthetically and visually, is
precisely what makes partnering a matter of rhetorical concern. With respect to physical
contact, for example, rhetoric scholar Shannon Walters suggests,
Rhetorical touch takes place when bodies come in contact; the meanings produced 
by this contact are rhetorical in that they convey messages, craft character, and
create emotion in a way that fosters a potential for identification and connection 
among toucher and touched. In short, touch is rhetorical because it is epistemic,
creating knowledge, communication, and understanding about the widest ranges of
embodiment and ways of being in the world. Understanding touch as rhetorical
makes rhetoric accessible to a wider range of bodies and minds, increasing the
means of persuasion and possibilities of rhetoric.xxvi 
Again we are directed to the notion of rhetoric as epistemic, this time in an explicitly bodily 
sense. Walters suggests above the relationship between knowledge, communication, and
understanding. Positioning this within the epistemology of Elgin, the epistemic is a “cognitive
achievement”xxvii concerned primarily with understanding, rather than the limits of traditional
epistemology (namely non-fortuitous justified, true belief). Elgin’s work does not, however,
hierarchize the cognitive over the bodily, and so her work sets a solid framework for understanding
from and within embodied practice. Her investigation of epistemic yield within the arts more
broadly is especially valuable given her claim that “dance enriches our lives at least in part because
it enables us to understand things differently than we did before”.xxviii While this may seem like a
banal statement, I believe understanding the nature of dance partnering may reveal insight about
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Within the demands of partnering, the physical dialogue that takes place necessitates
agreeing on the appropriate conventions for negotiating movement. That is, if we are moving 
together within the context of a milonga, we will ostensibly be negotiating weight in a way that is
significantly different than if we are moving together in the context of a Contact Improvisation jam.
The same can be said if individuals are negotiating weight in a ritual form versus combat. Indeed 
this can be further differentiated if individuals are moving together in the context of capoeria versus
aikido.
Agreeing on the appropriate conventions by which partners negotiate movement raises a
concern of whether partnering is a form of physical argumentation, albeit informal. In a
previous section I appealed to Pflugfelder, who stated “movement in the world is argument”.xxix 
Argumentation here is not in reference to the verbal exchanges that occur between partners,
although those too are valuable. Rather argumentation here is in reference to the means by 
which partners convince each other that a given physical action necessitates a particular
physical response. As rhetorical theorist J. Anthony Blair states, “arguments aim to move us
by appealing to considerations that we grant and then by showing that the point of view at issue
follows from those concessions […] the process is impossible if the appeal is vague or
ambiguous. Thus vagueness or ambiguity makes argument impossible”.xxx Blair suggests that
this is true of standard verbal and written arguments, as well as visual ones. If partnering 
involves finding agreement of how weight is shifted and shared, what are the tools with which 
dancers make their arguments? Of particular significance is the point of agreement the
negotiation presupposes, which we can consider to be the space where an exigency emerges.
Though partnering may not seem to be an argument in the formal sense, decisions are being 
made in real-time by each party based on interpreting the physical actions they direct at one
another. In moving, weight is always already being negotiated, individually and in concert with 
others, regardless of whether the movement is extemporaneously generated or choreographed.
For ease of communication, there must be agreement between each agent about which cues are
meaningful and what constitutes an appropriate response. This agreement may be unspoken,
simply by following the conventions of a particular movement form. Rhetoric scholars Chaim
Perlman and Louise Olbrechts-Tyteca, who present a case for non-formal argumentation, state,
“if we presuppose the coherence of reality and of our truths taken as a whole, there cannot be
any conflict between facts and truths on which we would be called to make a decision”.xxxi That
is, in partnering, to be able to communicate physically and achieve a state of connection,
dancers cannot simply be moving randomly, even if it is improvised. While there may be no 
inherent truth-value in our physical arguments, we ostensibly interact with our partners in a
way that they understand us to be trustworthy. Thus, it seems there are certain consequences at
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assuming we want to level with our partner(s). Duping them explicitly, while beyond the scope
of this paper, is still a provocative thought when considering how our smallest actions influence
and are interpreted by our physical interlocutors. To make sense of the non-formal
argumentation elicited in a partnering situation, of the point of agreement in the process of
negotiating weight, let us focus on how an action executed by one partner is sensed and 
perceived by the other.
Audience in Partnering Situations
Bitzer claims “the second constituent [of a rhetorical situation] is the *audience“* xxxii 
(emphasis in the original). He states,”since rhetorical discourse produces change by influencing the
decision and action of persons who function as mediators of change, it follows that rhetoric always
requires an audience – even in those situations when a person engages himself or ideal mind as
audience“.xxxiii Bitzer, like many before him, points to the performativity of rhetoric, yet is clear
that one may engage oneself as both audience and performer. It is beyond the scope of this paper
to consider audience-performer relationship in a more traditional understanding, yet if we consider
a partnering scenario with two individuals, it is evident that each influences the other. It may still
be unclear how each individual mediates change. In cases where partnering is sequenced
choreography or improvised lead/follow, one partner relies on the other to complete actions based 
on certain predetermined cues (such as a change of direction or timing). In this way, though
movements may be quite fast, one is acting as audience for the performer. It is interesting to note
that it is perfectly possible that both individuals are moving at the same time. In such cases, as well
as ones where there is no choreography, the spectating partner(s) must be very sensitive to potential
cues, choosing when and how to respond. Bitzer clearly states that an audience must be able to act
as a mediator of change.xxxiv Thus, as one partner listens and is influenced by the performer, so the
spectating partner(s) elicit(s) change by reacting. In this way, partners are always switching fluidly
between spectator and performer for each other, mediating change through subtle cues that can be
physical, visual, or perhaps even energetic. It is important to note that the absence of movement,
the choice of stillness, can be a valid response, perhaps sometimes even more than choosing to
respond by moving.
Bitzer notes, “in any rhetorical situation there will be at least one controlling exigence
which functions as the organizing principle; it specifies the audience to be addressed and the
change to be effected”.xxxv For a simple example, consider an individual who suddenly moves
into close proximity of another. There is no limit to possible responses for the second 
individual, but for the purpose of this example, let us say the sudden proximity is unwanted.
What cues may function rhetorically to communicate discomfort? There may be a tightening 






            
         
         
            
             
              
           
            
             
          
              
        
       
             
             
          
            
           
             
         
            
           
           
             
             
            
               
                   
           
                 
         
            
              
           
           
199
moving past and avoids the interaction completely. These cues may easily be overlooked,
creating a new problem (exigency) that needs to be addressed.
A more complex example may involve the quality of response time between each 
partner; or, following Birdwhistell, the chronemics of an interaction. At first glance, this may 
seem only relevant to forms where timing plays a principal role, such as ballet and ballroom.
Timing in a practice such as Contact Improvisation is no less important however, given that
concepts such as “pelvic tracking” are also time-dependent, despite the form having quite a
capacious understanding of what signifies an “appropriate” response. A response may, for
example, be too quick; rather than focus on responding by attending to relevant stimuli, and 
thus connecting to the impulse, one responds by executing an action based on a preconceived 
notion. If there is a particular aesthetic in mind (i.e. a particular line, pattern, movement figure,
or even quality of effort), both the performing partnering and the spectating partner will be
bound to movement that satisfies the aesthetic ideal.
This is perhaps the most difficult view to articulate, because there are multiple levels
of complexity. For one, there is the case in which a particular aesthetic quality is perceived by 
an outside party. The outside perception may be a misinterpretation of what is being 
communicated between the performers because one may be not be privy to what is happening 
between moving partners. For example, gestural choreography may seem to indicate particular
cultural tropes that are not significant to the performers themselves, such as when one dancer
extends a hand to another seemingly in invitation but is really only extending the arm as part
of the architecture of the choreography. Those trained in non-western forms (i.e. Balinese
dance) are quite familiar with culturally meaningful gestures, which may be easily misread or
misunderstood by those who are inexperienced. On the other hand, a partner is always sensing 
and perceiving the cue kinesthetically, and so is also technically acting first as a spectator,
before continuing on to perform a response as an actor. It is interesting to note that a partner
may misperceive and/or give ambiguous cues based on poor conceptual understanding of the
conventions of a particular form. A prime example is the cues in social dancing forms. To
signal an underarm turn, a leader is taught to raise the arm of the partner, under which s/he can
then perform the turn. Even with extensive training in other forms of dance, the signal to turn 
from the lifting of an arm may be a convention particular to the social form. Thus, without
explicit previous experience in the social form, arriving at conceptual understanding of an 
underarm turn is unlikely (though of course, not impossible). The case is interesting to consider
both for an individual who newly arrives to the social form as a leader or as a follower. The
novice leader may raise the arm of an experienced follower for aesthetic effect, and so 
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an inexperienced follower to no avail, given that the lack of experience prevents the novice
from discerning the lifted arm as a relevant cue.
In relation to the misperception of cues, performance theorist Erving Goffman 
introduces an asymmetry within communication, noting how one is usually aware “only of one
stream of [one’s] communication” while an observer is aware of that stream “and one
other”.xxxvi Goffman points here to the way in which an interlocutor (observer/audience)
experiences the “expressive behavior” of a performer in a given interaction. As dancers, we are
apt to control our movement far more than is conventional in everyday life, yet Goffman’s
claim is still relevant. The claim he makes is both epistemic and aesthetic in that the “other” in
the conversation – whether an interlocutor or merely an onlooker – witnesses, interprets, and
subsequently derives meaning from particular visual cues, including posture and facial features
such as a smile, frown, raised eyebrow, averted glance, and so on. In being preoccupied with 
form (aesthetic expectation), one may no longer be attending to relevant stimuli of the partner,
as well as the possibility of accidentally expressing ambiguous, albeit subtle, cues (such as the
case in the social form). Before arriving to the semantic construal of cues and impulses, it is
clear that the aesthetic expectations of partnering practices may interfere with ethical
dimensions such as care, responsibility, and trust. The main rhetorical concern that emerges
from the tension between aesthetic and epistemic concerns in partnering is how partners are
convincing each other that a particular cue is relevant and as such necessitates a particular
response that is fitting (appropriate) to the situation. To get at this problem, we move to the
constraints of partnering.
Constraints in Partnering
Bitzer claims “every rhetorical situation contains a set of constraints made up of persons,
events, objects, and relations which are part of the situation because they have the power to
constrain decision and action needed to modify the exigence”.xxxvii He delineates between two
classes of constraints, ones that are “originated or managed by the rhetor” and “those other
constraints, in the situation, which may be operative”.xxxviii That is, the constraints that are created 
by the rhetoric of the individuals and those that are intrinsic to the situation itself. With respect to 
the operative constraints, a simple and obvious example is physics; there are only so many
movements that are physically possible given forces such as gravity, as well as consequences of
momentum, pressure, inertia, and so on. If one pushes a partner, the individual can respond by
effortfully absorbing or effortlessly surrendering to the force of impact. The space itself is also
intrinsically constraining – perhaps a ceiling is too low to execute a particular lift, or a room is too 
small to complete a full sequence with a supported saut-de-chat.
The constraints that are created make for interesting study with respect to dance
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defy gravity by finding ways to use momentum and inertia. There are the obvious
considerations of measured time (chronos), such as music or predetermined choreographic
sequences, as well as less obvious elements such as internal bodily rhythms (kairos). In
lead/follow scenarios, a follower is constrained by the timing of the leader. In extemporaneous
leading, a follower is further constrained by not knowing when a partner will change direction,
orientation, rhythm, or speed. A leader is subsequently constrained by the time it takes for a
follower to respond. The kairotic element functions as a clear constraint in that the actor must
be attentive to potentiality – when is a particular cue or impulse going to be most effectively 
received by a partner? This is perhaps especially true in ritual movement, as well as
extemporaneous forms such as Contact Improvisation; though it is perhaps more acceptable to 
disrupt sequences in CI than in other forms (by actions such as jumping out of a lift), attending 
to the potential of one’s partner(s) provides opportunities to be intentional about response to 
previous action. Given that many of these practices are saturated with cultural meaning, distinct
forms have their own communicative content and conventions, which serve as constraints. For
example, both Argentinian and ballroom Tango typically do not involve both partners engaging 
in floorwork, though there may be choreographic choices that can involve floorwork (such as
dips, death drops, and other “tricks”). Contact Tango, on the other hand, blends the conventions
of Argentinian Tango and Contact Improvisation to provide dancers with more opportunities
to interact through conventional foot patterns, as well as non-conventional floorwork and lifts.
Irrespective of form, responding to movement is tricky given the myriad possibilities of
articulation. As Elgin suggests, “we are prey to massive information overload. Inputs flood our
sense organs. Infinitely many obvious consequences follow from every belief. To know,
understand, perceive, or discern anything requires overlooking a lot. The question is: what
should be overlooked?”.xxxix Taking a step back, it is evident that knowing which cues are
relevant is something that is manifest in context, which necessitates a certain kind of sensitivity
to movement. This claim, while reductive, serves as a strong argument for the embodied 
understanding derived from engaging in physical practice (in studio or social settings). Indeed,
the first canon of Aristotelian rhetoric is discovery [heurisis], which seems to necessitate
understanding the constraints to appropriately respond to an imminent exigency. Creating a
universal formula that could prescriptively dictate which movement(s) function persuasively is
quite likely impossible, yet questioning the rhetorical nature of cues and impulses within 
practice may serve as a useful tool for increasing the efficiency of communication between
partners. This I leave as a question to be asked physically within a partnering practice.
Conclusion
Understanding partnering as a rhetorical situation provides a framework by which to detect
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understanding between each moving body, whether the situation involves a dyad, trio, or a large
group dynamic. The greater aim of this research is to contribute to the practice and training of dance
partnering as a rigorous mode of communication, stemming from the firm belief that such an 
approach facilitates potentiality, freedom of expression, as well as an ability to exemplify 
connection in and outside of studio practice and performance events. This framework may be useful
for interpreting partnering in a didactic setting, especially to promote specific articulation to satisfy
one’s own aesthetic fancy, be it technically virtuosic or otherwise. It may also, however, promote
self-monitoring that can be inhibitory to expression. Cognitive psychologists Daniel Kahneman and
Amos Tversky suggest a model of decision-making as a Two-System, wherein System One is
quick-thinking and impulsive, and System Two is slow, rational, and self-reflective.xl Training in
partnering may begin as a System Two process, with slow, serial processing of cues and impulses,
and become a System One process once principles become embodied. For some, the transition may
be fast, and for others may take many years that it might not seem worth it to continue. Kahneman
and Tversky suggest common heuristics that act as cognitive biases, the discovery [herusis] of
which harkens back to Aristotelian rhetoric and the necessity of attending to the situation in the
moment. Plato himself suggests that philosophy (i.e. the love of wisdom), begins first with wonder
[thauma] and continues with discovery. The ability to be curious within partnering lends itself well
to philosophical investigation of how best to communicate with the partner in front of you.
Perhaps, however, the Two-System approach is too reductive for a complex process
like partnering. Nevertheless, a significant lesson from cognitive neuroscience is the notion 
that “practice makes permanent” xli – meaning that if our practice is always self-monitoring,
then we become really good at self-monitoring, making it difficult to be “in the moment”. Yet,
by practicing this type of metacognition, we can gain articulation that can be quite freeing. This
is not a paradox – to achieve the freedom of expression that can be technically virtuosic is
largely a question about the way in which we practice attending to relevant stimuli. As Elgin 
notes, “by attending to and reflecting on our emotional responses, the situations that trigger
them, and the orientations they give rise to, and by assessing the opinions they generate, we
have resources for developing more nuanced and more accurate responses”.xlii If we hope to 
achieve a connection that emerges from attending to relevant stimuli and responding in a way 










                                                                                                                                            
   
   
   
   
   
  
   
           
             
            
   
  
   
  
   
  
     
   






    
  
  
   
   
    









xi Meaningful in this context refers to gestures that literally carry meaning, such as a
thumbs up to connote success or a wave to connote hello or goodbye. A gesture
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